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Introduction: What Makes People Creative? 
Creativity as a Social Construct 
Michał Kozłowski and Kuba Szreder 
Creativity appears, at a first glance, to be a very trivial thing, and easily 
understood. Its analysis shows that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, 
abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties. There are 
indeed many good reasons for restating Marx’s famous passage on 
commodity fetishism. Thus, not only does it seem that creativity undergoes 
various forms of commodification, but that it is also one of the fetishes of 
our times. We unavoidably tend to forget that, in a way similar to the 
commodity, creativity is not merely a thing, an action, a feature or a quality, 
but it is, above all, a social relation and, as such, it is shaped historically. We 
propose to reflect upon creativity not as a bond linking creator and creation, 
not as a quality found in one individual, but rather as a relation between a 
creator and other subjects involved in the creative process. The theological 
nuance is here. No doubt the very term ‘creation’ started its world-historical 
career with Christian theology. Creatio ex nihilo provides an unmediated 
example of a sovereign, one-sided, free, voluntary and unique productive 
gesture. Is not this monotheistic figure of ‘the creator’ echoed in parts of our 
contemporary imagination? Do not our present-day creative classes and 
individuals partake in the divine aura of the original creator? Or maybe they 
relate more to the pagan concept of praxis, which Aristotle defined as an 
action undertaken by a free man as virtuous conduct, without any purpose 
other than itself, as opposed to poiesis, an action guided by sheer necessity? 
The concept of praxis as self contained activity – being the goal in itself, not 
driven by mundane obligations – takes us to the ultra-modern Schillerian 
concept of art as an action freed from worldly utility and therefore from 
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necessity. For Schiller, art ‘throws a veil over physical necessity, offending a 
free mind by its coarse nudity, and dissimulating our degrading parentage 
with matter by a delightful illusion of freedom’ (Schiller, 1794: Letter IV). 
The sweet burden of creation, however, is not for all but only for a few. ‘We 
see that remarkable people uniting at once fullness of form and fullness of 
substance, both philosophising and creating, both tender and energetic, 
uniting a youthful fancy to the virility of reason in a glorious humanity’ 
(Schiller, 1974: Letter XXVI). Schiller establishes the connection between 
creative action and the redemption of humankind; he forges this link in the 
privileged zone of artistic autonomy. This very connection explains to a great 
extent the fact that in order to look for a political and social economy of 
creativity, this volume extensively discusses creativity in art. Not for the sake 
of art itself, but rather seeking to exploit it as a polygon where creativity, 
power and freedom are closely intertwined.  
However, it is not only la bohème that is ascribed such a fundamental role in 
creativity. A young Karl Marx didn’t perhaps count on creativity as an 
emancipatory force but, conversely, he thought human creativity was 
something that should itself be emancipated in a revolutionary process.  
Yet the productive life is the life of the species. It is life-engendering life. The 
whole character of a species, its species character, is contained in the character 
of its life-activity; and free, conscious activity is man’s species character. 
(Marx, 1988: 76) 
This creative character of human beings is for now suppressed, suspended or 
rather alienated through capitalistic exploitation. Thus the worker ‘surrenders 
its creative power, like Esau his birthright for a mess of pottage’ and ‘the 
creative power of his labour establishes itself as the power of capital, as an 
alien power confronting him’ (Marx, 1973: 307). So, creativity is to be freed as 
praxis in the ancient sense of the term (as ‘free conscious activity’) while, at 
the same time, it already is an alienating force of the capitalist world as we 
know it. This suppressed though still thriving creativity as real labour power, 
is the hidden secret of alienated labour. But this somewhat dialectical account 
of creativity didn’t save Marx from severe criticism,issued by later generations 
of his eminent followers. 
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Raoul Vaneigem, one of the protagonists of the Internationale 
Situationiste (IS), wrote in an afterword to a new edition of The Communist 
Manifesto: 
‘It is creation, not labour, that is specific to human beings. The transformation 
of life force into labour force represses and inverts this aspiration for self-
enjoyment that demands the combined creation of the world and individual 
destiny. A universe transformed by labour only achieves the modernity of its 
fundamental inhumanity because it implies the transformation of man into 
labourer, his negation as a living and desiring being. By basing emancipation 
on the collective management of the means of production, Marx and Engels 
turned liberty into the flag of universal oppression.’ (Vaneigem, 1996: 76)  
Obviously in this passage Vaneigem refers less to Marx’s early writings 
than to the policies and dogmas of those Marxists (the vast majority) who 
considered productive labour and toil the inevitable destiny of mankind. But 
his arguments are representative of the movement, around 1968, as he 
dissented with the disciplinary system of what we now call ‘capitalistic 
Fordism’. The refusal of the assembly line’s debilitating conditions was at 
least partially driven by the notions of free, non-alienated and creative life. 
Although Vaneigem and his colleagues from the IS never missed a chance to 
scorn the official art scene, they nevertheless promoted the surrealists’ 
uncompromised legacy, one that bravely struggled to merge art and life while 
redeeming the ‘poetry of the everyday’ (Vaneigem, 1982), from the alienated 
regimes of capitalistic dullness. As Boltanski and Chiapello point out such 
‘artistc critique’ of capitalism contrasted tedious bourgeois ways of life with 
‘the freedom of artists, … their refusal of any form of subjection in time and 
space and, in its extreme forms, of any kind of work’ (Boltanski and 
Chiapello, 2005: 38). This type of critique tapped into the mythology of 
artistic avant-gardes that considered artistic creation as a paradigmatic 
example of unalienated labour, of what Bruno Gulli identifies as ‘neither 
productive nor unproductive’ activity (Gulli, 2005: 1). To its apologists and 
propagators, art formed an autonomous exception to capitalistic regimes of 
disciplined labour and instrumental reason. 
But as Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello argue, eventually such ‘artistic 
critique’ and reasonable refusal of objectified existence was co-opted and 
utilized in the ‘new spirit of capitalism’, which evolved in response to the 
upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s. The popular desire to lead an unbridled 
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creative life cushioned the progress into what David Harvey calls a new 
regime of flexible accumulation. Sadly, it soon followed that freedom was not 
awarded to working populations but rather to capital flows that, unrestrained 
from stiff labour arrangements, could roam the globe in search of the highest 
profit rates. 
In this new regime, human creativity became just another resource to be 
harvested by a variety of ‘mechanisms of capture’, to use Christian Marazzi’s 
(2010b) term. The forces of creation, instead of defying capitalistic pursuits 
for profit, are captured as intellectual property, framed as lifestyles and 
consumer preferences and utilized as a means for accumulating capital.  
In the 1990s and 2000s, creativity became cherished as a stimulant of 
productivity, a way to maintain competitive advantages and safeguard the 
fading dominance of the developed West. This explains the incredible 
progress that the ‘creative industries’ have made over the last three decades. A 
long time had already passed since Thedore Adorno and Max Horheimer 
wrote that the ‘culture industry endlessly cheats its consumers from what it 
endlessly promises’ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 2002: 131). With genuine 
contempt, they criticized the culture industry as a mechanism designed to 
manufacture ideological docility, mass deception and false reconciliation. 
Quite contrarily, proponents of the creative industries presented their 
industry as salvation for ‘Cool Britannia’ (a term coined in the late 1990s in 
circles surrounding British New Labour), from the vices of globalization and 
deindustrialization that had been wreaking havoc in the West since the 1980s. 
The discourse of industrialized creativity, promoted by, among many others, 
the British think-tank Comedia and the American consultant guru Richard 
Florida, was unapologetically capitalistic, treating creativity as a resource to be 
tapped for a variety of uses. Creativity acquired an almost supra-natural 
status, being both a magical treatment for social ills and a managerial snake oil 
to keep companies or cities competitive. The notions of ‘creative cities’ and a 
‘creative class’ were founded on the success of what Sharon Zukin had 
already called the Artistic Mode of Production in early 1980s, which ‘by an 
adroit manipulation of urban forms … transfers urban space from the “old” 
world of industry to the “new” world of finance, or from the realm of 
productive economic activity to that of nonproductive economic activity’ 
(Zukin, 1989: 178). The blueprints for culture-led regeneration and creative 
gentrification were replicated in numerous cities around the world, more or 
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less dutifully imitating so called ‘Soho effect’. Countless municipalities, 
reacting to the their financial calamities, strove to attract cohorts of hipsters 
and legions of bourgeois-bohèmes to their otherwise derelict districts in the hopes 
of using their creative revalorisation. Obviously, these creative dreams were 
shattered by the recent financial crisis, which revealed what creative makeup 
attempted to hide: the structural instabilities of contemporary capitalism. 
However, the critical interest in creativity did not lose its momentum, as 
the term turns up in many discourses that are not necessarily related to the art 
scene, holding its enchanted grasp on policymakers and creative practitioners 
alike. Through its complex genealogies, the term ‘creativity’ acquired a bundle 
of meshed and frequently conflicting meanings. Creativity intertwines and 
semantically merges with other terms like artistic creation, innovation, self-
fulfillment, spontaneity, vocational involvement, freedom and flexibility. 
Instead of following foundationalist phantasms to pin down the essence of 
creativity, our publication pursues a different strategy. It features authors who 
are critically concerned with dissecting the semantic opaqueness of creativity, 
focusing their attention on a variety of social, economic and political uses and 
abuses of this notion. Their arguments, uncompromising in their complexity 
and specificity, could be categorized into three general registers, each tackling 
creativity from varied perspectives: 
1. Creativity as discourse and ideology. The two are distinct but closely 
related. Ideology consists of grand narratives about creativity, combining 
axiology, philosophy, historiosophy and eschatology. It saturates the 
contemporary Zeitgeist in particular theories and various forms of cultural 
representation with common, naturalised wisdoms about creativity, 
originality, genius and expression. Discourses about creativity are less 
coherent but more practical; they are concerned with creativity in terms of 
management techniques and schemes of the division of labour, justifications 
concerning the share of profit and working conditions, rationales for public 
services, grounds for setting new social distinctions (creative vs. non-creative) 
and modes of subjectivisation and subjection etc. 
2. Creativity as a productive force. There is a feeling or a belief that, in the 
current phase of capitalism, an enormous amount of creativity is being 
suppressed, wasted or exploited – possibly all three. How, if at all, did the 
‘creative turn’ in capitalism’s evolution transform the power relations in our 
societies? What are the new forms of exploitation and seizure of profit that 
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take into account the diffused creativity and dispersed labour of the ‘social 
factory’? Subsequently, where are the new lines of labour struggle, its new 
frontiers and stakes, located?  
3. Creativity as critique. On the one hand, we asked ourselves whether it is 
still possible to deliver a coherent and binding social critique from the 
position of creativity (as Vaneigem intended). On the other hand, we simply 
wanted to know how and what men and women who think of themselves as 
creative (or are considered creative by others) actually critique. Putting these 
two questions together it seemed could prove particularly relevant and, we 
believe, it has. 
We don’t want, in any way, to assimilate the texts included in this volume 
to this somewhat arbitrary tripartite division. Nonetheless, as the reader will 
see, each of them contributes to enrich at least one of these registers and 
most contribute to all three. We were looking to dissect the social uses of 
creativity and we hope that, thanks to our authors, much light has been cast 
on its shadows and blind spots. For better or worse, we were not able to 
utterly disenchant the appeal that creativity still holds. Moreover, we are 
unsure whether such disenchantment would be the right thing to achieve, 
since the question to what extent capitalism’s abuse of creativity is playing 
with fire remains unanswered. 
  
PART ONE: 
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From Object to Œuvre. The Process of 
Attribution and Valorization of Objects 
Luc Boltanski 
[translated by Jason McGimsey, reviewed by Daniel Malone] 
Capitalism and Aura 
In ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, an essay 
written in 1935, Walter Benjamin announces ‘profound changes are 
impending in the ancient craft of the Beautiful1’ . This shift is caused by the 
‘amazing changes’ created by the technical procedures that allow the 
unlimited reproduction of an œuvre, i.e. primarily photography and cinema 
(Benjamin, 2007: 217). Similarly to the other thinkers of the Frankfurt School 
– like Theodor Adorno or Max Horkheimer – Benjamin associates technical 
reproducibility with the development of a cultural industry and with the 
irruption of modes of production and the relevant circulation of the 
‘capitalistic mode of production’ into the art world. These changes are 
interpreted in terms of ‘decline’. Reproducibility removes the uniqueness – the 
main property of art – from it, the property it depends on for its aura, as a 
unique presence manifested in ‘the here and now’, which Benjamin compares to 
the ‘unique phenomenon of a distance, however close it may be’, like ‘a 
mountain range on the horizon or a branch which casts its shadow over you’ 
(Benjamin, 2007: 223). This aura, originally tied to the ‘cult value’ of an 
œuvre, is displaced to what Benjamin calls its ‘exhibition value’ (ibid.). 
                                                
1 Note from the editors: Benjamin here cites Paul Valéry. 
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Considered as a spatial and temporal singularity, an œuvre is therefore 
relevantly assimilated to an ‘event that happens only once’, so that its 
reappearance is a sort of reiteration or a commemoration of an original event. 
The example of a theatrical performance shows this, being a recreation that 
‘cannot be separated for the spectators from that of the actor’ (Benjamin, 
2007: 229). ‘The poorest provincial staging of Faust’, writes Benjamin, ‘is 
superior to a Faust film in that, ideally, it competes with the first performance 
at Weimar (Benjamin, 2007: 243). ‘The presence of the original’, states 
Benjamin, ‘is the prerequisite to the concept of authenticity’ (Benjamin, 2007: 
220). Uniqueness is what makes the ‘authority of the object’ (Benjamin, 2007: 
221) Opposed to this uniqueness, there is what we can call multiplicity, 
comparable to ‘products [put] on the market’ (Benjamin, 2007: 219) by the 
cultural industry that abolish an œuvre by transforming it into a commodity. 
In short, this uniqueness of an œuvre calls to the ‘empirical uniqueness of the 
creator’ (Benjamin, 2007: 244) and, at the same time, surpasses it. 
We can clearly see that these interwar critical theorists saw cinema as the 
paradigmatic example of capitalism’s cultural invasion. In terms of 
production, films require important investments and management techniques 
that can coordinate the activity of a great number of workers in a strictly 
hierarchical organization, just like a factory. Likewise, regarding consumption, 
the film presents itself as multiple, encouraging the greatest number of copies 
possible so that it can be seen by a multitude of paying moviegoers. It should 
be noted, however, that more than 70 years since this text was written, art 
seems to have escaped its seemingly fatal destiny of being transformed into 
multiple commodities produced by a cultural industry. Works of art are still 
unique, most often created by individuals working alone or with a small team, 
like artisans, and whose fabrication doesn’t require great financial means. The 
fact that they can be the object of monetary exchange is nothing new. Can it 
be deduced that the production and circulation of fine art have remained at 
the margins of continual capitalist expansion, extending to ever-new 
domains? 
Using some concepts introduced by Benjamin, notably those of 
singularity, event, object, ‘the authority of the object’ and ‘exposition value’, 
we will try to propose a framework that can interpret the recent changes in 
the art world and the changes in capitalism, paying particular attention to the 
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displacement of the sources of profit from the productive industry to the 
financial industry and the economy of singularities. 
Exposition Value and Market Value 
In Pierre Bourdieu’s analyses (1992), we find the idea (alluded to by 
Frankfurt’s critical philosophers) that art is inhabited by a tension between its 
strictly artistic value and its market value. Art’s aesthetic valorization (on 
which the formation of an artist’s ‘symbolic capital’ rests) is the inverse of its 
market value, i.e. its capacity to generate profit. This relation, quite clear in 
the case of multiple copies produced by the cultural industry (with, for 
example, the distinction between blockbusters and art films) is far from 
evident in the case of unique works. The current situation offers numerous 
contrary examples, in particular those analyzed by Isabelle Graw (2009), of 
contemporary artists whose prices have rapidly risen without this hurting 
their artistic reputation, as if the increase in market value had caused an 
increase in artistic value (Moulin, 1992: 70-75). 
Indeed, in the case of unique works circulating in a narrow market of 
experts and collectors, market value builds on exposition value. It is the 
growth of exposition value that gives an œuvre the authority on which the 
growth of its market value rests. These two forms of valorization are 
manifested through the process of the circulation of an œuvre. Like economic 
assets in general, a work can only acquire value through circulation. On a 
theoretical level, it is therefore necessary to distinguish two processes of 
circulation that can, in practice, partially overlap: one that assures the creation 
of exposition value and another on which the creation of its market value 
depends. Assuming that the process of market valorization depends on the 
process of artistic valorization, the latter must have, in the eyes of the 
observer, a relatively autonomous character so that market valorization is 
constituted and, more importantly, stabilizes. 
In the case of art, the relation between determining exposition value and 
market value can be compared, metaphorically, to the value established 
between rating agencies and trading floors in finance. Or, in another example, 
the relation between the ‘core value’ established by financial analysts (that is, 
as we know, fictional) as compared to daily stock quotations. If we can show 
that the agents who lavish advice on investors closely collaborate with those 
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who intervene in markets, or even worse, that they are one and the same, the 
whole financial system tends to break down under accusations of 
manipulation and illegality. This effectively gives credibility to the 
descriptions that, revealing the absence of any supporting foundation for 
determining value, denounce the purely speculative character of value. In art, 
the degree of intricacy – variable according to the historical situation – 
between the process of circulation that establishes exposition value and the 
process of fixing market value, constitutes an important factor of stability or 
instability for assessment in this domain. 
The Question of Attribution 
When he speaks of the ‘authority of the object’, Benjamin implements a 
sort of concatenation that links two states of an object of art in the same 
utterance. It is, on one hand, the object and, on the other, a sign that manifests 
a claim to authority, in the sense that it can lend intentionality (Baxandall, 
1991) and agency to it, as Alfred Gell’s analyses (2009) have successfully 
highlighted. It is this close relation of the object and the sign that constitutes 
the œuvre. This is also recognized through the concept that copyright only 
can be claimed – as we well know – when an idea is placed on a ‘support’ 
(text, canvas, score, etc.). Consequently, a process that precedes the 
determination of exposition value (on an analytical level, if not necessarily in 
practice) exists. This process is the one through which the object is given the 
properties of an œuvre. This process could be described as a process of 
attribution. 
Two uses of the term attribution can be found in historical and social 
sciences. The first, in art history, indicates the study of the way in which, 
especially since the 19th century, disparate objects (pieces) are compared so 
that they can be attributed to the same individual, to whom the ‘paternity’ of 
these objects is recognized (paternity is also the term used in copyright). This 
can be an individual whose identity is already known, or an individual whose 
uniqueness is supposed, although his identity remains unknown (‘the Master 
of St. Bartholomew’s altarpiece in Cologne’). It can even be a group, a style or 
a period (as when a piece is attributed to the series of ‘Etruscan bronzes’). 
Carlo Ginzburg, in his famous essay dedicated to traces, demonstrated the 
importance of this process of attribution for social sciences in general 
From Object to Œuvre 
  13 
(Ginzburg, 1989: 139-180), taking particular note of the processes invented 
by Morelli. 
Four remarks can be made regarding this process of attribution. The first 
is that it doesn’t modify the substantial properties of the piece, but 
contributes in determining their sense. The second is that it doesn’t settle for 
establishing a relation of sameness between them but concerns their identity 
(in accordance with the distinction established by Paul Ricoeur, 1990). The 
third is that it alone renders the determination of false or apocryphal works 
possible. The possibility that counterfeits exist thus becomes the best 
indicator that we are in the presence of an œuvre. Finally, the fourth remark 
is that this process of attribution modifies the exposition value of a piece and, 
consequently, its market value. The same signs, placed on the same support, 
see their value increase considerably if the piece can be attributed to a master 
(a recent example, to which the French newspaper Le Monde dedicated an 
article, concerns the lively debate over whether a portrait on vellum of a 
young woman from Milan can be attributed to Leonardo de Vinci, the price 
of which could go from $120,000 to $150 million if this attribution was 
recognized; see Bellet, 2011). 
A second use of the term attribution was developed in the domain of 
social psychology, and later in cognitive sciences. In these disciplines, the 
theory of attribution concerns the study of the way so-called ‘ordinary’ people 
make casual hypotheses that allow them to explain events, both in the 
behavior of others (why did that colleague act like he didn’t know me when I 
passed him?), and in the case of historical events (for example the attack on 
the World Trade Center on September 11th 20012). Therefore its object is 
what is called ‘naïve psychology’ and describes the way relations of causality 
are understood in day-to-day life (Malle, 2004; Tilly, 2006). 
Comparing these two uses allows us to see several clear similarities. In 
both cases, attribution takes a fact (an event is a fact in the same way as an 
object is a fact) and considers it a spatial-temporal singularity with the aim of 
giving it a sense. An event, understood as a singularity inscribed in space and 
time, has an immediate meaning that its physical dimensions give to it. 
However, in itself, it doesn’t make any sense. To give sense to a singular 
event, a hypothesis concerning the cause of which it is an effect must be 
posed. This means attributing it an entity that is considered more stable over 
time than the event that needs explaining, and whose identity can support 
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intentionality and agency. Some building has just collapsed. This event is a 
fact. It has a meaning (if it had risen toward the sky instead of falling to earth 
we would have talked about a ‘miracle’). But to give sense to this fact, we 
must be able to attribute the responsibility to an entity’s action: an 
earthquake? A dishonest owner who wanted to pocket the insurance money? 
A terrorist planted a bomb? Etc. 
This process is precisely the one that transmutes an object into an œuvre. 
In order for an ordinary thing, whatever it may be – a ‘commonplace object’, 
as logicians say (Nef, 2000) – to be transmuted into an œuvre, it is necessary 
and sufficient to treat it like an event (to use Benjamin’s term), which is given 
meaning by attributing it to an entity – called the cause or the author of that 
event – that has an identity, intentionality and agency. If an œuvre, unlike an 
object, can be called intentional in the sense that it contains and is, as an 
object, something exterior to it; and if, following Gell, its agency can be 
accented in the sense that it generates actions or that it provokes new events, 
these properties befall it only insofar as it has been assigned to an entity. In 
other words, generally, it is assigned to a person who has a robust and stable 
identity. An œuvre’s intentionality and agency can thus be treated like the 
result of the projection of the intentionality and the agency of a person onto 
an object. Attribution is what allows us to give an object an authority. 
This can best be seen in the borderline case of the ‘chromos’ market 
discussed by Raymonde Moulin in an essay that builds on a study of art 
gallery stores set up in malls on the outskirts of Montréal, whose clients are 
the newly urbanized middle class. These galleries show paintings, sold as 
‘originals’ because they are manually painted, but produced in series, starting 
from pre-established formats or from photographs, by painters who give 
these galleries the exclusive rights to their abundant production (more than 
300 paintings per year). Now, to assure ‘the artistic valorization of the 
paintings’ and to transform these standardized products into an œuvre, the 
galleries engage in the work of constructing authors that these objects are 
attributed to. Each employee-painter is given a different pseudonym 
corresponding more or less to the different genres (landscapes, portraits of 
infants, etc.) that he or she is specialized in. Individual shows, complete with 
private viewings and catalogues, are organized. The same article cites the case 
of Swedish wholesalers who oblige painters to produce 4000 to 5000 
paintings per year, sometimes working on a dozen paintings at any given 
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time. In this case also, authors are invented and individualized through 
pseudonyms, fictional biographies mentioning awards, honors, etc. (Moulin, 
1992: 34-44). 
Adorno’s Desk in a Frankfurt Square 
This attribution device, which probably always presides over the qualification 
of what we call an œuvre, revealed as the gesture typical of 20th century art, 
consists in taking an object, a commonplace thing, and transmuting it into an 
œuvre through a simple trick of displacement and signature (Fraenkel, 1992). 
There is an œuvre in the public square of a university neighborhood in 
Frankfurt: inside a transparent cube of Plexiglas different things are arranged 
– notably a desk and a chair. There is a lamp, some papers and various 
objects on the desk. A copper plaque indicates that this is the desk where 
Theodor Adorno wrote. This œuvre is a monument to the memory of this 
Frankfurt School philosopher. Let’s consider the desk where I am now 
writing. The placement of the objects sitting on this desk has a certain order 
to it, and probably even a form of coherent logic that an intelligent 
semiologist or sociologist, having well-read (or over-read) Goffman, could 
reveal. But it is only an object and not an œuvre of the so-called ‘installation’ 
genre. The objects sitting on my desk are not fixed in such a way as to make 
their arrangement transportable without deforming it, and their fleeting 
combination hasn’t been the subject of an aggregation susceptible to giving 
them the quality of a count-as-one – as Alain Badiou’s ontology would have it 
(1988: 31-39) – that this work depends on to be qualified as art. 
I’m ignoring who the author of this œuvre is and his history. But it was 
probably commissioned by the City of Frankfurt to some well-known artist, 
intended to commemorate the death of Adorno. It would have been 
impossible for Adorno himself, even though he was an artist in his own way 
(he studied, as you know, composition under the direction of Arnold 
Schönberg and wrote chamber music), to pretend to ‘be an artist’ by moving 
his desk to a city square. Such an act, barely thinkable, would have been 
interpreted as a sign of insanity. This means that this kind of coup that 
constitutes attribution – it alone being capable of giving authority to an object 
and transmuting it into an œuvre – is not in the hands of the person the 
œuvre is attributed to. Like all forms of authority, it depends on an authority 
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granted by other people, invested with an authority that has been equally 
granted to them (and so on) by the intermediary of an unlimited chain of 
authorizations. The maker of an object can’t call himself the author of an 
œuvre, even if he claims having fixed an idea on a support. His situation is 
similar to the legitimate power holder who must be granted authority by 
others. This is illustrated, in opposite terms, in the scandalous example of 
Napoleon putting the crown on his head with his own hands during his 
coronation as the Emperor of France. Or again, to take another example 
from a distant area, the situation of the Mayenne peasant studied by Jeanne 
Favret, who overwhelmed with woes can’t declare himself bewitched and 
publicly accuse another person of being the guilty witch (usually a neighbor), 
unless there is a third announcer who occupies a supposedly neutral position 
in the system of witchcraft, and who has suggested this possibility to him. 
In this sense, the transformation of an object into an œuvre is equivalent, 
not metaphorically but substantially, to the transmutation of bodily waste into 
a holy relic, as the fact has often been noted (and, specifically, by my brother, 
the artist Christian Boltanski). Imagine a man who, regarding and declaring 
himself a saint or God’s vessel, cuts off a limb to give, or rather sell, to a 
group of followers? Such a gesture would be enough to disqualify his claim to 
sainthood. What historians of Christianity call the ‘invention’ of relics (a 
flourishing business in late antiquity and the Middle Ages) has many 
similarities with the transformation of an object into an œuvre. The invention 
consists in taking a body part, itself deprived of any value, and attributing it to 
a body glorified through the sufferings of martyrdom, based on the 
construction of a narrative that is both biographic and topographic. When 
this happens, which is far from always being the case, this attribution 
transforms the profane body part into a precious object with an 
incommensurable value, itself then producing value both on a mystic as well 
as economic level. Churches, pilgrimages, markets and all sorts of other 
derivative products are built around it. The relic, an object of desire par 
excellence, is the material of lucrative business and counterfeit productions that 
the holders of the one true specimen stubbornly unmask. Relics pass from 
hand to hand. But the question of knowing if we can discuss the existence of 
something like a relic market is problematic due to the absence of the 
principle of equivalence that allows objets to be ordered. There is no system 
of measurement that can organize Saint Celine’s toe and Saint Barnabas’ 
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bones into a hierarchy. What could a little piece of bone be good for if not 
accomplishing miracles? The relic poses, just like an œuvre, intentionality and 
agency that are manifested by the intermediary of actions that we attribute to 
it. This unique event, the transmutation of a body part into a relic, is then the 
source of multiple events. A relic, like the one studied by Krzystof Pomian 
from Saint Mark’s body, was the foundation of the authority of Venice’s 
Doges after its arrival in 808 and is, in this sense, what produced an 
uninterrupted series of events such as, for example, Petrarch’s 1362 decision 
to bequeath his books to Saint Mark. The author of Canzoniere is also a good 
passeur from relic to artwork if we remember that François I, traveling 
through Avignon, gave the city authorities a large sum of money to construct 
a mausoleum for the body of Laura, whose physical existence is still 
questionable. As Krzystof Pomian remarks, Venice was overflowing with 
relics, having ‘probably tens of thousands of them’, and whose presence 
played an important role in the city’s wealth. It is, according to the same 
historian, in this image that collections were ‘reinvented’, starting from 
princely or ecclesiastic collection-treasures and then to individual collections 
where the ‘content was principally antiques and paintings’ (Pomian, 2003: 20-
135). 
Object, Thing, Piece, Œuvre, Icon 
We can, at this point, suggest a vocabulary to indicate the different steps in 
the ‘social life of an object’ – as Arjun Appadurai says – that can be seen, in a 
certain moment of its itinerary, as an œuvre (1986). Let’s start with any object 
that we can call a thing. This object can have little pertinence for someone (a 
pebble); pertinence for me, for example because of how I use it, or simply 
because it belongs to me (my pencil); pertinence for an indefinite number of 
other people (the ticket machine in the subway), etc. The object can be 
carried by one person (my coffee machine) or can circulate among many, for 
example if it is rented (a public bicycle), etc. Here, it isn’t important whether 
this object is ‘natural’ or ‘man-made’. Let’s just say that the object in question 
can acquire pertinence in three ways: from someone’s personal attachment to 
it and the attention that this person gives to it; in the function of its use, 
which refers to its functionality; or because it is tied to an individual or 
collective entity in a property relationship (usually through a contract, i.e. 
according to a legal principle). None of these ways require, in themselves, that 
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the object changes, i.e. in order to become an œuvre for the purposes of our 
discussion. 
Two intermediate steps between the thing and the œuvre can be indicated: 
the object and the piece. We can take for example an object, an object that is no 
longer in someone’s environment, or in a relationship of attachment, nor in a 
relationship of functional use, nor in a relationship of property. At this point, 
it isn’t important if it was purchased, found or stolen. In the practice of 
second-hand dealers – the subject of a remarkable book by Hervé Sciardet, 
Les marchands de l’aube – we can simply say that it has ‘come out’ or that it is 
no longer ‘in its juice’ (Sciardet, 2003). This object, momentarily lifted from 
its destiny as garbage, has found a place, for example, in the heap of things of 
one of those bad guys who occupy the lowest rungs in the flea market 
hierarchy. The ones that, at the crack of dawn, display a collection of 
dissimilar things that higher ranking antique dealers use as the raw material 
for their business, hoping to come across a ‘good deal’, meaning a piece of 
quasi-scrap whose potential value has gone unnoticed until then. Some of 
these things end up being garbage. Others will come to know a more 
desirable destiny. But this isn’t important for the moment; they are nothing 
more than an object. 
The piece is a thing that has been considered worthy of belonging to a 
collection (Pomian, 1987), whatever grade it may be, Chinese bronzes or 
keychains. Lifted from the status of quasi garbage which it still holds in flea 
market heaps, the thing transmutes into a piece once it is near other things 
with which it has a relationship of affinity. This means that the piece is a 
thing that has met an amateur or a collector. The collector can be called the 
author of his collection. We can attribute this transmutation of the thing into a 
piece to him. His œuvre, just like that of a curator, consists in the invention of 
a principle of equivalence, allowing different things to be considered in a 
certain relationship. The collector, just like the curator, can consider himself a 
creator in this sense, almost in the same way an artist does (which is often the 
case today). The collection, or the exposition, is thus similar to a kind of 
installation. The principle of equivalence under which the pieces are brought 
together can remain largely implicit, requiring a kind of real work of 
interpretation on the part of the spectator (thus elevating him to the position 
of a quasi critic). 
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In many cases, the way the thing would be considered in this relationship 
will be tied to an entity that we can call ‘society’ or ‘period’, or even ‘style’. 
They are, most often, older pieces, meaning objects that have had a 
relationship of attachment, functionality and/or property in the past. For 
example, medieval spoons. It is the fact of being connected to these entities 
that makes them pieces and not things. Their sameness gives them, on one 
hand, a common meaning, and the fact of being brought to ‘society’, a 
‘period’ or a ‘style’ gives them, on the other hand, a sense. We can note that 
in order to be good collection objects these pieces must be similar under a 
principal relationship (sameness), often established by referring to the 
functions that they had when they were used (as keychains, as stoups, as 
spoons, etc.), and different under secondary relationships in such a way that 
they offer the largest variety possible. Thus, when these things are gathered, 
they gain dignity and can, for example, be put into a catalogue. But they are 
not, in this sense, œuvres, even if they are well on their way. 
In order for an object to be truly considered an œuvre, it must go through 
yet another change in state of matter, meaning that another kind of event 
intervenes. This event consists in attributing the object’s origin to an 
identified entity, called the object’s author. The author is the cause of the 
object. In Alfred Gell’s terms (citing Pierce), the œuvre takes on an indexical 
relationship with the entity which is supposed to be its cause (Gell, 2009). In 
this sense, the œuvre can always be considered an event, too. In fact, it 
constitutes an absolute singularity whose attribution and interpretation reveal 
its sense. Following this change in state, the œuvre stands out from the 
backdrop of the object that now acts as a support. The canvas, virgin or 
uniformly covered by color, is an object. But a monochrome attributed to an 
author (like Malevitch, for example), is an œuvre with intentionality and 
agency. A doubt may remain: if, for example, a canvas is covered by 
something that resembles a child’s scribbles. We may think it is a thing. 
However, attributed to Twombly, it is an œuvre, etc. 
We can speak of icons (Marion, 1982: 15-38) to accent a last transformation 
of an object (that, like the previous transformations, is reversible). The 
change of state (i.e. the event) that transforms the object, the thing or the 
piece into an œuvre displaces the intentionality and agency of a supposedly 
identifiable and permanent entity (i.e. a person) to an object. But we can think 
that, in the case of certain, particularly famous œuvres, the œuvre itself is 
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detached from the author and is thus invested with the identity of an 
intentionality and agency of its own. Thus it has the power to bring about 
other changes, exercised on other œuvres or other people, as if they fell under 
its ascendancy. 
The Force of An Œuvre 
We can call the force of an œuvre its capacity to bring about changes in 
states, i.e. in turn generate a more or less high number of events that are 
related to it as the original event. Certain œuvres have a very weak force (but 
are nevertheless œuvres). Others have considerable force. This depends on 
the tests that it is put to, in each moment of time, so that the force of an 
œuvre is never definitively stabilized and is always uncertain. It gives rise to 
debate. This force is gained or lost in the course of different trials of 
circulation that are also trials of valorisation. Some of them will increase or 
restrict the exposition value of an œuvre. In the course of another trial of 
circulation, dependent on the first, the object will be given a price. This 
second trial says what it is, but as an object, since it is the one that determines 
its market value. 
In a great number of domains, the capacity of reducing uncertainty in the 
most ordinary situations by saying it is what it is (referring to ‘the whatness of 
what is’ as I explain in the book On critique), particularly in the case of debate, 
is delegated to what we call the institution. In On critique, I tried to show that 
what we call an institution’s semantic task – inspired by John Searle (1998; 
2005: 1-22) – is always, in our society, more or less dependent on the State, 
and plays a major political role, since it was linked to their quality of beings 
without bodies. Institutions are thus endowed with an authority that can resolve 
disagreements between corporeal beings who are always reducible to 
divergences in points of view, tied to their specific positions in space or time, 
individual interests, the unconscious, etc. But, since institutions are beings 
without bodies, they can only render their qualifying operations public through 
spokespersons who are, themselves, of flesh and bone like you or me. So, in 
this sense, they fall easily under the blade of criticism: do they really express 
the ideas of the institution where they, too, can only provide a point of view 
that depends on their own interests, under the guise of their institutional role? 
I call this tension the hermeneutic contradiction (Boltanski, 2009). 
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We can take a particularly successful institution, whose political role is one 
of the most important, as an example: the scientific institution. This 
institution accomplished this tour de force (to not say coup de force) in 
building itself a monopoly over the statements about what is while assuming 
the possibility of modifying them in function of its internal debate. The project 
of establishing an artistic institution based on the model of the scientific 
institution, attempted by the great 19th century European states, with its 
Academies, Grandes Écoles, National Competitions, awards and official 
Expositions, was never able to impose itself in a permanent way (it perhaps 
resurfaced in the 1970s-80s but without much success). 
It would take too long to try to go further into depth regarding the reasons 
for its failure here. Suffice to note that, in the case of œuvres, the process of 
attribution, qualification and valorization can’t be based, at least for living 
artists, on institutions with inescapable verdicts. Art is made circulating in 
spaces with blurred boundaries, where autonomy isn’t sufficiently assured to 
make determinations that try to condition these spaces while immune to 
external forces, notably, the forces that can be attributed to capitalism. This 
also means that, like capitalism itself, these spaces are never safe from 
criticism. 
One of the main tasks of what we call ‘the sociology of art’ is dedicated to 
building models that permit an awareness of the way paths of circulation are 
articulated as the means through which exposition value is generated and 
market value is established. I will now propose two programs of inquiry that 
aim to define the contours of two modes of articulation that have marked the 
20th century or, if you will, the two ways these different trials are arranged. I 
will call the first domestic arrangement and the second capitalist arrangement. 
Domestic Circulation 
We can base our discussion around Canvases and Careers, the seminal book by 
Harrison and Cynthia White, written over 40 years ago, that analyses the 
collapse of the academic system in France at the end of the 19th century in 
order to roughly sketch the contours of the domestic model of circulation 
subsequently put into place. It by no means excludes the circulation of 
money, even of large in sums of money. It is not so much the fact that there 
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is money involved in the process that is the problem. The question, rather, 
concerns the way that œuvres circulate and the speed of that circulation. 
It is generally considered that what I call the domestic model has four 
agents: the artist, the dealer, the collector and the critic. It is among these four 
agents that the object circulates to become an œuvre and acquires a certain 
force. In this kind of model, the event that determines the sense of the œuvre 
passes, as always, through its attribution to an entity, in this case someone 
with a body – called the ‘artist’ – during the course of a process of circulation. 
This attribution, once accomplished, must be constantly maintained for the 
œuvre to remain efficient. 
But, in the framework of a domestic mode, the way that these processes of 
attribution and maintenance work retains a personal character. The œuvre is 
passed around from body to body, along a chain of personal and even 
physical relationships. For example, the dealer, who is friends with the artist, 
goes to his studio. He sees the object – the future œuvre – ‘in its juice’ to use 
the flea market term from above. It is there, in the hodgepodge of the studio, 
near an old kettle, next to dirty rags covered in paint, a bottle of wine, etc.; 
traces that are a part of the artist’s body and that are, in some way, an 
extension of it. The dealer, for a sum of money, extracts that object from the 
hodgepodge, snatches it from its environment and transports it to his gallery 
(if he has one). In the gallery, collectors will come to see what is going on. 
Perhaps what has become an œuvre will get their attention based on the 
dealer’s opinion; they might even be friends with the dealer himself. They will 
buy the object, but most often only to show it in their apartment where the 
object will stay (unless they have serious financial problems), then it will be 
passed down in their family or bequeathed to a museum. In doing so, it is 
virtually the person to whom this œuvre is assigned to that makes it enter into 
their familiar environment. And this is probably the reason why authors 
whose behaviour or personal opinions are judged as too scandalous may have 
trouble in finding buyers. 
During this circulation, the object, having become an œuvre, retains the 
trace of the artist’s body, transported through the chain of personal 
relationships that tie the artist to the dealer, the dealer to collectors, etc. We 
can think of what Marcel Mauss says, in his The Gift, about the sale of 
domestic animals in traditional societies. The transmission of the beast, in 
exchange for a sum of money, isn’t enough to separate it from its previous 
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owner. A whole ritual of detachment – to make sure that the animal doesn’t 
go back to who is still its veritable master – must be associated with the sale. 
This kind of personal attachment, which is a problem in the case of selling a 
cow, can be an advantage when selling a painting. It is what allows the sense 
of œuvre to be maintained, as a sign of the author, during the different steps 
in its circulation. 
Now, a word on the critic who plays an essential role in this domestic 
mode. Most often, this mode maintains personal and friendly relationships 
with the artist, the dealer and collectors. They are all part of the same circles, 
almost the same family. The critic’s importance lies in the fact that the ‘artist’ 
– let us remember – can’t self-proclaim himself as one. More particularly, in 
this specific organization, he is expected, according to the romantic ideal, to 
not know what he is doing, in the true sense of the word. He is comparable 
to a sibyl who ignores the sense of the words she pronounces. Things come 
from him, things that might become œuvres. But he ignores the sense and the 
value of his œuvre (for example, hagiography would have it that he takes no 
care of the object that he makes, or forgets it as soon as it comes into the 
world, etc.). The critic occupies the place from whence the paternity (and it 
would be better to say, in this case, the maternity) of things that the artist 
makes can be attributed to him. The critic is also the one that gives them a 
force and that starts the process of valorization. He works by gathering 
different things attributed to the same artist and establishing a relation of 
biographical equivalence or affinity among them. He can also constitute the 
artificial group of œuvres that are attributed to the same entity in the form of 
a totality doted with sense: the Œuvre, with a capital letter. This œuvre can 
be, in turn, differentiated from the œuvres of other artists constituted 
according to the same principle. 
In this way, the critic’s job is an essential contribution to the attribution 
process. It maintains and reinforces the ties between the object and its cause, 
of which the œuvre is the index. Thanks to the critic, circulation can extend 
beyond the artist’s circle of friends and personal relationships. The critic can 
also become, almost without wanting to, a collector. He buys œuvres or 
receives them as gifts. But his collection has, first of all, a dimension of 
memory. A whole, that can be seen as patrimony, is formed and this question 
will then arise with the issue of succession. 
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An essential characteristic of this mode of circulation is its sluggishness. 
An œuvre’s path can cross multiple generations. Consequently, the temporal 
lapse between the moment of creation and the moment of recognition 
contains, in each moment in time, an uncertainty in the question of knowing 
which œuvres really count. The current judgment is always relativized by its 
comparison with a future judgment, in another possible world – a gap on 
which the hopes of avant-garde artists are founded. The same goes for 
market value, whose growth is supposed to take long enough to discourage 
short-term speculation. Seen from an economic point of view, accumulation 
therefore takes the patrimonial, rather than capitalist, form. A good that lasts 
– as it is said – (for example a priceless family home) is not capital. Property 
is revealed as capital only when it generates profit through a process of 
circulation that is only as effective as it is fast. 
Capitalist Circulation 
A new regime of circulation that has been progressively put into place over 
the last few decades, has the primary characteristic of an important increase in 
the speed of the circulation of œuvres and the area where this circulation 
takes place (Rosa, 2013). It multiplies exchanges and therefore the perspective 
for profit. It detaches the œuvre from the patrimonial sphere to push it into 
the sphere of capital. We can try to describe this process without getting into 
the thorny issue of the sheer artistic value of œuvres that concern aesthetic 
judgment (often accompanied by an almost ethical judgment) and not 
sociology, even if different modes of circulation tend to select and valorize 
different œuvres. A sociologist is therefore relieved of the delicate task of 
playing the arbiter between Alberto Giacometti and Damien Hirst, and of 
asking if one is more ‘authentic’ than the other, to use Walter Benjamin’s 
term. 
The agents of domestic circulation – artists, curators, collectors, critics – 
are still active in the capitalist mode of circulation. But their relative 
importance, like their respective roles, are modified and they have to face the 
rise to power of other agents operating in the media or the economic sphere, 
such as the now famous auction houses or sovereign wealth funds. The 
consequences include a concentration of galleries, an increased importance of 
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the most financially powerful collectors for establishing exposition value and 
a shrinking role given to critics. 
In this mode of circulation, an œuvre’s market value is better assured than 
it was in domestic circulation. But the high degree of intricacy in the process 
of establishing exposition value and market value tends to throw doubt on 
the autonomy of judgments that the first is based on. This confusion 
consequently risks increasing the volatility of the latter that, as we’ve seen, 
exposition value depends on. Moreover, the increase in the speed of 
circulation and the area where circulation takes place modifies the attribution 
conditions that assure – and that must still assure – the relation between the 
œuvre and the person identified as its ‘creator’. A few important elements to 
describe these changes can be found in Isabelle Graw’s book High price 
(2009). 
In domestic circulation, the paternal object-œuvre-author relationship was 
assured through the chains of interaction between bodies. In capitalist 
circulation, it must be intensified through ties of another kind, favoring faster, 
more distant operations. An artist’s body and the œuvre’s texture must be 
able to be substituted by aliases, supposing the intervention of a process of 
codification that requires the selection and stylization of traits judged 
pertinent. Because this process is subject to constraints of speed and distance, 
it tends to escape critics who work on a local level. This can be seen, for 
example, in œuvres in the media sphere, with the growing importance given 
to celebrity culture and storytelling (a technique originating from management 
that has also conquered the political world – see Salmon, 2007). The alias 
must be able to function almost as a brand that the œuvres can be attributed 
to. The analogy is less metaphorical than it seems at first glance if we 
remember that the brand, at least at its origins in the 19th century, was always 
associated with a signature or even a portrait, as to simulate a personal tie 
between products industrially produced in series and a corporeal person 
incarnating their origin and guaranteeing their quality. 
The development of capitalist circulation tends to bend an œuvre’s mode 
of constitution and perhaps, at the same time, modify the principles for 
selecting recognition postulants in function of their dispositional capacities to 
adjust to these new forms. We have seen that, in domestic circulation, the 
artist isn’t supposed to control, reflexively, the sense of his œuvre; that task 
being assigned to the critic who, in some way, reveals it to him. In capitalist 
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circulation, the artist has to produce not only an object that can transmute 
into an œuvre, but also an alias of that object that gives it sense – all of which 
assumes codification, as in the case of the figure of the artist himself. The 
object-maker must also have a sufficient level of reflexivity to anticipate the 
conditions that will preside over their reception. This is done to make the 
task of associating the alias and the object to the alias of its presumed creator 
easier and more fluid. He constructs his œuvre, in the same sense that sociology 
talks about constructing reality. This is probably the reason why artists have 
become, over the course of just a few years, so fond of theories, borrowed 
from philosophy and/or the social sciences. 
In this state of things, the force of the œuvre is measured less in the 
number and sophistication of the interpretations, spread out over a long 
period, that it provokes in commentators, than in the potency of events that 
mark its circulation, that have a media or market dimension, or that they 
inscribe in the framework of expositions with near-architectural dimensions 
(like the ‘Monumenta’ expo in Paris). The figure of the post-romantic, post-
impressionist or post-surrealist artist, vulgar, alcoholic, working-class and 
above all rebel, now disqualified, is substituted by a new figure that joins the 
qualities of the savant, aware of what he does and what value it has, and the 
entrepreneur able to manage the fabrication of great machines perceived as 
unique, even if their edification requires the participation of a great number 
of collaborators. The trials, in the sense of the term used in On Justification 
(Boltanski and Thévenot, 1991), that must be satisfied in order to make it in 
this world, have profoundly changed, as have the personal and social attitudes 
of those chosen by these trials. 
Similarly, the roles of curators and critics have changed. The former, if 
they haven’t been eliminated or absorbed by the process of concentration, 
risk being left to local niches, corresponding to secondary markets. As for the 
latter, they are more and more confined to the tasks of common education 
and popularization, destined to form the tastes of a growing number of those 
who, with cultural capital but without economic capital, make up the lines in 
front of big expositional spaces that present œuvres they will never acquire. 
But the effects of their advice on the choice of large collectors are probably in 
marked decline. They are, in this, analogous to the market analysts on 
mainstream media whose predictions motivate the ‘little people’, online 
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traders (who are called trolls) who have but little influence on the decisions of 
large traders. 
Two States of Capitalism 
Were Walter Benjamin and the critical thinkers of the Frankfurt School right 
or wrong when they anticipated capitalism’s hold over œuvres that, for them, 
was the near collapse of everything they loved and everything they called ‘art’ 
and ‘beauty’? Putting these value judgments aside, and limiting ourselves to 
the issue of the relation between the world of creation and that of capitalist 
accumulation, we can say they were sometimes right and sometimes wrong. 
Wrong, because they imagined capitalism as above all industrial, which 
explains that their apocalyptic predictions could take not only an anti-
capitalist but also an antimodernist bent. But how could they have foreseen 
capitalism’s shifts that have marked the Western world over the last few 
decades? 
If the logic of capitalism has indeed penetrated the art world, it hasn’t 
been through the substitution of unique works with an aura with mechanically 
reproduced multiples. It has done so, on the contrary, by assuming its own 
means to assure the rapid circulation of unique works, valorizing techniques 
and a circulation that allows the confection, manipulation and distribution of 
this aura. Subjected to the potency of events, including the market events that 
punctuate circulation, this aura can surge or evaporate according to the coups 
de force that break big operators onto the scene. Do we not read, in the 
works often written by specialized journalists, of the turpitude of the art 
market, for example when Charles Saatchi was able to make the value of 
Sandro Chia plunge by boisterously getting rid of his works that he has in his 
collection? Or again, when Kunstkompass, created in 1970 (one of the 
ancestors of the benchmarking techniques that later invaded every other 
domain, including the university – see Bruno, 2008), come to be considered, 
thirty years later (and not only by the Wall Street Journal), as ‘the only possible 
yardstick of contemporary art’ (Bellet, 2001: 218, 245). Who remembers the 
indignant diatribes that the appearance of this caused among critics and 
‘avant-garde’ artists who even asked for their names to be taken off of the list 
of award winners? 
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Cinema’s contrasting evolutions, on one hand, and the changes in fine 
arts, on the other, are particularly illuminating to demonstrate how these two 
forms that developed under Western capitalism have affected the art world. 
On one hand, the enormous industrial experience, accumulated over the 
course of the last two centuries, largely deserted the mass production of 
material goods that occupied numerous workers who were difficult to control 
and discipline and has been delegated to poorer countries, called ‘emerging 
countries’, that in a number of cases are subject to authoritarian powers. 
Industrial know-how has been displaced, for the most part, toward 
technological research and the production of immaterial and reproducible 
goods, proposed on large markets to a multitude of consumers asked only for 
modest financial sacrifices. Cinema is a typical example of this. The art of the 
multiple par excellence, cinema has continued its evolution toward more and 
more industrial forms, characterized by enormous investments, modes of 
organization and coordination borrowed from management to organize the 
labour of huge teams and the more and more frequent use of sophisticated 
digital technologies. 
On the other hand, there has been the development of a financial 
economy as well as what Lucien Karpik calls an economy of singularities. The 
latter is based on ‘single-exchange and incommensurable products’, which 
include – according to Karpik – ‘personalized professional services, artwork, 
high cuisine, gourmet wines, luxury items,’ etc. (Karpik, 2007: 9). 
In conclusion, we will propose two hypotheses. The first is that the 
financial economy joins an industrial dimension with specific traits that bring 
it closer to the economy of singularities. The second is that, in the vast area of 
the economy of singularities, the mode of circulation of contemporary 
œuvres is the domain where its similarities with the financial economy’s way 
of functioning are the most vivid. 
The financial economy has developed considerably for over 20 years, 
transposing an industrial know-how to bond exchanges, notably by way of 
the organization and management of financial businesses and in the use of 
digital technologies and software based on mathematic models. But, in other 
relations, the financial economy has a number of traits in common with the 
economy of singularities. This is the case of derivative products called 
‘exotic’, built for particular clients and mutually negotiated. These products, 
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which conserve the trace of the mathematicians that created them, are largely 
incomprehensible to inexperienced traders. But, more generally, these 
financial instruments are products that, although they are supposedly ‘known 
before purchase’ as ‘standard products’ might be, most often hold an 
important component of ‘mystery’ so that ‘every interpretation’ contributes to 
the ‘requalification of the product’. Financial markets are populated by radical 
uncertainty, meaning that they are unpredictable, taking on the quality of the 
products and the strategies of traders that can easily be suspected of 
opportunism. In these types of markets, options are oriented toward the search 
for information that enables the selection of the ‘best product’, in market 
conditions that are ‘unpredictable and opaque’. The gap between ‘the 
necessary knowledge and the client’s competence’ induces modes of 
profitability that are based on ‘information asymmetries’ that favor a limited 
number of experienced traders to the detriment of the masses of small 
buyers. All this despite the numerous directives responsible for the 
transparency of transactions, and despite the reference, above all in crisis 
situations, to a ‘fundamental value’ whose ‘objective’ character is fictional, 
just like the now abandoned reference to the ‘criteria of beauty’ is in the 
domain of art. 
As this schematic description suggests, we can only be struck by the 
convergences between the evolution of financial markets and the part of the 
economy of singularities that constitutes the market of contemporary œuvres. 
In both cases, a number of common traits appear. Notably, both the 
difficulty of using specific criteria to break down ‘indivisible realities’ and to 
build systems of equivalence able to arrange incommensurable goods into a 
hierarchical order. The role given to interpretation in valorization and the 
similarity of agents, or supposed instances of these, determine the value of 
goods and those who profit from their circulation. Finally, we observe the 
appearance of ever-new and opaque goods and the increasing speed of 
operations. 
Nevertheless, the evolution toward this type of economy adopts an even 
purer form in the case of the valorization and circulation of œuvres than it 
does in finance. Finding themselves emancipated from the industrial 
imperative, these processes can, in the case of art, systematically profit from 
the ‘reference most radically opposed to interchangeability’: the reference to 
‘the human being’ (Karpik, 2007: 51). The relation of attribution, important in 
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the case of finance constitutes, in the case of œuvres, the very foundation of a 
way to make profit based on the indissociable circulation of objects that are 
sometimes homogeneous and sometimes distinct, as well as names of singular 
people to which the creation of those objects is attributed. 
Coming back to our point of departure, we will remark that it was difficult, 
for example, to anticipate in the 1930s the way that photography, multiple par 
excellence, and video art – which shares many traits with film – would 
sacrifice, in some way, one of their main attributes, i.e. being reproducible, in 
order to be treated like unique pieces, objects of collections and market 
speculation. It all happened as if the new opportunities of market access, 
made possible by changes in capitalism, had predominance over the changes 
in technical, or properly artistic, constraints – but at the price of maintaining 
and even reinforcing the relation of attribution that ties a unique piece to a 
unique creator. This, against many prophets who, coming from the avant-
garde, announced the death of the author and the development of creations 
that would be the work of collective intelligence. Or even those who felt the 
creative possibilities contained in each human being liberated, a liberation that 
what would have supposedly had the effect of vaporizing art as it had been 
known to Western metaphysics and, consequently, the disappearance of the 
art market itself. 
In the end, we will add that, as rereading earlier philosophers suggests, 
changes in capitalism have, affecting the world of arts, notably changed the 
situation of the social critic, when claiming to manifest itself with the aid of 
œuvres. During the 20th century, the external critique of capitalist society was 
almost always associated with an internal critique of the functioning of the art 
world in that, precisely, the latter was seen as threatened by the intrusion of 
capitalism. This critique was founded, above all, on the valorization of the 
artisanal as opposed to the industrial; the personal as opposed to the 
anonymous; the unique as opposed to the multiple. It is now struggling to 
affirm itself in a capitalist cosmos that not only recognizes the singularity of 
œuvres and their creators, but also makes that recognition a significant source 
of profit. 
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A Joy Forever 
Neil Cummings 
Act 1. Scene 1 
It’s Friday the 10th of July 1857, it’s mid-morning, cold for the time of year 
and drizzling with rain. We are in a crowd approaching the entrance to the 
spectacular Art Treasures Exhibition at Old Trafford in Manchester. As we 
enter the doorway, above our heads is inscribed the first line of English poet, 
John Keats‘s Endymion,  
 
A thing of beauty is a joy forever. 
 
Inside the spectacular, temporary, cast-iron and glass structure an orchestra is 
playing, and fountains are cascading. The Art Treasures Exhibition is 
obviously inspired by The Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of all 
Nations of 1851, the astonishing mid-century celebration of modern 
industrial technology, art, design and manufacturing. The Great Exhibition, 
of some one hundred thousand objects in Joseph Paxton’s pre-fabricated 
cast-iron and glass Crystal Palace, a temporary building so vast it enclosed 
mature elm trees, was a perfect performance of the free trade ideal. Fourteen 
thousand exhibitors from all around the world competitively displayed their 
goods in a previously unimagined space of exhibition and leisure. The 
traditional distinctions between things dissolved in entertainment. The Great 
Exhibition was the template for every museum, department store, shopping 
mall and trade fair thereafter, as historian Donald Preziosi (2001) suggests, 
‘We have never left the Great Exhibition’. 
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Inside the Art Treasures galleries, dense chatter accompanies the crowds 
as we navigate the 16,000 paintings and sculptures on display. Between the 5th 
of May and the 17th of October the exhibition will attract over 1.3 million 
visitors; that’s about four times the population of Manchester. And, I 
probably don’t need to remind you that Manchester is the shock-city of 
industrialisation, a laboratory for experimentation in manufacturing, trade and 
finance. Friedrich Engels is here, researching and writing; he had sent a series 
of reports to Karl Marx that were to be published as The Condition of the 
Working Class in England. The city’s increasingly wealthy cotton merchants 
want to celebrate its wealth and power, although not through industry: they 
want to celebrate through an exhibition of culture1. And so they convene the 
most spectacular collection of artworks England has ever seen, under one 
roof. 
As we walk through the exhibition following our printed guide, the 
artworks seem to be organised chronologically, a literal demonstration of the 
historical development of art. Although the exhibition is also subdivided into 
smaller spaces and themed: Pictures by Ancient Masters, Pictures by Modern 
Masters, British Portraits and Miniatures, Water Colour Drawings, and so on. 
Engels will write to Karl Marx: 
 
‘Everyone up here is an art lover just now and the talk is all of the pictures at the 
exhibition…’ 
 
Given that most public museum collections are, at best, in a nascent state, the 
majority of the artworks are borrowed from over 700 private collections from 
Britain’s wealthiest families. And many of the artworks have never been 
exhibited in public before.  
The organization of the Art Treasures Exhibition, the interplay between 
private and public interests, the modes of exhibition and display of artworks 
have a formative influence on the public art institutions currently being 
                                                
1 There had been a spectacular Exhibition of British Industrial Art in Manchester 
in 1845, although by 1855 there were 1,724 cotton warehouses in Manchester and 
only 95 cotton mills. Trade had replaced production as the city’s main source of 
wealth. 
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established. For example, in London, Sir Henry Cole – one of the prime 
movers of the Great Exhibition – is intent on using some of the £186,000 
profit to improve art and design appreciation. Land is purchased in South 
Kensington, and many exhibits from the Great Exhibition are acquired to 
form the nucleus of a public collection for the magnificent new South 
Kensington Museum – later to become the Victoria and Albert Museum.  
At about the same time, and nearing the end of his life, Sir Henry Tate, a 
sugar magnate, philanthropist and major collector of Victorian art, offers his 
private collection as a gift to the nation. Parliament declines. Tate then offers 
to fund a public gallery to house his collection and to initiate a National 
Gallery of British Art, providing the government donate a suitable site, and 
undertake the gallery’s administration. After much debate, Tate’s offer is 
accepted. The site chosen is the disused Millbank Penitentiary, a huge prison 
near the Thames, it is demolished and the new ‘palace of art’ the National 
Gallery of British Art, is constructed. Later, the name will change to The Tate 
Gallery in recognition of Tate’s generosity and commitment.  
Act 1. Scene 2 
It’s Friday evening, and after a tiring day at the Art Treasures Exhibition we 
take a hansom cab to the Athenaeum in Mosely Street. The Athenaeum is a 
private institution, a club for the promotion of learning. We manage to 
squeeze into a packed, hot, and smoky lecture hall just in time to see the 
famous John Ruskin step up to the lectern to deliver the first lecture in his 
series of two, entitled The Discovery and Application of Art. The second lecture, 
performed the following Monday 13th is called The Accumulation and 
Distribution of Art. Combined, the marathon lectures will build a coherent, if a 
somewhat rambling, model of a political economy of art, later published as A 
Joy Forever and Its Price in the Market (Ruskin, 2006). 
Ruskin clears his throat, and begins 
Now, it seemed to me that since, in the name you have given to this great 
gathering of British pictures, you recognize them as Treasures – that is, I 
suppose, as part and parcel of the real wealth of the country – you might not 
be uninterested in tracing certain commercial questions connected with this 
particular form of wealth. Most persons express themselves as surprised at its 
quantity; not having known before to what an extent good art had been 
accumulated in England: and it will, therefore, I should think, be held a 
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worthy subject of consideration, what are the political interests involved in 
such accumulations, what kind of labour they represent, and how this labour 
may in general be applied and economized, so as to produce the richest 
results. (2006: 16) 
He goes on to discuss how to discover your genius. He thinks that the 
recently founded art schools – he calls them trial schools – are good and 
productive2. And then, how to distribute the genius you have found. Put 
simply, Ruskin feels we need people with money prepared to spend on 
contemporary art, and nurture it. 
Act 1. Scene 3 
It is Monday 13th, a little warmer, and we are back at the packed Athenaeum. 
Ruskin, stroking his beard, begins by recapping 
Our subject which remain for our consideration this evening are, you will 
remember, the accumulation and the distribution of works of art. Our 
complete inquiry fell into four divisions – first, how to get our genius; then, 
how to apply our genius; then, how to accumulate its results; and lastly, how 
to distribute them – we have tonight to examine the modes of its preservation 
and distribution. 
Accumulation 
Art should not be cheap – great works depend on the quality of attention 
paid to them. You need a commercial network of artists, dealers and 
collectors to circulate artworks. Private individuals prepared to invest time, 
attention and money. 
                                                
2 In 1835 a Select Committee is set in motion to ‘Enquire into the best means of 
extending a knowledge of the Arts and the principles of Design among the 
people, especially the manufacturing population of the country’. The following 
year the Committee recommends that Parliament invest £1,500 to establish a 
central school of design in London, with further annual funding to establish a 
network of provincial schools in the major industrial centres of the country. The 
Government School of Design is established at Somerset House in London in 
1837, and Art & Design becomes the first form of publicly funded education in 
Britain. 
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Distribution 
And yet, he asks rhetorically, how can we bring great art within the reach of 
the multitude? [Ruskin’s term] The answer? We need larger and more 
numerous public museums – to do for art what printing did to literature. 
[…] don’t grumble when you hear of a new picture being bought by 
Government at a large price. There are many pictures in Europe now in 
danger of destruction, which are, in the true sense of the word, priceless; the 
proper price is simply that which it is necessary to give to get and to save 
them. (2006: 61) 
While he appreciates the love and investment implicit private collections, he 
also recognizes the necessity of public institutions, of curating national wealth, 
and then he ends by drawing this distinction 
So then, generally, it should be the object of government, to collect the works 
of dead masters in public galleries, arranging them so as to illustrate the 
history of nations, and the progress and influence of their arts; and to 
encourage the private possession of the works of living masters. (2006: 65) 
Ruskin profusely thanks the audience for their attention, and then basks in 
thunderous applause having sketched the foundations of a political economy 
for artworks. His sketch has two principle structural forces: priceless artworks 
(literally) by dead artists removed from the competitive market by public 
museum acquisition, and a competitive market circulating and evaluating 
artworks by living artists. 
Act 2. Scene 1  
We are in New York on the 18th of October 1973, an Indian Summer, it’s a 
pleasantly warm evening. 
Two years earlier, on 15th August, and without prior warning, President 
Richard Nixon announces in a Sunday evening televised address that America 
is abandoning the almost thirty-year-old Bretton Woods agreement, and 
removing the dollar from fixed-rate convertibility to gold. Through the 
Bretton Woods system, the US dollar had acted in the 20th century as gold 
had during Ruskin’s 19th. Inflation in the United States, the escalating cost of 
the war in Vietnam, a growing American trade deficit and increasingly vast 
amounts of finance capital circulating outside of government control, are all 
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pressurising the value of the dollar. With Bretton Woods abandoned, the 
dollar is allowed to ‘float’, that is, to fluctuate against other currencies, and 
exchange rates promptly recalibrate.  
In the midst of this financial downturn, and on the eve of divorce, Robert 
and Ethel Scull decide to sell 50 artworks from their amazing collection of 
American pop and Abstract Expressionist art at Sotheby’s auction house in 
New York. The Sculls had begun collecting in the mid-1950s, when there was 
virtually no interest, or market, for contemporary art, with funds derived 
from a taxicab business founded by Ethel’s father.  
When Jasper Johns first exhibits at the Leo Castelli Gallery in 1957, not 
one of the artworks sell. Castelli calls Robert Scull, he visits, and buys the 
whole exhibition. 
At the entrance to Sotheby’s on 5th Avenue, security holds back a crowd of 
protestors at the door, demonstrating at the obscenity of selling artworks for 
profit in a time of crisis. We manage to squeeze through and into the packed 
auction saleroom to mingle with gallerists, dealers, museum directors, wealthy 
collectors, celebrities, TV crews, and a drunk and irate Robert Rauchenberg. 
After three hours of frantic, and near hysterical bidding the sale ceases and 
has turned-over an astronomical $2,242,900.  
Thaw, a Robert Rauschenberg combine-painting that the Sculls bought for 
$900 some 16 years earlier, sells for $85,000; Andy Warhol’s large-canvas 
Flowers, bought for $3,500, sells for $135,000, and Jasper Johns’ Double White 
Map, bought for $10,000, fetches $240,000.  
The auction is a spectacular event, which ends in an awed silence and a 
sharp exchange as Rauchenberg shouts at Scull: ‘I’ve been working my ass off 
just for you to make that profit.’ Scull retorts: ‘It works for you too, Bob. 
Now I hope you’ll get even bigger prices’ (Schott and Vaughn, 1973). The 
shock is not just from the Sculls’ unbelievable profits, but also from the 
sudden realisation that contemporary art is a viable financial vehicle. A thing 
of beauty is a joy forever, and has a price in the market. A speculative market 
for contemporary art is both enacted and revealed, and one of the things 
revealed is a further bifurcation in the political economy of artworks. 
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ACT 3. Scene 1 
Markets are a brilliant bundle of technologies, assembled to circulate things. 
All kinds of things. The most visible form of a market is the competitive 
market. A neo-classical economic model of a competitive market pictures 
rational individuals pursuing their own self-interest, without regard for others, 
as the motive force in markets. The laws of supply and demand at play 
amongst these rational individuals extrudes the values – often represented by 
a financial price – exchanged, in any transaction.  
These fundamental elements – rational agents, supply and demand and 
price mechanisms – function in all markets everywhere; like natural laws. Like 
gravity. 
Except of course competitive markets don’t actually work like this. Or at 
least, only in ideological models. Principally this is because the neo-classical 
model is spectacularly under-socialised, and the social labour of market-
making is under-researched, under-theorised and undervalued.  
Enabling values to be made, and made present, is part of the work that 
markets do. And every value expressed as a price, is a nexus of myriad social 
processes. Markets are meshworks of embedded desires, needs, rules, 
technologies, rituals and obligations, and nowhere is this more apparent than 
in the markets for the circulation of contemporary art.  
As in Ruskin’s sketch for a political economy of art, outside of public 
museums, and some secretive private collections in the Freeport of Geneva, 
artworks circulate through competitive markets. But how does this circulation 
take place? What are these embedded desires, rules, behaviours and 
obligations? 
The bankruptcy of art history, and the public failure of criticism and art 
theory has enabled the values of competitive markets to dominate our recent 
evaluations of contemporary art. And markets mark the things that circulate 
within them3. 
                                                
3 That ‘Markets mark the things they distribute’ was a phrase political philosopher 
Michael Sandel deployed in the first 2009 BBC Reith Lectures. He used an example, 
derived from the USA, of paying a fee to schoolchildren to encourage them to 
read. By paying children to read they might begin to believe that reading is a way 
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ACT 3. Scene 2 
Primary Market 
As the Robert and Ethel Scull auction sale exposed, the circulation of 
contemporary artworks is structured by two competitive markets – and prices 
for the same assets in one are routinely half that of the other. This already 
makes little sense to a neo-classical economist. 
The primary market is convened by gallerists who organise and manage 
‘commercial’ galleries. Whether as small single person enterprises or vast 
corporate machines, what gallerists share is the desire to work directly with 
artists, promote their work through exhibitions, and sell their artworks to 
potential collectors.  
To become a gallerist is easy, the start-up costs are extremely small – some 
enthusiasm, contacts, a small exhibition and office space, and an advertising 
budget. There are no formal qualifications necessary; no indemnity required, 
no trade association to join, and no regulatory bodies. The primary market is, 
for all intents and purposes, while not quite ‘unregulated’, certainly without a 
‘formal’ professional structure.  
It’s also easy to attract a group of artists keen to exhibit; just tell them you 
are a gallerist, and they generally come running. Typically a gallery will 
‘represent’ between 10 and 25 artists. To be ‘represented’, usually means that 
an artist will be offered a solo exhibition annually or bi-annually and their 
artworks will be included in appropriate gallery group exhibitions. 
‘Representation’ for the gallery includes bringing the artwork to the 
attention of curators and collectors, and placing the artworks in curated 
public exhibitions, biennials, and at art fairs; nationally and internationally. 
They also arrange studio visits with select collectors and curators, organise 
private views to launch exhibitions, assemble press brunches and lunches, and 
choreograph lavish dinners and after-parties. The primary gallerist chooses, 
nurtures and develops the artists they ‘represent’ through creating a dense 
social network.  
                                                
of earning money. Any inherent good of reading will be overwritten by the desire 
to financially profit. 
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Much of the labour of nurture is in the management of the informational 
prosthesis of the circulating artworks; through producing press releases and 
exhibition invites, buying advertising space, placing articles in newspapers and 
magazines, publishing catalogues, documenting and archiving artworks, and 
by cultivating critics, editors and publishers.  
These are just some of the mechanisms through which an emergent 
market for artworks is convened.  
And into this potential market, the gallerist introduces new artworks to 
collectors. Usually artworks are taken on consignment from an artist for 
exhibition, and it’s common for the gallerist to take a 50% commission, and 
often more, on any sales. Sold artworks leave the artist’s studio, pass through 
the gallery at exhibition and enter private collections. Here they remain until 
the collector decides to re-sell, or donate to a museum collection. Unsold 
artworks return to the deep-sleep of storage, while some linger in the gallery 
as ‘stock’ to be displayed to prospective collectors, or curators4. 
All ‘represented’ artists have a primary gallery. Any curators, public 
institutions or museums that want to exhibit the artists artworks have to deal 
with the primary gallery; and any other commercial galleries who wish to 
exhibit and sell the artists artworks have to do business with them too.  
Gallerists talk endlessly about supporting young artists, they love visiting 
studios, socialising, and installing exhibitions; they love art, and prefer not to 
let commerce and the market ‘complicate’ their relationships. And yet when 
they discuss gallery stock, or their private collections, they know exactly how 
much they initially paid, the last market evaluation, any potential discounts to 
be offered to select collectors or museums, and of course, in the blink of an 
eye, are able to calculate the artwork’s financial appreciation. 
While primary gallerists thrive by taking risks and having confidence in 
their ‘taste’, they also seek to hedge the risks involved, through their 
promotional practices and by managing their network of friends and 
collectors into an economy of taste. To paraphrase sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu: ‘taste is what other people like you like’. 
                                                
4 Unofficially, artworks are often ‘kept’ by the gallery to offset un-recovered 
expenses in the hope of recouping costs at some later date. 
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If you or I were to stroll into the Foksal Gallery Foundation from the street 
with a pocket full of cash, fall in love with a Paulina Ołowska painting on 
display, and decide we really, really wanted to buy it for our home, the 
gallerist would not necessarily sell it to us. Even if we offered to pay over the 
asking price5. She or he will feel that we are the ‘wrong’ sort of person to own 
the artwork, or probably buying it for the ‘wrong’ reasons. And, if we are not 
already known to the gallerist, and therefore outside of their economy of 
taste, then definitely, we are the ‘wrong’ sort of person. 
Nurturing the ‘right’ collector, and placing an artwork with them for the 
‘right’ reason is the principle means of control of the value of an artwork 
through the primary competitive market in the political economy of art. 
Selling for the ‘right’ reasons include placing an artwork with a prestigious 
collector who will add to the evaluation of an artist and artwork – not 
necessarily the person prepared to pay the highest price. The ‘right’ collector 
might already have, or be in the process of building an ‘important’ art 
collection. The ‘right’ reasons might include the collector being prepared to 
sign a resale agreement, a quasi-legal document guaranteeing a ‘right of first 
refusal’ on any future sale back to the primary gallerist6.  
The ‘right’ reason could be encouraged if the collector promised to donate 
the artwork to an important public museum collection at some future date.  
Gifting an artwork to a national collection removes the artwork from 
circulation, but also lends prestige to the artist – and therefore future 
artworks, the generous collector, and perceptive gallerist7. 
Through managing the circulation of artworks through economies of taste, 
an artwork or artist are never entirely disentangled from their producer – the 
gallerist. It’s not surprising that relationships, and particularly long working 
                                                
5  If the artist is fairly prominent in the competitive market, the gallerist will 
sometimes pretend that there is a waiting-list to acquire an artwork. And if you 
are very, very lucky you will be added to the list. 
6  Resale agreements are mechanisms by which the gallerists try to insure that 
artworks do not spin out of their orbit, and into the less manageable secondary 
market. 
7  A gift distributes status, while gifting to a public museum removes an artwork 
from circulation. In public collections artworks cease to circulate, they become 
literally ‘priceless’. 
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relationships develop into friendships between gallerists and artist, or gallerist 
and collector, or perhaps all three8. Collectors are often referred to as 
supporters, ‘angels’ or ‘friends’ of the gallery.  
In the extraordinarily dense flow of gifts and obligations, debts and 
favours, loans and discounts that lubricate artworks in their circulation, 
economic transactions merge into relational social exchanges. A discount 
offered between gallerist and collector is as much a sign of mutuality as it is a 
display of economic of power. 
Primary gallerists appear to do everything possible to delay an artwork’s 
spiral into the secondary economy. 
ACT 3. Scene 3 
The Secondary Market 
The secondary market for contemporary art is structured through auction 
houses.  
Auctions are relational competitive markets, and breath-taking theatre. 
The twin poles of drama – the flicker between despair and euphoria – are 
endlessly produced, because buyers compete to establish an appropriate 
evaluation – when the hammer falls. The price is extruded as the auction is 
conducted, by the last person standing in the tournament of value9.  
Of course there are price precedents to refer to, there are reserve prices 
established, published estimates, and guarantees offered, and yet none of 
these can be taken as true. An auction has to be convened and set in motion 
to perform the social production of evaluation, live, and in real-time.  
If the primary market relies on deep, personal and complex relationships 
between artists, gallerists and collectors, then in the secondary market, 
artworks circulate through looser, more diverse and contingent networks 
                                                
8  The one thing likely to destroy these fluid relationships – often unstructured by 
legal contracts – is if the artist decides to sell an artwork directly from the studio. 
That’s bad. 
9  ‘A tournament of value’ is a phrase used by Jean Baudrillard (1996) in The System 
of Objects to describe auctions. 
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outside the manipulation and monopolization of the primary market. While 
the primary market is reproduced within established communities of taste, the 
secondary market has to continually perform itself. 
In theory, an auction is close to the ideal of a ‘free’ market. Anyone can 
participate, and everyone has equal access to the market, all the information 
regarding the market is readily available, and artworks are distributed on the 
ability to pay the ‘spot’ price. Except again, this is an ideological fantasy. 
Auctions are secretive and information is guarded, auctions are very sensitive 
to hype, excitement, gossip and rumour. And very, very susceptible to the 
arbitrary competitive clash of two determined bidders10. When two or more 
collectors are determined to acquire the same artwork, or, when a particular 
individual wants to make a statement, a sensational or ‘sacrificial price’ can be 
achieved. A ‘sacrificial price’ inscribes a mark in the market ‘I can afford this’ 
or ‘I want this, this much’ or ‘Look at the scale of my desire’ or simply ‘Look 
at me’!  
There could also be a financial logic in the desire to establish a ‘sacrificial 
price’; other comparable artworks already in the collector’s collection will 
(notionally) have a similar evaluation. Simply, a sensational price recalibrates 
the market. 
Anyone can attend an auction, in England no tickets are issued and no 
booking is required. Like legal trials, auctions are truly public judgements. 
And, anyone can purchase an artwork offered for sale, as long as they have 
the access to the appropriate sum of money, or credit-line. In the secondary 
market, there are only the ‘right’ reasons to transact. The auction does not 
care where the money comes from or where the artwork goes, as long as 
international laws are not seen to be broken. In the secondary market, the 
only taboo is around stagnation. Artworks must always circulate, and their 
extruded prices escalate. A stalled lot – an artwork offered for auction which 
does not reach its reserve price – fails to sell. It’s ‘passed’. This can damage 
the artwork, the artist’s reputation, and all the other artists artworks currently 
in circulation or exhibited in private collections. Worse, a stalled artwork 
could trigger a collapse of the current auction, and confidence can simply 
                                                
10  Auctions are prone to ‘rigging’ and price-fixing. Rumours circulate of auctioneers 
‘taking’ fictional – usually telephone – bids to stimulate a sleepy saleroom, or 
leverage the bid-price over the lots reserve. 
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evaporate from the saleroom; in an instant. And even more catastrophically, a 
failed lot can puncture a bubble and trigger a systemic market collapse. So, 
artworks that fail to reach their reserve price at auction are literally ‘passed’, 
they are passed over with a stifled incantation by the auctioneer of words 
barely audible on the saleroom floor ‘pass’. 
‘Passes’ can be contagious. Perfectly healthy auctions can stutter, stop and 
die11. If the secondary market thrives on constant circulation, record-prices 
and buoyant confidence, on the management of a ‘virtuous circle’ of 
evaluation, ‘passes’ expose the sensitive underbelly of market confidence. If 
you only want what other people like you want, and they no longer want the 
goods on offer; it’s over. Circulation ceases12. ‘Passes’ are the inverse of the 
‘sacrificial price’. 
One of the instruments for managing circulation of artworks in the 
secondary market is the reserve price. The reserve is a financial boundary, 
agreed by the seller/collector advised by the auction house specialist. At 
auction, if the lot does not reach its reserve it returns to the seller/collector 
unsold. If bidders drive the price of the artwork above, it’s transacted from 
one collector or dealer to another. Reserves are private financial agreements, 
usually somewhere towards the lower margin of the published estimates. To 
encourage collectors to circulate important artworks in the secondary market 
– and not with a rival auction house – financial guarantees may be offered. 
The guarantee is a fee, which is probably close to the reserve price, paid to 
the seller/collector up-front. It’s in the auction house’s interest to pressure 
the edge of the previous market evaluation, to tease-up prices. If the lot is 
‘passed’ the auction house loses the financial guarantee, as well as the 
confidence of the saleroom. To recoup some of their losses, after the sale, 
                                                
11  At a Sotheby’s sale in New York on the 7th of November 2007, almost half the 
lots failed to sell – the ‘passing’ of Vincent van Gogh’s Wheat Fields (1890) is 
credited as triggering the collapse. The auction house lost $14.6 million in 
guarantees, and as a consequence 36% was wiped from the share value of the 
company; overnight (http://www.artnet.com/magazineus/news/waltzer/ 
waltzer11-8-07.asp). 
12  Auction houses financially profit by adding a percentage to the hammer price, 




quietly and behind the scenes, the auction house will try and broker a private 
sale. 
The auction house ‘expert’, or collector or dealer active in the secondary 
market needs to be aware of which collector owns what artworks, how the 
collection is being developed and through which gallerists, and what artwork 
is about to be ‘offered’ to the market13. A prominent artwork is located, 
prised from a collection, offered for sale and achieves a record evaluation. It 
passes from one collector to another, and a window of opportunity opens. 
An opportunity for other collectors with similar holdings of artworks to 
‘realise’ their value, a chance to ‘refresh, or ‘re-focus’ their collection. Or, for 
the ‘experts’ and dealers to encourage collectors to buy into this fleeting 
market opportunity. This is the moment for dealers to ‘flip’ artworks or 
‘churn’ the market. ‘Churn’ the secondary market, because it thrives on 
difference within repetition. There are endless Andy Warhol prints and each 
one can be narrated into difference.  
The traditional slow steady circulation of artworks – with concomitant 
checks and balances; like a solid record of prestigious exhibitions, a range of 
critical reviews, citation in refereed articles and scholarly books, 
representation in respected private collections, museum acquisition, etc. – is 
being replaced by the shriek of record prices, achieved in the secondary 
market with artworks straight from artists’ studios! If markets mark the things 
that circulate within them, then recently, the slower processes of evaluation of 
artworks has been overwritten by the swaggering confidence of a competitive 
market asset bubble. Gallerists, so powerful in the primary, despise the 
secondary market. It’s an aggressive, volatile and parasitic environment. And 
yet they participate in auctions, either brazenly in person or discretely by 
proxy. They bid-up or buy back artworks that have temporarily spun outside 
their sphere of influence, to ‘protect’ the artists they represent.  
ACT 4. Scene 1 
A cold evening in London, it is November 2011. News spools from the radio, 
Spain has elected a centre-right government, Italy is governed by un-elected 
                                                
13  The ‘three D’s’ – debt, divorce and death – are often cited as the main motives for 
selling. 
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financial technocrats, Greece, too, and anonymous traders in sovereign debt 
markets are driving European public policy. As John Ruskin suggests in his 
Art Treasures lectures, organisational, financial and exhibitionary practices are 
not imposed on spontaneous modes of creativity. Rather, organisational, 
financial and exhibitionary practices produce forms of creativity, and a 
political economy for their management.  
By enabling competitive markets to dominate the political economy of 
creativity, the kind of creativities produced and distributed is limited, severely 
limited. We know Its Price in the Market but have obscured the Joy Forever. 
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3 
Notes on Speculation as a Mode of Production 




The focus of this text is the elision between art and labour from the 
standpoint of the value-form. What I am trying to do is draw a link between 
the expansion of the category of art and the expansion of the value-form in 
the dynamics of social production and reproduction in recent times. Such an 
expansion, I will argue, is an index of the crisis in the relations of production 
that have kept art and labour separate, a separation that can no longer hold 
once that crisis is considered not just a general malfunctioning of a secular 
logic of valorisation called ‘finance’, but a crisis in the capital-labour relation 
more generally, which derives from the terminal logic (for capital) of finance 
as abstraction. In an unprecedented way, art not only reflects but revises the 
productive forces, shading into forces of extraction, enclosure and de-
valorisation in the era of debt-financed austerity that we are now seeing. 
Financialisation: Form Follows Finance 
Among the relationships that bind artworks to the political economy of their 
times, one of the foremost is that identified by Theodor W. Adorno, who 
conceives of ‘aesthetic forces of production’ that inescapably imprint the 
artwork: ‘The artist works as social agent, indifferent to society’s own 
consciousness. He embodies the social forces of production without 
necessarily being bound by the censorship dictated by the relations of 
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production’ (Adorno, 2007: 55). Those relations are legible in art, but 
encrypted in such a way as to underline their contingency. Jean-Joseph Goux 
relates Marx’s schema of the development of a general equivalent to the 
invention of forms of representation; of art, literature and language (Goux, 
1990). This system presents modes of signification and modes of exchange as 
imbricated. Goux describes capitalist exchange’s tendency towards 
abstraction and the tendency to ‘dematerialisation’ in art as two sides of a 
general crisis of representation punctuated by historically locatable crises in 
the value form (1919, 1929 and 1971). Each crisis marks a limit to the existing 
system’s ability to represent real world goods through money, and in each 
case resolution of the crisis is by way of an expansion, or further abstraction, 
of the money-form. Put crudely, the drives towards abstraction in art and 
money are entwined. 
I should mention here T.J. Clark’s analysis of the early Soviet currency 
crisis (re-fashioned into measures taken to abolish exchange-value) and the 
Soviet revolutionary avant-garde’s evacuation of the sign. This analysis occurs 
in the chapter ‘God is not cast down’ of Farewell to an Idea: 
… the implication that there is a deep connection between the 
representational order called capitalism and the belief (which we could call, 
for short, Saussurean) that all representational orders are at heart systems of 
difference, of pure exchange-values generated out of the relations between 
elements of a signifying system. Marxists would say that the insight here – and 
certainly there is an insight – occludes the further problem of the sign-
systems’ materiality, and thus their belonging to patterns of material 
production and reproduction which we call social practice. […] It takes a very 
special (and no doubt terrible) moment for these structures to be thinkable at 
all as socially determined. 1920 was one such. (Clark, 2001: 259-260) 
Art is both an innovator of the forms of representation – extending the limit 
of what can be represented – and, at times, their antagonist – eschewing 
equivalence and disrupting orders of measure. Art as a special commodity 
rebels against its commodity status, proposing different orders of value: 
‘Great 20th-century avant-garde art – and poetry in particular – from Celan to 
Brecht and Montale, has demonstrated the crisis of experiential units of 
measure… This emphasis on immoderation, disproportion […] is where 
[avant-garde art] edges up to communism’ (Virno, 2009). 
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Arguably in the movement towards financialisation art has tracked capital’s 
proclivity to escape from engagement with labour and into the self-reflexive 
abstraction of value. As gold became paper and then electronic, money 
increasingly became autonomous from productive labour. The movement of 
self-expanding value, appearing as money making money on financial 
markets, dissolves all prior values and relationships into abstract wealth. 
Similarly in art, the expansion of its claims upon material previously alien to it 
tends towards the hollowing out of this material’s substance. One notable 
aspect of ‘dematerialisation’ in art is its temporal coincidence with 
deindustrialisation in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This period saw a re-
engagement with industrial materials and (vacant) industrial spaces by artists. 
Another was the move towards information systems and new technologies. 
This could also be associated to the ‘spatial fix’ discussed by David Harvey, a 
regime of accumulation centred on exploiting differentials in land values – 
and cultural tourism’s primary role in this – and the irrevocable changes 
wrought in financial markets by information technologies, such as the nano-
speed trading which makes thousands of transactions on one commodity or 
quantity possible in a second. 
We can likewise examine instances of conceptualism which approached art 
as a ‘fiduciary’ object, using speculation as its material. One of these can be 
seen as the precursor to Robert Morris’ Money: Abraham Lubelski’s Sculptural 
Daydream (1968). The work itself was a pile of paper consisting of 250,000 
one-dollar bills borrowed at interest from the Chelsea National Bank. The 
sculpture, exhibited for five days, ran up a bill of three hundred dollars in 
interest. Perhaps intending a pun on the ‘disinterested’ status of the artwork 
in Kantian aesthetics, Lubelski here posed the same question as Morris’ later 
and better-known piece: is the artwork the sculpture (the physical money) or 
the interest it accrues? Morris, however, in common with other examples of 
‘investment art’ and more broadly in the current of early conceptualism, 
showed a lack of interest in the form of the work. With Money (1969), the 
interest (the transactions) is definitely what constitutes the work.1 
Morris had of course by then developed a vector in his oeuvre that sought 
to conjugate both linguistic and financial abstraction as conditions for the 
‘dematerialisation’ of the art object. An earlier piece responded to a collector’s 
                                                
1  Mike Sperlinger has written incisively on this and related works. 
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non-payment for a work with the production of a certificate withdrawing 
‘aesthetic value’ from the unpaid-for work; the Statement of Esthetic Withdrawal, 
1963. Naturally this certificate was also collected and displayed, next to the 
de-aestheticized work (although possibly not by the same collector). 
Concluding this very brisk survey on an ironizing note, we can refer to 
Carl Andre, who wrote: 
The most farcical claim of the conceptualizing inkpissers is that their works 
are somehow antibourgeois because they do away with objects. In fact, doing 
away with objects and replacing them with such reifications of abstract 
relations to production as stockshares, contracts and paper money itself 
(which is nothing but the fetishization of the idea of exchange value severed 
from even the dream of production) is exactly the final triumph of the 
bourgeois revolution. (Andre, 1976; quoted in Shell, 1995: 115) 
In this sense, the conditions set by the movements of finance provide the 
material and conceptual parameters for art. Art operates in these conditions 
but also upon them to transform their terms. Both are speculative 
commodities; art is backed by the credibility of the artist and money by the 
credibility of the state. Yet art is engaged in an endless testing of its own 
conditions which anticipates negations of the determinations of the value 
form from inside, rather than beyond, its tensions. 
To bring the discussion briefly up to date and into recent and current 
practice; a little précis of recent art which positions itself in the allegorical 
mode with relation to finance. There is Maria Eichhorn’s well-known 
Aktiengesellschaft (2002), for one, which freezes capital, or Zachary Formwalt, 
who works on the relation between circulation and visibility of capital. Images 
of crisis in the media show us capital at a standstill, whereas its movements 
are normally invisible and intangible (and bound to be even more so with the 
nanosecond-speed forms of electronic trading recently made possible by the 
discovery in particle physics of new forms of temporality not covered by the 
law of relativity) (Foresight, 2011). Here the making public of crisis 
exacerbates the crisis. Crisis makes circulation visible; when circulation 
freezes, it becomes visible, like Benjamin’s ‘dialectics at a standstill’ in the 
dialectical image. With his project on the 1847 Henry Fox Talbot photo of 
the Royal Exchange in London – almost the exact site of the 2011-2012 
Occupy London Stock Exchange assembly at St Paul’s – in which the long 
exposures necessary for the state of photographic technology at the time 
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meant that no people were visible in the streets around the building. It is as 
though these missing multitudes were represented, through the 
monumentality of the financial edifice, in absentia. This also links to how 
finance embodies a crisis of representation, even as representation augurs a 
crisis in finance. ‘Credit instruments, financial innovation – how to represent 
relations with no correlate in the object world? Financial innovation is 
basically the production of new saleable objects without ever entering into an 
external sphere of production. They cannot be represented because they are 
themselves terms of representation’ (Formwalt, 2010).  
If this complicity between money and art has led to unseemly games with 
both, the strain of this relationship has also ushered in forms of critical 
reflection.2 Throughout art’s development in the face of advanced capitalism, 
tension with commodification gravitates towards uselessness and negation 
when it comes to representing or emulating productive labour, and 
speculation when it comes to representing or emulating the characteristic 
processes of accumulation. 
Speculation and Contingency 
“Modernity” means contingency. It points to a social order which has turned 
from the worship of ancestors and past authorities to the pursuit of a 
projected future – of goods, pleasures, freedoms, forms of control over 
nature, or infinities of information. (Clark, 2001: 7) 
The ‘disjunctive synthesis’ between art and finance in terms of abstraction, 
indeterminacy and speculation can also be addressed through the hermetic 
quality common to works of art and innovative financial instruments. This 
quality stands in for an excess of an otherwise utterly heteronomous or 
overdetermined reality, but both of course depend on the subjugation and 
expropriation of labour in order to realize their value in the market. This 
subjugation and expropriation also has to, perhaps most importantly, happen 
symbolically; the invisibility of labour which is deemed profane and 
‘unproductive’ of this freedom that only money can guarantee in its 
                                                
2 This specific relationship between financialisation and art is explored in detail in 
Melanie Gilligan, Notes on Art, Finance and the Un-Productive Forces, Glasgow: 
Transmission Gallery, 2008. 
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frictionless self-valorisation, is a result of the emergence of speculation as the 
template for economic, but also personal and social valorisation. Speculation 
thus pre-eminently arises in the division between mental and manual labour, 
in the attribution of innovative thought and praxis to a class of people who 
are not constrained by material need: the ‘symbolic analysts’ and creatives of 
art and of finance. The connection to the undetermined, to the future, to the 
unknown and to the possible is removed from labour and becomes the 
property of this class, whose dependency on labour is henceforth mediated as 
the access to universality lent by independence from material constraint, an 
autonomy from interest. The genesis of such a class division and social 
division of labour in the concomitant emergence of Enlightenment rationality 
and industrial capitalism will have to be passed over here, though we can cite 
the early 18th century, when the rise of the social logic of speculation, as 
evidenced in the South Sea Bubble and chronicled by the likes of Daniel 
Defoe and Jonathan Swift, gave rise to the modern antinomies of bourgeois 
consciousness wherein speculation is linked to new forms of freedom, but 
also to an anxiety about measure, reduction and degradation of time-tested 
and dense forms of social exchange based on hierarchy and feudal moral 
economies. The historical autonomy of art, then, can be sited in the split 
between mental and manual labour which presupposed the generalisation of 
alienated labour as the hallmark of social relations in capitalism. 
The social existence of art as a distinct sphere of human endeavour enjoys 
a strong correspondence with the value-form insofar as the basis of both is, 
in a way, indeterminacy. The value-form is a way of organising and extracting 
surplus, and art is a materialisation or socialisation of that surplus as open-
ended speculation – in the sense of speculative praxis. This speculation is 
suffused with the ideological freight of open-endedness; the utopian moment 
that is also corollary to capital – the relationship between the ‘unconditioned’ 
that is art, and the pure abstraction that is the core of capital, the pure algebra 
of value – which is not to downplay the more strictly ideological role of art as 
affirmation of freedom from capitalist social relations. As cited earlier, the 
services rendered by autonomy, however provisional and fragile that 
autonomy is understood to be by now, nonetheless tie in with the paltry 
individuations offered by the ‘creative industries’ and the massification of 
speculation on the ‘self’ through e.g. social networking platforms. It should 
be noted that ‘speculation’ has another purchase as well: it is not simply 
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indeterminate/utopian, or amenable to characteristically financial mediations, 
such as gambling or the production of subjectivity as a commodity. 
Speculation is also a type of political thought which departs from the 
parameters of the actual and draws on them for its sense of possibility when 
envisioning or constructing change. This implied speculation can also operate 
in a dystopian or prefigurative mode, both of which are more determined by 
the present and by history than the exhilarating vacuum of the utopian. 
Frederic Jameson, writing on Bertolt Brecht’s notion of the scientific in 
aesthetic praxis as the ‘experimental attitude’ which secures aesthetic praxis as 
non-alienated labour, discusses speculation in these terms: 
Brecht’s particular vision of science was for him the means of annulling the 
separation between physical and mental activity and the fundamental division 
of labour (not least that between worker and intellectual) that resulted from it: 
it puts knowing the world back together with changing the world, and at the 
same time unites an ideal of praxis with a conception of production. […] In 
the Brechtian aesthetic, indeed, the idea of realism is not a purely aesthetic 
and formal category, but rather governs the relationship of the work of art to 
reality itself, characterising a particular stance towards it. The spirit of realism 
designates an active, curious, experimental, subversive – in a word scientific – 
attitude towards social institutions and the material world… (Jameson, 2007: 
204). 
Setting aside for a moment the impact of this kind of aesthetic praxis on the 
division of labour and social change, we can attend to speculation’s 
hegemonic function in the current period. The shift of speculation from 
being an elite activity to a normative parameter for all labour marks the 
erosion and eclipse of understanding of class interests as real, divergent and 
institutionally mediated. The loss of the external referent that labour posed to 
capital, or use-value to exchange-value, has resulted in the situation of 
capitalist recursivity that the social logic of speculation needs in order to 
flourish. This self-referentiality, the harmonious self-regulation that 
neoclassical economics has propounded for decades, if not centuries, as the 
regulative ideal of social relations and market transaction alike, produces a 
kind of loss of measuring capacity which has in certain quarters been called 
the obsolescence of the law of value. But perhaps such an erosion of measure 
speaks simply of the great expansion, diffusion, and refinement of that law; it 
has nothing to measure any longer but its own effects. It is a law founded on 
abstraction, reduction, and on the proliferation of instruments of abstraction, 
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rather than the institution of abstract equivalence between labour-time and 
the wage through money that anchored a time when the law of value did 
apply in some well-defined sense. Thus, the proximity between art thought of 
as abstract labour and abstract labour thought of as human capital is 
exemplified by the loss of measure in both under the sign of finance, by the 
indeterminacy and expansion of art and the indeterminacy and expansion of 
work. A note on human capital: if we look at the idea of it, both in its original 
ideological formulation by Gary Becker and as analysed by Foucault, and its 
unproblematic embrace as a neutral terminology by all manner of policy 
discourses, it might be helpful to see it as another way of describing what 
Marx called ‘real subsumption’, that is, the integration and transmutation of 
labour into capital in the production process, but which, as in the writings of 
the Italian autonomists and other more recent trends in political theory, we 
now see extended into the whole range of social relations, subjectivity and 
biological existence. Furthermore, human capital can also be seen as the 
figure of the shift in the guiding logic of capital from the equivalence of 
exchange (the worker) to the asymmetry of competition (the entrepreneur), 
and its internalisation by, or endo-colonisation of, the subject. 
In terms of updating the topology of heteronomy and autonomy for the 
present relations of aesthetic production, with an emphasis on labour, art 
seems to provide a way of reconciling the extension of the value-form – 
expropriation, privatisation, imposition of work – with the erosion of the law 
of value that seemed to make some sense out of work before. The social 
expansion of finance, and the expansion of art, should be seen in strict 
analogy with the contraction of labour; both are processes of ‘real’ (?) 
abstraction, so to speak – they render the processes of social domination ever 
more abstract in daily life, in reproduction, while locating that reproduction 
more and more intimately within the sphere of finance. Why this should be 
the case – why art should play the legitimating role it does for the rule of 
finance – can perhaps be found in art’s privileged relation to contingency, 
that is, contingency understood as novelty, unpredictability, and the creation 
of as yet untested and potentially infinite value. Art has the capacity to 
socialise what, on the face of it, are rather financial imperatives such as these, 
since art is the name for innovative praxis in a capitalist society, positioned as 
beyond economic or other deterministic interests, or as ‘unconditioned’; a 
social ‘research and development’ site even after decades of intensified 
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proximity to market behaviour and government policy. Thus contingency 
seems to belong to both art and finance insofar as both are speculative 
practices. It could also be said that contingency is a kind of negativity as well; 
an ‘antithesis to that which is the case’. But to go a little more deeply into this 
link of contingency between art and finance, what exactly is the structural role 
of contingency in finance? 
The market trader-turned-speculative realist Elie Ayache, in his published 
lecture ‘In The Middle of The Event’ (Ayache, 2011), contends that the risk 
formulas used in derivatives trading, such as the well-known Black-Scholes 
equation, are ultimately nonsensical since in order to accurately assess the 
probability of various risk factors of the asset in question, they would end up 
in an endless recursion of trying to evaluate the volatility of each factor based 
on its relation to the volatility of all the other factors, which itself relates back 
to the risk assessment that influences the trading of the assets. His simple 
counter-argument to such formulas is that if assets traded at the price which 
risk-assessment value algorithms allocated to them, the trade in these assets 
would be a priori impossible. The trade depends on the recursivity of the 
implied rather than assessed risk of the assets; at a basic level, it is the 
recursive volatility of the market itself which drives trade. Hence he proposes 
that probability should be dispensed with when predicting, describing or 
regulating what takes place in financial markets in favour of what he calls 
‘contingent claims’. The ‘absolute contingency’ of asset prices in the market 
retroactively creates its own conditions, which then serve as the basis of the 
asset prices in the next cycle, and so on. He links this to Henri Bergson’s 
concept of creative evolution, Alain Badiou’s theory of the event, and Gilles 
Deleuze’s conceptual dyad of the virtual and the actual. All these are concepts 
which operate outside the shadow of probability; the radical unforeseeability 
of the event means that its causes are only discernible in retrospect – the 
event is an effect that creates its own causes: ‘Absolute contingency of the 
final world gets reflected or translated, ahead of time, by the exchange. The 
market, or the exchange, is how absolute contingency projects itself ahead of 
time. This may even act as a definition of exchange’ (Ayache, 2011: 35). 
Here we can see that financial speculation is formulated as the exemplary 
instance of absolute contingency, since transactions are powered by the 
contingency of value-claims: the market is constantly re-setting itself in line 
with those encounters between claims to value and the contingency of those 
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claims, and this is what keeps the market going – absolute contingency is the 
market’s metastability. It is interesting to juxtapose Ayache’s account of the 
paradoxical aspects of probabilistic risk assessment in a milieu of absolute 
contingency with Marxist political economist David McNally’s description of 
the Value at Risk formulas as a cancellation of contingency (McNally, 2009: 
70)3. A contrast emerges between their two visions of the relation between 
finance, contingency and the emancipatory. Ayache is concerned with 
ascribing an emancipatory agency to contingency in markets, and not only 
tries to articulate it using philosophical concepts usually associated with 
transformative and counter-hegemonic programmes, but to situate it in 
relation to art – his lecture was delivered in the context of an exhibition at a 
London gallery. McNally, on the other hand, while agreeing with Ayache’s 
critique of existing models of quantification of risk, frames the critique in a 
rather different way. For him, market speculation cannot be extracted from 
its reliance on, or description by, those models, since the speculative agency 
of finance needs to assume the continuity of the market, e.g. of capitalism, 
and thus can only operate in the foreclosure of a different future. 
Consequently, financial speculation is ultimately anti-speculative, if 
                                                
3 Both Ayache and McNally’s critiques of measure in financial markets can be 
usefully read alongside Christian Marazzi’s account of ‘endogenous’ risk in 
markets: ‘In fact, there is a particular ontological weakness in the models of 
probability calculation used to evaluate risks due to the endogenous nature of the 
interactions between the financial operators […] This explains the “evaluation 
errors” of risk not so much, or not only, as mistakes attributable to the conflict of 
interests scandalously typical of rating agencies, but as the expression of an 
(ontological) impossibility of making rules or meta-rules able to discipline 
markets in accordance with so-called rational principles. All the more so when, 
according to the methods used to establish the value of financial assets, like the 
ones based on the new accounting norms (International Financial Reporting 
Standards, IFRS, secured by Basel II), the fair value of assets is calculated on the 
basis of the conflict between their market value and the value at which the asset 
is being negotiated, that is, its historical value (the method used to establish this 
valuation is called ‘mark to market’). The problem posed by these methods of 
valuation is that, since fair values act as a reference to calculate the value of a 
patrimonial asset – in the same way as a private citizen who calculates his real 
assets, including the current market value of his real estate – there is a strong urge 
to increase asset value by increasing debt…’ (Marazzi, 2010b: 80-81). 
Notes on Speculation as a Mode of Production in Art and Capital 
  57 
‘speculation’ is taken chiefly in its experimental or creative-innovative sense, 
since the kind of speculation that happens in markets is concerned to 
minimise systemic change, or at least, to subsume all change into the logic of 
profit. 
McNally stresses that ‘value-forms have been extended at the same time as 
value-measures (and predictions) have become more volatile’ (McNally, 2009: 
57). This volatility means that capitalist measure, in the shape of money, is 
problematised, as the value of money itself is one of the quantities to be 
measured, or traded. This creates a situation of systemic risk, as the very 
preconditions of trade (weather, agriculture, governance structures) 
themselves became tradeable entities and financial commodities. This 
emergence of systemic risk necessitated the design and deployment of all 
kinds of risk-hedging instruments, whose trade was conditional on the 
volatility these instruments themselves put into play, as in the trade of 
derivatives contracts, CDSs and CDOs, and other and more recondite forms 
of risk insurance. As the markets for risk-assessment and risk-managing 
devices expanded, this in its turn led to an escalated level of volatility, a 
‘positive feedback’ loop (or chaos), as most recently witnessed in the 
speculative attacks on the Euro, or the 1990s attack on the Pound by George 
Soros. Bets on debts going bad are profitable when those debts stand a 
greater likelihood of going bad due to the inimical market conditions created 
for those debts by those bets. The geopolitically decisive, if not absolute, 
power of ratings agencies in both determining the policy options of sovereign 
nation-states and feeding speculative markets in sovereign debt is something 
we are witnessing now in the most explicit ways in the consequences of the 
brutal austerity programmes imposed at the behest of those agencies and 
markets in Greece and other Mediterranean countries. While generating 
geopolitical turmoil, such speculation tends towards enhancing the stability 
and accumulative capacities of the financial markets, as the political fallout of 
currency attacks have demonstrated time and again – social turbulence is an 
easily hedged risk in the global financial architecture, provided it doesn’t 
impinge on the dominance of that architecture as well. In distinction from the 
apocryphal derivative trade on ‘the end of capitalism’ reported in the early 
days of the crash, the stability of this architecture is the basis of the 
burgeoning levels of speculation; the law of value itself cannot enter as a risk 
factor into the ‘absolute contingency’ of speculative markets. Not only this, 
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but the assumption that the law of value will continue to hold fuels what is 
the hallmark of financialisation; that is, the trade in fictitious capital,4 or 
claims to future surplus-value not yet produced. Variants of this have been 
mentioned in the foregoing account, which produces temporal closure, or 
rather ‘securitisation’ – the indefinite extension of the present, a present 
quantified by instruments such as the Black-Scholes equation or the Value at 
Risk (VaR) formula.5 While McNally sees such instruments as clear instances 
of the ‘single metric’ tendency of capitalist measure which needs to establish 
common bases for commodity exchange (money as the general equivalent, 
abstract labour as the common substance of value), he links the financial 
crisis to the dysfunctionality of these instruments, and takes this 
dysfunctionality to be a symptom of the inability to measure risk in an 
economic climate of constant currency fluctuation (instability of the general 
equivalent) and where calculations of risk are increasingly recursive and 
                                                
4 Sander gives the following precis of Marx’s concept of fictitious capital: ‘In one 
sense, all financial capital is fictitious since its value, its power to represent real 
commodities, ultimately depends on fiction, on “faith in money-value as the 
immanent spirit of commodities” (Marx). But money is also “only a different 
form of the commodity” and must therefore expand together with the value of 
the commodities it represents. To the extent that financial capital’s expansion is 
disconnected from the expansion of value of the commodities it represents, it is 
fictitious. More specifically: fictitious capital is capital neither invested in the 
physical means of production, infrastructure, or the wages of workers, but rather 
in assets (stocks, bonds, securities) that are expected to yield profits at some 
future time. It constitutes claims to future production and the profits that this 
may generate – paper claims to wealth. While the existence of fictitious capital is 
inherent in the development of a capitalist banking and credit system, its actual 
development in present-day capitalism in the form of both public and private debt 
necessary to sustain economic activity constitutes a huge and unsustainable 
burden on future earnings that may never be repaid or which creates credit 
bubbles the bursting of which constitutes a formidable threat to the very stability 
of the capitalist system’ (Sander, 2011). 
5 The concept of Value at Risk or VaR is glossed by McNally (2009: 70): ‘First 
developed in the early 1990s, VaR has become the fundamental basis upon which 
pF9F;A9D AFKLALMLAGFK 9F< AFN=KLGJK 9KK=KK L@= JAKCAF=KK G> L@=AJ AFN=KLE=FL-
portfolios. Indeed, over the past decade, it has also been the basis upon which 
banks establish their own capital-requirements.’ 
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unmoored from any of the value they claim to measure: ‘Using a set of 
models that share a common mathematical framework, VaR is supposed to 
measure literally any asset under any and all conditions. Crucial to the 
operation of VaR assessments is the assumption that all points in time are 
essentially the same and, therefore, that tomorrow will be just like yesterday 
and today’ (McNally, 2009: 70-71). 
Thus 
time AKJ=Ap=<	LJ=9L=<9K9HMJ=DQIM9FLAL9LAN=N9JA9:D=	9F<IM9DAL9LAN=:J=9CK
or ruptures in a temporal continuum are ruled out. […] The process of 
abstraction these models undertake involves treating space and time as 
mathematical, as nothing more than different points on a grid. This 
homogenisation of space and time assumes that what applied at any one 
spatio-temporal moment applies in principle at any other. But crises destroy 
any basis for such assumptions… (McNally, as above) 
Another view on temporality and finance comes from Randy Martin, when he 
writes ‘Derivatives have a temporal aspect, making a future possibility 
actionable in the present, and a spatial dimension where certain features of 
what is local take on global salience and the far becomes near’ and 
[D]erivatives work through the agency of arbitrage, of small interventions that 
make significant difference, of a generative risk in the face of generalised 
failure but on behalf of desired ends that treat the future not simply as 
contingent, uncertain, or indeterminate but also as actionable in the present, 
as a tangible wager on what is to come. (Martin, 2011: 156) 
This discussion of the time of finance disrupted by crisis recalls the role of 
time as a social form which is a corollary of the relations of production, as the 
collective Endnotes writes: ‘Communism is thus understood not in terms of a 
new distribution of the same sort of wealth based in labour time, but as 
founded on a new form of wealth measured in disposable time. Communism 
is about nothing less than a new relation to time, or even a different kind of 
time’ (Endnotes, 2010: 79). 
It may be added here, parenthetically, that ‘a new relation to time, or even 
a different kind of time’ is a modality that would seem equally if not more at 
home in aesthetic practice or thought, or, perhaps more broadly, a speculative 
praxis oriented towards transformation of experience, as well as but not 
limited to the relations of production. While the ‘absolute contingency’ of the 
market formulated by Ayache has explanatory power and is conceptually 
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suggestive, it seems hard to discount McNally’s analysis of Value at Risk as a 
repudiation of the actual contingency operating in markets; a contingency 
which is recursive but not in any sense social, nor truly contingent as in an 
event that disrupts calculations, as Ayache would like it to be, since in the end 
there have to be conditions for a financial market, whatever anomalous 
events transpire within it. A truly anomalous event, following McNally, could 
not be internal to markets and the type of contingency which animates them. 
This suggests that despite certain provocative analogies, speculation as a 
mode of production is not consistent between financialised capital and art 
from the standpoint of horizon, since financial speculation has to exclude the 
suspension of the law of value, and is thus only speculative within the defined 
parameters of chronologically attenuated and homogeneous risk. 
Hence financial speculation, the speculation confined to the value-form, 
lacks the key element of negativity which would enable it to be actually 
speculative in the philosophical or aesthetic sense that Ayache intends for it. 
This means that financial speculation and the indeterminacy of the aesthetic 
do not really share a common ground, despite earlier appearances. In 
comparison to the deceptive normality of labour’s ‘use value’, the pure form 
of value as seen in finance does indeed give us an insight into the level of 
abstraction and contingency proper to labour performed under capital’s value 
relations. But this contingency of exchange value and value, or, negativity 
with regard to use, runs up in the positivity of its own drive to expand. This 
requires a homogeneity of time and stagnation of the social which seem to 
vitiate the speculative drive of the value-form as we have witnessed it in the 
expansion of finance over the social terrain over the last several decades. The 
political theorist Robert Meister has spoken of the ‘options-form’ replacing 
the ‘commodity-form’ as the central form in which value is manufactured and 
traded, making temporality itself the typical commodity for an era in which 
risk is the main driver of social reproduction. His account starts in 1973, 
when derivatives or options theory developed as a way for capitalism to re-
think itself once the gold standard was jettisoned – so the future orientation is 
also a shift to a kind of reflexivity. He also sees this shift as a way of putting 
the struggle with socialism in the past – first conceptually and eventually 
politically. Class struggle became a factor of individualised risk management, 
juggled among economic variables, e.g. human capital theory. Then 
financialisation as a hedge against uncertainty in an ever-more economically 
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volatile and unequal society/economy starts to become the dominant logic. 
Human capital investment e.g. tuition, is a hedge against the uncertainty that 
the rule of finance itself has established. If it can be priced, it can be 
commoditised – this is the outcome of turning social contradictions into risks 
that could be hedged. ‘What you know long-term simply raises the price of 
uncertainty about what you know will happen next’. 
Contingency only has value because it is part of an overarching narrative 
wherein which nothing is forever. All past history is accumulated in the 
current price in the option-form mode of capital, the speculative mode of 
production or, here, finance, just as all past suffering (dead labour) is 
accumulated in the current accumulation of wealth according to the labour 
theory of value. The options-form is also interesting within relation to forms 
of immaterial property such as IP (intellectual property). Here rent supplants 
final sale; no sale is ever complete, and rent ensures the sale can happen again 
and again, under different conditions. Here the shift from the commodity-
form to the options-form opens up the commodity to time in a radical way, 
leaving behind the closed loop of self-expanding value in the usual sense. The 
art market remains relatively traditional in its transactional forms and 
property contracts by comparison, though it is a truism that, particularly in 
the last decade, the market has been driven, or inflated, by fortunes made via 
dealings in ‘innovative’ financial commodities which operate with the kind of 
risk temporality described above, that is: derivatives and hedges. 
Art of course is also a space where reflexivity and recursivity are the main 
engines of production of meaning since at least the conceptual art era, but 
tendentially before, since the ‘game of reference’ became an operative rule for 
artworks and art per se, i.e. the readymade. On the other hand, art derives its 
‘speculative value’ from not just the parameters and value-games of art, 
whether significatory or financial, but also from the suspension or dissolution 
of art itself, and the social relations that underlie the existence of art as a 
discrete institution with its own laws. As Rancière writes, the contemporary 
‘aesthetic regime’ of art is precisely predicated on exacerbating the confusion 
about what art is or where it belongs, and its boundaries with other regimes 
of meaning, practice or validation. Crucially, though not emphasised by 
Rancière, the speculation of art (or, the speculation that is art), measures and 
dramatizes its speculative capabilities through its relation to labour, be that a 
relation of proximity or negation. In this sense, art cannot be considered in 
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relation to politics without first being considered in relation to labour – and 
this is even more the case when artistic subjectivity and modes of production 
become a supplement to the restructuring of the labour-capital relation away 
from the wage and its equivalences to the precarious and ‘infinite’ demands 
of creativity. Art as a model of emancipated labour both figures unalienated 
activity which is not measured in money and the infinite, unwaged 
exploitation that capital is imposing on all of us in the drive to find new 
sources of accumulation. It can be seen as a relic of the past, of feudal 
relations, produced in an artisanal rather than industrialised way for the most 
part (the domestic regime, as Luc Boltanski describes it). Or it can be a 
prototype for the future, whether that will be a bad infinity of the present, or 
operating in radically transformed condition; in which case art’s relationship 
to ‘free labour’ in its current sense, exacerbated in its post- or trans-object 
period (both liberated and dependent on selling itself or its products to 
survive) will itself no longer be a reliable category when art and labour cease 
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4 
The Value of Painting. Notes on Unspecificity, 





In the following, I will first try to develop a medium-unspecific notion of 
painting that is nevertheless able to capture its residual specificity under 
conditions that led to its despecification. These conditions – often referred to 
as a ‘post-medium condition’ (as described in Krauss, 2000) – will be 
addressed in view of their implications for painting. If painting has expanded 
and tends to be everywhere, as I will argue, then it seems to make little sense 
to delimit its realm. Yet this is what numerous painting-exhibitions keep 
doing: they treat painting as if it was a clearly circumscribed entity. The only 
thing is, however – painting has long since left its ancestral home, that is, the 
picture on the canvas, and is now omnipresent, as it were, and at work in 
other art forms as well. We therefore can’t be sure to what we are referring, 
when we talk ‘about painting’. Do we mean painting in the sense of a 
medium, a technique, a genre, a procedure or an institution? As a way out of 
these semantic quandaries I will propose a less substantialist notion of 
painting that conceives it as a form of production of signs that is experienced as highly 
personalised. 
This understanding of painting as a highly personalised semiotic activity has 
several advantages: it is less restrictive, allowing us to see how painting is at 
work in other art forms as well and it is able to capture what is specific about 
its codes, gestures and materiality. In addition to this, the focus on painting’s 
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indexicality enables us to grasp the particularly strong bond between the 
person and the product that we encounter here. I will therefore investigate 
the highly personalised nature of this particular sign production and relate it 
to the way in which value gets attributed to it. There are many indications of 
painting’s lasting popularity: it keeps fetching the highest prices on the art 
market and it survived the manifold historical attempts to declare it finished, 
dead, obsolete etc. I will conclude by offering one way of explaining its 
tenacity: as an art form it seems particularly disposed to support the 
expectation – widespread in the art world – that by acquiring a work of art, 
you get a hold on the artist’s labour capacity and therefore own a slice of her 
life. Buying artworks indeed comes close to buying people – and this is 
especially true for painting. 
1. For an Expanded Notion of Painting 
I have already hinted towards the problems of defining painting: when most 
artistic practices, not only painterly ones, have undergone massive 
differentiation and expansion, it becomes rather difficult to pin down 
painting. How to determinate an ‘unresolved category’, to quote a press 
release accompanying a recent exhibition on this subject in Bergen1? I would 
like to suggest that we work with an expanded notion of painting that breaks 
with the modernist understanding of it as a clearly delineated practice, 
characterised by given norms and conventions. Since the borders between the 
different art forms have become permeable at least since the 1960s, we have 
found ourselves in a situation where different media relate to, re-fashion and 
re-model each other. This process has been termed ‘re-mediation’ (Becker, 
2009). Such re-mediation occurs when the features that have been ascribed to 
one medium – say flatness or representational strategies in painting – are 
addressed by another medium – say large-scale photography2. And sure 
enough, artists from Jeff Wall to Wolfgang Tillmans have tirelessly 
demonstrated that photography can take up the representational and narrative 
                                                
1  See Press release of the exhibition Gambaroff, Krebber, Quaytman, Rayne, Kunsthall 
Bergen, November 2010, available at www.Kunsthall.no. 
2  Michael Fried (2008: 1-4) has written a whole book about how earlier themes 
which he detected in 18th century painting – absorption, theatricality – are now 
taken up by contemporary photographers. 
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strategies of painting; that it can aim at creating surfaces that suggest the 
materiality of abstract painting. The crucial point remains here that the 
modernist idea of an art that is defined by the ‘essence of its medium’ 
(Heidegger, 2008) has clearly lost its relevance. Once the medium can no 
longer be delimited, then no qualities can be inherent to it either. Its 
character, rather, depends on how the artist will proceed with it. 
2. Good-Bye to Medium-Specificity? 
Clement Greenberg was the leading champion of the idea that modernist 
painting in particular is not only characterised by ‘essential norms and 
conventions’ such as the flatness of its surface (Greenberg, 1993: 89), but that 
each painting has to ideally criticise these limitations ‘from the inside’ (ibid.: 
85). It is interesting to note how the descriptive and the normative level 
merged in his notion of the medium. Not only did he essentialise painting, 
ignoring the fact that it actually shares its supposedly ‘essential’ condition – 
the flat surface – with writing. He moreover expected the artist to defend the 
imaginary purity of her medium by criticising it from within. 
Now, this privilege that Greenberg had accorded to the medium became 
historically untenable once painting lost its purity and expanded into life, as in 
the Combine Paintings of Robert Rauschenberg. 
Greenberg’s position became even more questionable when those 
conceptual art practices emerged in the late 1960s that strongly relied on 
different technologies, such as film photography or diagrams. 
This was an art that was more generic than medium specific, as André 
Rottmann has rightly pointed out (2011). One might add to this that the 
rejection of the privileged status of painting has a much longer history, and 
regularly occurred in painterly practices as well. As an example of a painting 
that says goodbye to the tradition of ‘pure painting’, I would refer to Picabia’s 
Nature Morte (1920) – a painting that contaminates the alleged purity of its 
medium by drawing on different formats: 1) the readymade (in the form of 
the stuffed animal that is attached to the surface and ‘stubbornly clings to the 
domain of painting’, as George Baker (2007: 101) put it so adequately); and 2) 
text (the written names of ‘great’ male artists like Cézanne, Rembrandt and 
Renoir, whose portraits we are meant to see and who turn out to be nothing 
but a dead animal, natures mortes). Cézanne for one, whose work was always 
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considered to be the epitome of pure painting, is declared to be as dead as the 
stuffed ape. The status of painting as a higher art form and the correlating 
belief in its purity and essence are doubly threatened here: not only by the 
incorporation of a readymade that enforces the external logic of the 
commodity and of productive labour into the painting, but also by the textual 
elements, which equally threaten to bury painting’s alleged essence. 
Are we then obliged to deduce from this that there is nothing medium-
specific about painting anymore? I believe that we have to concede at this 
point that some artists, and painters in particular, do indeed encounter 
problems in their practice that they ascribe to the specificity of their 
respective medium. But it is one thing to acknowledge a certain degree of 
medium-specificity at this level of artistic production, and another to derive a 
highly questionable general norm of medium-specificity from it. 
3. Painting and Indexicality 
So, how to define painting once it has merged with other procedures – from 
the readymade and linguistic propositions to the insights of institutional 
critique? How to determine a practice that renders the rigorous distinction 
between what is intrinsic and what is extrinsic to it impossible? I want to 
propose that we conceive of painting not as a medium, but as a production of 
signs that is experienced as highly personalised. By focusing on painting’s specific 
indexicality, we will be able to grasp one of its main characteristics: that it is 
able to suggest a strong bond between the product and the (absent) person of 
its maker. This is due to the way indexical signs actually operate: according to 
Peirce, an index shows something about a thing because of its physical 
connection to it (Peirce, 2000: 193). Since he mentioned photography as an 
example for this ‘class of signs’, art historians tend to mainly treat 
photography as the indexical art form par excellence (see Krauss, 1977). But I 
would argue that it is painting that suggests such a physical connection even 
more strongly. Someone has left her marks. Frank Stella’s observation that 
painting is a sort of handwriting was actually quite to the point (Glaser, 1995: 
157). Its signs are indexical insofar as they can be read as traces of the 
producing person. Now even if we opt for a deconstructivist approach to the 
trace thereby insisting on how the trace equally addresses ‘the formal 
conditions of separation, division and deferral’ (Derrida, quoted in Krauss, 
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1993: 260), we are still dealing with the ghost of a presence. This is also true 
for those paintings that avoid handwriting by using a technical device, as in 
Gerhard Richter’s abstract paintings produced with a squeegee. The more 
negation there is of handwriting, the more this negation will be considered to 
be the handwriting of the artist3. In other words: attempts to eliminate the 
subjectivity of the artist from the painting usually lead to a re-entering of 
subjectivity into painting (Graw, 2012). 
Yet linking indexicality to painting does not imply that we ignore the split 
that occurs between the artwork and the authentic self. What we encounter in 
painting is not so much the authentically revealed self of the painter, but 
much rather signs that insinuate that this absent self is somewhat present in 
it. As a highly mediated idiom, painting provides a number of techniques, 
methods, and artifices that allow for the fabrication of the impression of the 
author’s quasi-presence as an effect. 
For this indexical effect to occur the artist does not need to have literally 
set her hand to the picture, or to have brandished a brush, or to have thrown 
paint on it. A mechanically produced silkscreen, say by Andy Warhol, who 
often delegated his work to his assistants, or a printed black painting by Wade 
Guyton, is no less capable of conveying the sense of a latent presence of the 
artist – by virtue, for instance, of imperfections deliberately left uncorrected, 
selected combinations of colours, or subsequent improvements. Painting, 
then, would have to be understood as the art form that is particularly 
favourable to the belief – widespread in the visual arts more generally – that 
by approaching or purchasing a work of art, it is possible to get a more 
immediate access to what is assumed to be the person of the artist and her 
life. 
4. Painting as a Highly Valuable Quasi-Person 
There is one feature of the indexical sign that I haven’t yet mentioned: 
according to Peirce, the indexical sign is able to capture our attention because 
                                                
3  ‘Noch ein Medium, das Handschriftlichkeit ausdrücklich negiert kann Ausdruck 
der Handschrift eines Künstlers sein.’ (Lüthy and Menke, 2005: 9). 
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it is affected by the power of its object 4. Now, in the case of painting’s 
indexicality, this object is a subject – the person of the artist. This is why 
painting can be potentially experienced as being as intriguing in a way that 
only an intriguing person could be. Now you might object to this that 
sculpture is able to do exactly the same thing. Isn’t sculpture marked by a 
similar kind of indexicality and doesn’t it therefore also suggest that it is a 
quasi-person? 
Yes it does, but to a lesser degree. It is only painting for which many 
historical arguments have been raised which point to its subject-like power – 
arguments I believe do reach into our present. The very first systematic 
treatise on painting produced in the modern era, Leon Battista Alberti’s Della 
Pittura (1453), for instance, already aimed to raise the reputation of painters in 
order to advance their emancipation from the larger class of craftsmen. 
Indicatively enough, Alberti based his preference for the painter over the 
sculptor on his view that the former worked ‘with more difficult things’ 
(Alberti, 1966: 66), making painting an intrinsically intellectually demanding 
activity. Once painting was declared to be intellectually challenging, it was 
only a matter of time that the intellectual powers of a subject would be 
claimed for it. It was Hegel who defined painting as a mode of artistic 
representation into which the principle of ‘finite and internally infinite 
subjectivity’ has forced its way (Hegel, 1970: 17). Everything that is 
fundamentally part of a subject accordingly urges toward painting’s surface. 
Subjectivity, however, designates here not that of the artist but a universal 
faculty – ‘the principle of our own being and life’ (ibid.). According to Hegel, 
we see in the artifacts of painting what is ‘at work and operative within 
ourselves’ (ibid.). And it is precisely because we believe we recognise in it a 
familiar potential that we at once feel ‘at home’ in it. In other words, painting, 
in Hegel’s view, moves us also because it stages principles that strike us as 
familiar and that constitute us. The decisive point of this argument is that 
Hegel aligns painting with the subject by ascribing a capacity for it – the 
capacity of subjectivity – that is properly speaking the exclusive privilege of 
subjects. Only subjects possess the ability to evolve an independent mental 
                                                
4  ‘Ein Index ist ein Ding – von einer Kraft seines Objekts affiziert – mit seiner 
Kraft seinen Interpretanten beeinflusst und ihn veranlasst, seinerseits von der 
Kraft des Objekts affiziert zu sein.’ (Peirce, 2000: 428) 
The Value of Painting 
  71 
life. By according a subject-like power to painting, Hegel laid the ground for 
what I would describe as the central trope around painting in the 20th 
century, namely the assumption that there is a thinking of painting, that 
painting itself is able to think. French painting theorists like Louis Marin or 
Hubert Damisch in particular have put forward this argument – that painting 
is a sort of discourse producer that arrives at its own insights. Once it is 
declared to be able to think it becomes subject-like. 
But how does painting’s capacity to evoke the sense of a subject-like force, 
how does its power to suggest that it actually operates like a person relate to 
the value that is attributed to it?5 
For an artwork to be considered valuable, it first of all has to be 
attributable to an author. One could say that it thereby gets loaded with 
intentionality. This process gets intensified in the case of the indexical signs 
of paintings. Here someone has left her traces (even if mechanically 
produced, this suggestion of a handwriting persists) and this enhances the 
impression of an intentional artwork, of an artwork that itself has agency. 
While all artworks have to function as an index of the one who brought them 
into existence in order for value to be attributed to them, painting seems to 
go further by suggesting that it is a quasi-person. Or to put this slightly 
differently: painting is particularly well equipped to satisfy the longing for 
substance in value. It indeed seems to demonstrate how value is founded in 
something concrete – the living labour of the artist. Let’s recall how Marx 
conceptualised value. While it is certainly true that his reflections on value 
were bound to the commodity and not to the artwork as a commodity of a 
special kind, his notion of value has two undeniable advantages: 1) it doesn’t 
confound value and price and thereby prepares the ground for a notion of 
symbolic value that is crucial for artworks; and 2) it insists on the relational, 
metonymic quality of value thereby reminding us that value has no substance 
and is always elsewhere. Indeed: Marx on the one hand emphasised that no 
                                                
5  I’m not distinguishing between symbolic and economic value here on purpose. I 
am referring to value in the sense of the place where social relevance is attributed 
to an artwork. All the claims that have been made for painting constitute its 
symbolic value. While symbolic value doesn’t get automatically translated into 
economic value, it is never the precondition for economic value to occur. 
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commodity is valuable in itself, that value is a ‘purely social’ phenomenon6. 
This is also true for artworks: no artwork is valuable per se, its value is the 
result of an ongoing and never ending social negotiation. On the other hand, 
he pointed to how value represents ‘the overspending of human labour in 
general’7. This would mean that value eclipses concrete labour and turns it 
into its opposite – abstract human labour8. Now, painting seems to be one of 
the last places where the desire for a concrete foundation of value seemingly 
gets fulfilled. Not only does it generate the illusionary impression that it is 
possible to grasp a fibre of the living labour that was mobilised for it. But it 
moreover promises the existence of an imaginary place where labour actually 
remains private and concrete, detectable in the concrete materiality of its 
surface and the gestures that it displays. The process of labour is not hidden 
but seemingly exposed as if the living labour of its author was something we 
could hold on to, as if it hadn’t been transformed into ‘objectified labour’ 
(vergegenständlichte Arbeit) (ibid.) during the process of exchange. It is painting’s 
capacity to appear particularly saturated with the lifetime of its author that 
makes it the ideal candidate for value production. 
It is important to note that this search for value within living labour gets 
even more pronounced in the current context of ongoing devalorisation. It is 
one of the effects of the financial crisis from 2008 that more and more 
desperate searches for value take place. The belief in the ‘personality’ of the 
artwork and painting in particular is of course not a solution to the crisis; it is 
a way of both delaying and extending it. 
                                                
6  ‘We may twist and turn a single commodity as we wish; it remains impossible to 
grasp it as a thing possessing value. However, let us remember that commodities 
possess an objective character as values only in so far as they are all expressions 
of an identical social substance, human labour, that their objective character as 
values is therefore purely social. From this it follows self-evidently that it can only 
appear in the social relation between commodity and commodity’ (Marx, 1976: 
138-139). 
7  ‘But the value of a commodity represents human labour pure and simple, the 
expenditure of human labour in general.’ (Marx, 1976: 135). 
8  ‘The equivalent form therefore possesses a second peculiarity: in it, concrete 
labour becomes the form of manifestation of its opposite, abstract human 
labour.’ (Marx, 1976: 150). 
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Let me conclude by saying that the topos of painting as a quasi-person has 
historically turned up in many different guises – starting from painters 
themselves, like those who have all either seriously (Bacon, von Heyl) or 
ironically (Oehlen) referred to the idea that painting tells them what to do. 
The belief in the self-activity of painting is one of its central myths, a myth 
that is of course closely interwoven with the experience of production. I have 
mentioned already how several French art historians like Louis Marin or 
Hubert Damisch have made a slightly different claim for a metapictorial 
‘thinking’ of painting, demonstrating how it is able to produce its own 
discourse9. While I would not deny the possibility that a painting can 
occasionally deliver its own interpretation, I find it nevertheless important 
that we realise that by claiming agency for painting (or for artworks in 
general), by treating them as quasi-persons, as I have aimed to show here that 
we tend to do, we become somewhat implicated in the process of value 
attribution, a process that has in any case already been fired up by our 
propositions regarding the nature of the artwork. 
 
                                                
9  On Poussin’s Et in Arcadia Ego: ‘Dieses Gemälde interpretiert sich selbst, denn es 
stellt den Repräsentationsprozess der Geschichte dar.’ (Marin, 2003: 30). 
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5 
What kind of Petrified Human Lifetime are 
You Buying when You are Buying Art – And 
How Do You Want to Reliquify It? 
Diedrich Diederichsen 
 
I am doing two things in this paper: firstly to ask how it has happened that 
the consensus of all European governments that the investment in culture, 
especially in contemporary art, is economically reasonable, has been shaken, 
and even reversed by many. Don’t tell me it’s ‘the crisis’. Secondly, I would 
like to look at the economic side of art production in general, not to offer 
something completely new, but to propose a slightly different, but of course 
related, angle to the one I use in my book On (Surplus) Value in Art 
(Diederichsen, 2008). 
It is perhaps not so surprising to talk about the topic of this conference in 
relation to works of art, given the relation to the art world, or one of the art 
worlds, in the professional histories and biographies of many of the 
participants and organisers. But artworks are normally not considered to be 
produced by the multitude; they are not even considered to be interesting 
from the perspective of labour. They are debated aesthetically or 
economically as objects; objects which carry values, messages, aesthetic 
decisions, ideology and other immaterial items, but, particularly since 
conceptualism and neo-conceptualism, they seem not to be made and 
produced by human physical labour, and even the mental labour is often 
delegated to social processes and a willing participating audience, which loves 
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to produce content for free. That, of course, is a mistake. Even though the 
labour in works of art so often disappears in the shadows – assistants are 
invisible and, unlike every driver, gaffer and intern in Hollywood, receives no 
credit – it is a crucial factor in relation to value. However, in this case I am 
not so much interested in the exploitation of the labour of others, but will 
look at the labour of the artist her- or himself, and the time he or she spends 
while making art in one way or another. In the contemporary economic set 
up all time spent by humans with anything is a form of production and an 
economic factor, including browsing the internet, reading a newspaper, 
staring into the setting sun over Poland from a train from Berlin. All these 
moments generate possible decisions in my brain; consumerist decisions or 
productive decisions. They lead to consequences, which would not have been 
if this time had been spent otherwise, or not at all. 
Nearly everything in our world is at some level about objectifying human 
time. Every human-made object can be seen as a petrification of the time 
spent producing it. There are seemingly at least two types of time that you 
can buy from human beings. There is mechanical and rational time; the kind 
of time, when we directly become an instrument of an intention, a telos. On 
the other hand, there is affective, receptive, mental and even irrational time. 
In both cases I refer to humans who spend time in that way. Humans plus 
machines or tools equals human time of the first kind; humans plus 
institutions, education, informal learning, art reception, processing of cultural 
data et cetera equals human time of the second kind. Of course, they are not 
as easily separable in the practical reality of a profession or a job. Rational 
tool using of the first kind needs informal and institutional education of the 
second kind as well. But one can talk about this distinction in terms of 
tendencies: one type of labour is more dependent on the first or the second 
kind of time-spending. 
Artworks are at first glance a kind of objectification of the second kind of 
time; of course, they are not the only type. But they are a specific type; so 
specific that one needs to put them into an extra category. So we can divide 
objects into three types, in relation to the time spent making them. First: 
Objects which mechanically consumed the time it took to make them, by 
humans and machines, like the famous box by Robert Morris (Box with the 
Sound of Its Own Making, 1961; see also Berger, 1989). To make an object there 
is a need for a certain number of labour hours. These are largely only the 
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human plus machine hours that have been invested in the making of the 
object. The factor of the machine and the making of the machine, or the 
extra surplus value necessary to buy the machine, can be neglected since they 
are clearly less than 10% of the hours spent by men and women just 
producing a specific object with the machine. 
The second type is the object in which it is not the actual time spent on 
making it that dominates, but time spent on the education of the person 
making it; time spent on the building and rebuilding of the institution 
providing that education, and also the informal time to develop the necessary 
emotional and behavioural framework. Even divided by the number of goods 
produced in a given time, and divided again by the number of people 
educated in the same university, or informally educated in the same leisure 
hours, is still much higher than the time spent on the work. This is the case 
for many services, for lawyers’ and doctors’ work, and of course for so called 
knowledge products. 
But the proportion of the formal education invested in these products is 
much higher than that of informal knowledge; the chaotic and irrationally 
produced knowledge and the type of education which is the basis for the 
production of art. In artworks, much as in type 2 products, the human time 
necessary to produce them is to a far larger degree time spent with education, 
preparation and symbol processing of all kinds than with working with a tool 
on the actual product. But, in contrast to type 2 products, the majority of 
time necessary for the production of artworks is not spent on formal but on 
informal education. State sponsored art academies organise the informal, with 
the formal largely on an institutional level in connection with other 
institutions. At the same time there is another milieu around them, which 
takes care of the informal or the extra-institutional informal part of 
education: bars, alternative lifestyles, projects, communes etc. So the human 
time necessary to produce artworks is to a very high degree informally spent 
time; time spent outside the rules that apply for workers, employees and 
students of other kinds. We call this the exceptionalism of art, which is an 
element of the function of art in bourgeois history, but also in many versions 
of bourgeois ideology. 
Now I would like to briefly introduce – albeit unnecessarily, given the high 
degree of Marxological knowledge evident in all of your contributions here – 
the notion of socially necessary labour time. This Marxian category means the 
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average amount of a type of a labour time or human work hours necessary to 
produce a product. One can say that art pieces are so many different things 
that it does not make sense to construct such an average. But if you include in 
the calculation the sheer number of hours which all artists have spent at the 
same institutional and extra-institutional, informal and exceptional places 
seemingly doing nothing but enjoying their life while in reality learning how 
to be an artist, you come to such a high number that the average starts to 
make sense. You will then look at the originally large difference between 
projects and products in the art market and the large variety of prices with 
different eyes. You will realize that they are as different as car prices in 
relation to a factory producing different models, or the prices of different 
dental care procedures or operations in relation to the education of dentists 
and the decades they spent in universities and colleges. There is, however, a 
big difference between cars and dental care, and even old paintings on the 
one hand, and contemporary art on the other. Of course I am talking here 
less about visual arts of the conventional type, like painting, but rather about 
genres like performance art, technology based media art, conceptual and 
project based art. This difference is that the hours spent learning that went 
into car production were hours of being taught to do something, and be 
someone else at the same time, just as later in the factory: do something, use 
your craft, but dream of your leisure time. Live expertly in other people’s 
teeth, but write a poem at home later. Dream of the other side of town while 
drilling in that rotten mouth! Whereas artists were not learning to do 
something and think of something else, but learning to be someone – and the 
product would come automatically from their being what they were. The 
crucial element – the existential factor, the sensitivity, the sensuality, the 
criticality – were not crafts or skills but elements of their personality which 
they acquired while living the exceptional life, learning informally at Cedar 
Tavern1 and Max’s Kansas City2. So the classical worker or doctor learned to 
                                                
1  The Cedar Tavern (or Cedar Street Tavern) was a bar and restaurant in New 
York opened in 1866 on Cedar Street. Art historians consider it an important 
incubator of the Abstract Expressionist movement. It was famous as a former 
hangout of many prominent Abstract Expressionist painters: Jackson Pollock, 
Willem de Kooning, Mark Rothko, Franz Kline and beat writers including Allen 
Ginsberg, Jack Kerouac, Gregory Corso and Frank O’Hara (see Lieber, 2000: 
127). 
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be semi-attentive, being here to a degree, but only as much as is necessary to 
do the job, but the artist learned to be just where he or she was, but there 
fully – and the production would come magically just out of this 
concentration of the self. 
But their patrons were people who worked their way to the top. They were 
a bourgeoisie that was still mainly shaped by old Protestant or even puritan 
values. Even if it was old money, put into a collection, which in the case of 
the Sculls, Ludwigs and many others, it was not, this money was built from 
accumulated chunks of surplus value which had been generated by exploiting 
people who would not live an exceptional life. Their masters and exploiters 
had themselves to adopt the ideology necessary for this, at least in some 
spheres of their lives. So this bourgeoisie which collected art in the long 20th 
century was buying and collecting in order to reliquify petrifications of a very 
special kind: petrifications of a good life, a meaningful life; sometimes an 
excessive life, sometimes a heroic life, sometimes an erotic life; a scandalous 
life, a drugged life, a psychedelic life, a homosexual life, a critical life, a radical 
life, a drunken life – all these lives they could not have lived. 
Their specific reliquifying activity was not an attempt to get this other life 
after they had missed it. They knew they could not have it, they might not 
even have wanted it, but they wanted the trophy; they wanted these other 
products, indexes, traces of those good lives. They could have them too, 
without having produced them, paid for by the surplus value they generated 
from discipline and exploitation. This bourgeoisie also laid the foundation for 
the idea that it is good to build institutions around contemporary art. After 
their death, or even before, collectors gave to institutions – in the USA – or 
they contributed by philanthropic and not-so-philanthropic acts and deeds to 
                                                
2  Max’s Kansas City was a nightclub and restaurant opened by Mickey Ruskin in 
December 1965 at 213 Park Avenue South, New York, which became a gathering 
spot for musicians, poets, artists and politicians in the 1960s and 1970s. It quickly 
became a hangout for artists and sculptors of the New York School, such as John 
Chamberlain, Robert Rauschenberg, as well as Carle Andre, Dan Graham, 
Lawrence Weiner, Robert Smithson, Joseph Kosuth, Donald Judd, Richard Serra, 
Lee Lozano, Philip Glass, William S. Burroughs, Barnett Newman, art critics 
Lucy Lippard, Clement Greenberg and art dealer Leo Castelli. It was also a 
favourite hangout of Andy Warhol and his entourage (see Kasher, 2010). 
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the general desire to build and nurture museums and academies in the hands 
of the state in Europe. It is the Protestant backbone of the EU – Scandinavia, 
Holland, parts of Belgium, Germany and Switzerland, but of course northern 
and Catholic countries as well, who contributed to that consensus - a 
consensus which made a compromise with sin, with the good life on earth, 
firmly placing in art as petrified index of its existence to edify us all, and from 
time to time allow some of us to even live it. 
It is important that the notion of compensatory culture, which is a key idea 
of critical theory, is not limited to its traditional area of explanation, namely 
those cases where it was meant to keep the masses quiet; in order to keep 
them from rebellion they were pacified by spectacles and colourful candy 
experiences. It also kept the bourgeois actors quiet by giving them the 
opportunity to acquire the trophies which witnessed the life they had missed 
when busy exploiting, or representing father’s exploitations. 
This is why it was such a shock when, of all countries, the Netherlands 
announced the terrible cuts of their national spending on the arts; when 
museums and institutions in the USA were closed after the Lehman Brothers 
crisis, and when other European governments decided to cut state spending 
on the arts and art education – because we all took this compromise for 
granted, not as ideal, but as a basis of our daily negotiations with 
governments and institutions. Of course, there are many reasons, and some 
of them are not structural but short term. But a few are new, and they are 
structural. For example, for the first time in a long period the new right wing 
governments announced the cultural cuts without apologies, but enjoyed 
them as long overdue revenge against the cultural left. Moreover, it is also the 
first time that an open fascist became the director of a state funded theatre in 
Europe, as now in Budapest. 
But back to the Dutch situation: right wingers would normally not have 
the chutzpah to behave in such a triumphalist manner and dwell in the 
enjoyment of humiliating an opponent who is rhetorically their superior. 
They must be quite confident. They behave in such a way because the very 
bourgeoisie which had an investment in the state sponsoring of artists’ good 
times does not believe in them anymore. It does not believe in them because, 
among other reasons, they now finally want the good life for themselves. 
They are no longer protestant or quasi-protestant entrepreneurs; they have 
made their money from money, not from immediate production. The 
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concept of simple surplus value is alien to them, and the combination of long 
term, state-like investments in infrastructure, in even an informal 
infrastructure or an infrastructure of the informal, with all its complexities 
and mechanisms of delay, which used to be the system of state- or funding-
sponsored art, is far too complex for their desire to immediately show off. 
This post-bourgeoisie does not collect cakes or indexes of their being baked, 
they want to eat them. 
To avoid misunderstandings: I am not simply arguing for a classical 
productive Protestant bourgeoisie and against a post-bourgeoisie of finance-
jugglers and speculation-criminals. This is a vulgar-Marxist cliché, at best 
social-democratic, at worst anti-Semitic. The old construction could not 
survive the new capitalism anyway, not only because the people who have 
replaced the ruling class have no sense of culture, which means a sense of its 
slowness; the slowness of cultivation in the most literary sense: of investment 
and the postponement of gratifications. I am only offering an argument for 
why the bad conscience of the old ruling class, which has been one of the 
economic cornerstones of the old art world, is slowly crumbling away. 
Another is of course that the specific informal education of artists, an 
education that does not teach them a skill, but to become something or 
someone – and that production will immediately follow from their personality 
– is now a concept which has taken over regular business anyway. Regular 
people who work in presentation and service jobs, in performance- and 
presence-oriented immaterial production, function in this way anyway, and 
they have never been educated in such a way in specific institutions; they have 
learned it in the streets. So the specific immaterial object of the ‘fascinating 
personality’ and its related by-products can be owned without any infra-
structure in a far more unconventional manner. It can be bought rough and 
ready in the favelas and streets, it can be picked up on the high streets and 
malls, secondary schools and clubs of the global precarious hedonism; it does 
not need to be nurtured. This basically means that in the long run we cannot 
rely on any ruling class coming back to sense in their cultural politics in the 
near future. The ruling class is no longer a bourgeoisie, and it will no longer 
sponsor or support the type of state a bourgeoisie used to need not only for 
its self-understanding but also to guarantee its business. They don’t need such 
a state and they buy their culture elsewhere, if it is culture at all. 
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6 
Notes on the Exploitation of Poor Artists 
Hans Abbing 
 
In this text1 I argue that presently the exploitation of poor artists differs 
structurally from that of other knowledge workers and that this difference has 
consequences for actions aimed at the reduction of exploitation. The 
exploitation of poor artists is largely an affair internal to the art world: it is 
foremost an art elite that profits from low incomes in the arts.2,3 
1. Believing that the Arts Play a Pioneering Role in the Critique of 
Capitalism is Attractive 
Generally, artists are poor and their socio-economic situation is uncertain. 
One month they may have some income and the next none at all. Their 
situation is precarious. The term precarity in connection to labour has been 
brought to the foreground by social scientists who emphasise that, since the 
late twentieth century, an economic and social transformation towards post-
Fordism has resulted in the increased precarity of workers. The powerful 
                                                
1 Some arguments pitched in the current paper I elaborate more thoroughly in my 
upcoming book. Draft versions of some chapters are available at 
www.hansabbing.nl. 
2 I would like to thank Kuba Szreder and Georgios Papadopoulos for their 
comments on earlier versions of this text. 
3 The concept of economic exploitation used in this text refers to a structural use 
of people’s labour without adequate compensation. This is not necessarily the 
same as the Marxist concept of exploitation; in the latter an entire segment or 
class in society is exploited by another.  
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notion of post-Fordism as a contemporary form of capitalism, favouring 
flexibility, precarity and affective engagement in performed labour, emerges 
as a result. It is telling that, over the last years, the use of the terms precarity 
and post-Fordism has become popular in art circles, whereas a decade ago the 
terms were almost unknown; today they appear to be on everybody’s lips. 
Several explanations for this are likely to apply. First, the terms are 
illuminating. They contribute to a renewed attention to the bad economic 
position of artists in our society. Second, over the last two centuries, in spite 
of occasional alliances with deprived people, the position of artists in society 
has been predominantly one of relative isolation. Therefore, for critical artists, 
it is attractive to show that the socio-economic position of artists is not 
special anymore, and that making a common front with others makes sense. 
Third, in a time in which the negative effects of capitalism increasingly exceed 
its positive effects, it is tempting to blame capitalism for all of the artists’ 
problems and not look at causes which are not directly related to capitalism, 
like possible exploitation internal to the art world itself. (For me capitalism is 
an immoral system, which nevertheless brought prosperity to many people, 
but probably not anymore.) 
Fourth, artists and people in the art establishments like to see and present 
the arts as a forerunner in society, as a continuous avant-garde. This notion 
increases their self-esteem and the esteem coming from others. They believe 
that artists in the ‘60s and ‘70s of the previous century were pioneers in the 
criticism of capitalism. It is true that there were many artists among those 
who criticised capitalism for its stultifying and inhuman (Fordist) modes of 
production; nevertheless, it were foremost students who expressed this 
criticism most vehemently. In line with this belief, it is now attractive to think 
that the arts – with working conditions that have been precarious already for 
a long time – are presently the first to criticize the increasing precarity in 
capitalism and carry this load.  
Some art world people even think that after the war the arts served as a 
kind of laboratory for the new, more human modes of production which 
emerged, but which gradually also increased precarity. That Boltanski and 
Chiapello called the 1960s critique an ‘artistic critique’ has added to this idea. 
But they clearly did not want to say that the critique stemmed from artists or 
even that those artists played an important role in it (Boltanski and Chiapello 
(2005 prim. ed. in French 1999). However, even without assuming that the 
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arts served as a kind of a laboratory for the new modes of production, it is 
probably correct to say that the arts, as the field of creative self-realization, 
served as a point of reference for the formulation of the artistic critique of 
capitalism. 
As a side note, it is useful to note that although it is true that the artistic 
critique of the rigid post war society and capitalism at large preceded the 
post-Fordist rhetoric and may have contributed to the latter, it certainly did 
not cause the emergence of the rhetoric and even less caused the new modes of 
production to come into being.4 Chronological succession does not imply 
causality. It is far more likely that both artistic critique and new modes of 
production are the result of long-term developments in technology, 
production and administration.5 Moreover, I think that the belief that the arts 
hold an avant-garde position, both as a laboratory of production and with 
respect to criticism, rests on a vast overrating of the importance of the arts in 
society. If there has been and is a laboratory, it is located more generally in 
the culture industry, which includes the popular arts.6 
Fifth, I think that the eagerness with which members of the art 
establishment who earn normal to high incomes now use the term precarity 
can also be explained by the fact that this enables them to exhibit their 
progressive stance. It brings them prestige in many social circles in which 
they participate – including circles that are not necessarily leftwing. And 
finally, it enables the establishment to victimise the arts again, while 
emphasising the exceptionally high symbolic value of the arts. This way, their 
own privileged position is accentuated and maintained – see below. (This is 
not to say that there are no people within the art establishment who honestly 
believe in these notions and adhere to progressive ideas.) 
                                                
4 Though a superficial reading of their text may suggest the opposite, Boltanski and 
Chiapello (2005 [1999]) as well clearly do not think in terms of a causal 
relationship. 
5 They are part of what Norbert Elias (1994 [1939]) has called a civilization 
process, which in the second half of the twentieth century led to, amongst others 
things, de-hierarchization and informalization – see Wouters (2007).  
6 I distinguish, on the one hand, art and artists and, on the other, popular artists 
and popular art. Generally, people, including popular artists, do not consider the 
latter as ‘real’ art. 
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Before continuing, it may be useful to ask who belongs to the art 
establishment and who does not. Whereas many readers may have a rather 
clear idea of people they know or have heard of who may belong to it, it is 
difficult to draw a line. It seems reasonable to say that those in the art world 
who are poor do not belong to the establishment. This applies to the large 
majority of people in the art world, foremost artists themselves, but also to 
support personnel, volunteers and interns.7 In the case of the establishment I 
am thinking of, first of all, successful artists who are not only successful but 
also earn a more than decent income. The latter form a vey small percentage 
of all artists. Secondly, there are the people who administer art institutions, 
especially those with steady and better paid jobs, as well as many curators and 
mediators. The latter include a relatively large number of people who mediate 
between art institutions and artists on the one hand and, on the other, local 
and central government bodies and foundations. Third, quite a few people 
within governments and foundations as well as private donors and collectors 
can be said to be part of the art elite. Finally, the same applies to politicians 
and an elite of art lovers, from collectors to regular visitors of art 
performances, like classical concerts and opera, who associate themselves 
with the arts. 
2. How Similar or Different are Artists and other Knowledge Workers? 
An inventory of similarities and differences between the positions of the 
typical artist and the typical knowledge worker with a comparable level of 
professional schooling can help answer the question if the exploitation of 
artists is of the same nature as that of other knowledge workers, who share 
similarly precarious working conditions. 
At first glance, the correspondences are striking. (1) Performance is 
immaterial and often tied to the body of the worker (as is clear in the live 
production of music, theatre and dance, while visual artists as well produce a 
product with foremost symbolic value). (2) There is little routine in the labor 
involved – de-routinization being a characteristic of post-Fordism par 
excellence. (3) Working hours are flexible. The majority of workers have 
                                                
7 Support personnel, a term used by Howard Becker (1982), helps in the realization 
of artworks without being in charge, like for instance technicians. Often support 
personnel consists of former artists or artists who do this work as second job. 
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temporary contracts or are self-employed. (4) There is no clear distinction 
between work and the private sphere. (5) So-called multiple jobholding is a 
widespread phenomenon. (6) Informality (as generally characteristic of a 
bohemian attitude) is important and there is little respect for hierarchical 
differences (at least visible or ostentatious). (7) Communication and discourse 
are important. (Most contemporary artists are indeed good with words.) (8) 
Emphasis is on creativity. Creativity is a measure of success. There is a desire 
to explore new creative possibilities. Continuous development and innovation 
are important. 9) Individual autonomy is much appreciated. (10) Self-
realization and authenticity are significant goals. (11) Finally, work stress, 
existential doubts and frustration, burnouts and depressions caused by 
professional failure or the inability to realize one’s own creative potential are 
common. 
But there are also telling differences. (1) The typical artist is very poor. In 
most Western countries the total income (i.e. including second jobs) of 40% 
to 60% of artists is small enough to put them below the poverty line.8 
Evidently, artists are willing to work for very low incomes. At present, the 
typical knowledge worker with an equal level of professional training is not 
poor and often relatively well-to-do. In those cases in which their income 
becomes very low, they will re-train and attempt to find work in a different 
direction or profession. (2) Unlike comparable knowledge workers, artists 
have already been poor for a very long time, while working conditions were 
precarious. (3) Artists have a stronger work-preference. Often when more 
money comes in, part or all of it is used not for consumption and comfort 
but for working fewer hours in second jobs and more hours as artists, or for 
investments in their work as artists.  
Moreover, none of the economic logic that prevails in non-art fields of 
cultural production exists in the arts, as the following differences 
demonstrate. (4) In the dominant social imagery, in and outside the arts, there 
is a tension between a strong dedication to art and commercial success.9 The 
                                                
8 For more data on poverty in the arts, their proper interpretation, and on the 
criteria of defining artists as a professional category, see Abbing (2002) and 
various articles I have written since, which are available at www.hansabbing.nl.  
9 It is true that presently a small but growing number of foremost successful artists 
openly show commercial behavior. This particularly applies to artists who already 
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intention of the artist is to be altogether dedicated to art and to be as 
autonomous as possible. For other knowledge workers, positions in which 
they are less autonomous are often more satisfying, also because they bring 
more money. Other knowledge workers can be dedicated to their work and 
they as well like some degree of autonomy, but they also have goals other 
than ‘work for the sake of work’ and they will not negate the underlying 
economic purpose of their activities. This particular artist-intention is 
celebrated and propagated by artists, but it is also what is expected from 
artists. This celebration is absent or far less important in the case of other 
knowledge workers. 
(5) When people, including knowledge workers, are poor, they are 
ashamed of their poverty and they are looked down on. In our society being 
poor is bad. This apparently does not apply to artists. Unlike other poor 
people, artists do not have to be ashamed of being poor. (They may be 
ashamed, but they will not show it, nor will others openly look down on them 
for being poor.) (6) A comfortable life is not a widely shared goal in the arts. 
There is distrust of the pursuit of comfort and a solid career. (7) Public and 
private support is regarded as good and righteous. For the typical knowledge 
worker, it is a sign of failure. (8) Authorship and signatures matter far more 
than in the case of other knowledge workers. (9) Unlike pop and sport stars, 
very successful artists are (still) seen as geniuses rather than heroes. (10) The 
need for contemporary artists to be altogether innovative goes much further 
than in the case of most other knowledge workers. For the latter, creative 
variations on an existing theme are allowed and often demanded, while 
presently for artists this is taboo. Often the art world puts down artists who 
are not innovative enough or start to ‘repeat themselves’. (11) Finally, and 
                                                
become successful shortly after graduating. This phenomenon draws much public 
attention, but one should keep in mind that the relative number of artists 
involved is very small, that part of the showing-off is provocative, if not an 
artistic act, and that it therefore indirectly proves that the image is still one of 
opposition between dedication to art and commercial success and suspicion of 
the latter. In this context, it is worth noting that almost all very successful artists 
who fall in this category do not behave like pop and sport stars, for whom 
commercial success is altogether okay, and unlike them do not mingle with the jet 
set. For different opinions, see Graw (2009) and Stallabras (2004). 
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very importantly, respect for art, and artists, is (still) much higher than that 
for other creative workers. 
Therefore, along with many correspondences, there are also important 
differences between artists and knowledge workers. Specifically, the 
combination of precarity and low incomes in the arts, which has already 
existed for a long time, poses many questions. Given the differences, is it 
possible that the exploitation of poor artists is, at least partly, of a different 
nature than that of other knowledge workers? In order to see if this is true a 
detour is necessary. 
3. Rationalization and Bureaucratization Contributed to the High 
Symbolic Value of Art 
A relationship between the low incomes of artists and the high symbolic 
value of their work exists, which does not exist in related professions. At first 
glance, low incomes in the arts seem to contradict art’s high value: in spite of 
the high value of art, the majority of artists are poor. But maybe another logic 
applies: because the symbolic value of art is high, artists are poor. (This would 
imply that, if the symbolic value of art drops, in due time artists will start to 
earn more and will be less poor.) 
I am talking about symbolic value. Nevertheless, a high financial value 
both depends on it and contributes to it. The financial value of artwork and 
art-related objects can be very high. Some artwork costs millions of dollars, 
while governments and foundations spend huge amounts of money on 
prestigious new museums and concert halls – think, for instance, of the 
Louvre museum in Abu Dhabi and the Elbphilharmonie concert hall in 
Hamburg. Moreover, large sums of money are involved in public and private 
support. Support signifies the high symbolic value of art. But the typical artist 
is poor. 
High respect for art is related to what has been identified as the ‘romantic 
ethic at the origins of consumerism’.10 The rationalization, bureaucratization 
and disenchantment in modernity, which was emphasized by Max Weber, has 
                                                




been accompanied by the equally significant process of re-enchantment.11 
Already in the 19th century, this romantic ethic went hand in hand with an 
emphasis on creativity, self-expression and self-discovery. There is a romantic 
longing and search for individuality and authenticity. However, for ‘normal’ 
members of the bourgeoisie, the latter was beyond reach. Artists were the 
exception. Hence the high respect for art and artists.12  
Since the middle of the 20th century, this situation has somewhat changed. 
In people’s perceptions, not only for artists but also for other knowledge 
workers and increasingly for everybody, some degree of authenticity and self-
realization is attainable. Authenticity has become both a possibility and a 
necessity. In this context, authenticity refers to that what people claim to be 
authenticity. Therefore, more authenticity does not necessarily imply less 
alienation. Moreover, in contemporary capitalism, the attainment of such 
authenticity is only a temporary situation. To remain authentic, there is a need 
to consume ever-new products which can give people the feeling of being 
authentic.  
But for the time being, artists remain exceptional, in the sense that they are 
still seen as more authentic in both their work and life. They can better realize 
themselves. Indeed, when it comes to work, any knowledge worker, even the 
CEO of a large company, is replaceable. Within a week after his departure, 
another has taken his place. The newcomer may have a slightly different 
approach, but the nature of production and the product does not change. 
However, when an artist dies, no further works will appear in his typical style 
or with his sometimes very valuable signature. For instance, the death of 
Karel Appel implied that no more new and genuine ‘Appels’ were produced.  
The postwar democratization of authenticity and of education is not 
without consequences for the art world. The arts have become more 
accessible and attractive. When anybody can be authentic, anybody can 
become an artist, and becoming an artist can be a realistic goal. One can be a 
successful artist without having to be a genius or an extremely gifted 
craftsman. Since artists can still realize the goal of self-realization better than 
                                                
11 Only this can explain the consumer revolution in 18th century England. There 
can be no capitalism without high consumption – see Campbell (1987). 
12  Cf. the text by Diederichsen in this book. 
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others, while it is highly appreciated, the arts profession is very attractive. 
Hence the number of students entering art schools has increased. Presently, 
in a country like the Netherlands, the number of students admitted to the 
autonomous departments of art schools is five times higher than it was 40 
years ago. 13 
4. Exploitation of Poor Artists is Foremost an Inner Art World Affair 
Reasoning like an economist, one could argue that artists have chosen to be 
poor. They chose to be ‘poor and happy’. When deciding to become artists, 
they imagined that they would be compensated for their low incomes by non-
monetary forms of remuneration, like work enjoyment and status. Implicitly, 
such an opinion follows from thinking in terms of exchange: artists are 
willingly exchanging money for other rewards. But this is not the way people 
act. At best, they may somewhat weigh short-term costs and benefits.14 The 
assumptions of neo-classical human capital theory are incorrect - artists (and 
others) certainly do not estimate and weigh lifelong financial income and 
non-monetary income while taking into account overall costs of, among other 
things, training. Nevertheless, when we forget about rational choice and look 
at artists from outside, the notion of compensation or lack of compensation 
makes sense. I would argue that artists are not compensated for low income. 
The hardship of artists appears to be real and considerable. In the case of 
excited young artists, the low income may be somewhat compensated, but 
only a few years after leaving art school, compensation starts to diminish. 
Whereas an average lawyer is neither poor nor unsuccessful, the large 
majority of artists are poor, regard themselves as unsuccessful and are 
regarded by others as unsuccessful as well. This does not worry starting artists 
                                                
13 It is true that prosperity has increased at the same time, as perhaps did the 
demand for some art products. However, since the number of artists was already 
large and increased even more, this demand did not bring work and income for 
the large majority of artists. 
14  My thoughts have developed in this direction since I wrote my book Why are 
artists poor? (2002), which was still too much informed by the neo-classical 
economic perspective.  
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but, over time, many artists start to consider themselves as failures, even 
though they will not easily admit this openly.15  
At the same time, hardship and failure in the arts are essential for the 
existence and maintenance of the high symbolic value of art, that is, the 
exceptional prestige of art in society. If artists are so dedicated that they are 
willing to be poor and possibly fail, something very precious must be at stake. 
After all, artists appear to sacrifice themselves for this sacred object called art. 
In the common romantic imagery surrounding the arts people sacrificing 
their time and money for art and rejecting commerce (still) plays an important 
role. (And given their low incomes the overall donation artists make to art far 
exceeds overall private and public support.) The high symbolic value of art is 
not solely founded on poverty in the arts and the generosity of artists, but 
poverty certainly is one of its foundations. Without poverty among artists the 
symbolic value of art would be less high and the association with art would 
bring less distinction.16 
Because within this system the labour of artists is structurally used without 
adequate compensation we can speak of systemic economic exploitation. But 
this does not imply that a single group can be held responsible for this state 
of affairs. A system like this, which partly rests on the poverty of many of its 
participants, is reproduced by everybody involved, including the exploited. In 
one way or another every group has some interest in its reproduction or at 
least it believes it has an interest. The ‘distinction’ the association with art 
brings does not only go to a well-to-do art establishment or to art lovers in 
general, it also goes to poor artists. Moreover, given their low income, their 
rejection of commerce is sometimes more credible than that of other 
                                                
15 In Abbing (forthcoming) I say more about this and discuss several other forms of 
hardship. As far as I know, no empirical research on hardship in the arts exists, 
though it could well be done and should be done. Instead there is much research 
on success in the arts and on successful artists – a small minority of artists. 
Evidently researchers are more inclined to do research on the bright side of the 
arts than on its dark side. 
16 The distinction which the association with art can bring is the main topic of 
Bourdieu (1984 [1979]).  
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participants.17 Usually poor artist as well are aware and proud of their special 
position. But in the case of poor artists, most of all those who have been 
poor for quite some time, the symbolic benefits do not take away hardship. 
At the same time, the costs for people in the establishment or for art lovers 
are low or absent. Seen from outside, it is the latter who benefit most from 
the low incomes in the arts.  
In any profession similar relations exist and the difference is always a 
matter of degree. (Priesthood used to be a profession in which the incomes 
of some were very low, while the net benefits of a few were high.) But 
compared with most present day professions of knowledge workers requiring 
a similar level of previous training the difference is very significant. In the 
latter professions, the symbolic value of the core activity is much lower and 
thus is the interest in low income. Moreover, seen from the outside, 
persistently low incomes in such professions are not in the interest of neither 
professional elites nor capitalists. Flexibility is profitable, but persistently low 
incomes and poverty are not, at least not in highly industrialized countries. 
5. A Wild West Economy Exists in the Arts 
Before looking into the mechanisms that sustain the overall system of 
exploitation in the arts, it is useful to mention some forms of day-to-day 
exploitation that are enabled by the extreme willingness of passionate artists 
to work for very low incomes, which can easily be overlooked. This 
willingness enables a Wild West economy in the arts. There is extreme and 
unrestrained competition. However, since this goes against the belief in the 
goodness of art, it remains hidden or is denied and, likewise, artists 
themselves do not want to see it.  
Due to the high value of art, a belief exists in the arts, among artists as well 
as art institutions, that everything which serves art is good. The slogan is: 
‘everything for art’. However, the consequence is also an ‘anything goes’. 
Typical artists are ready to give up income and sacrifice a lot to get their 
works across, also when this way they harm their colleagues who demand 
                                                
17 Bourdieu (1983) points to the phenomenon that anti-commercial behavior can 
bring symbolic benefits and in the case of a few participant, it can, in the long 
run, also bring financial rewards. 
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proper payment. On the other side, institutional functionaries believe that if 
their institutions serve art they are justified to offer artists low or no 
payments at all.  
It is telling that this phenomenon does not only exist in commercial art 
sectors but that non-profit art institutions are also involved. Especially at the 
level of transactions with poor and unsuccessful artists, the ‘everything for 
art’ in the non-profit art sector often leads to severe exploitation of artists. 
For instance, it is common for non-profits to not pay artists’ fees, while for-
profit organizations do, although not much. Or non-profit organizations pay 
ridiculously low fees; but they, de facto, let artists pay for being able to perform 
or show their work by letting them pay for transport, frames, stage-props and 
so forth; all for art’s sake.  
Usually poor and unsuccessful (or not yet successful) artists go along with 
this attitude. When it comes to serving art, they trust that non-profits behave 
better than for-profit organizations. They also believe in an ‘everything-for-
art’ while, at the same time, they desperately attempt to become noticed; for 
future income or recognition, but even more for art. Therefore, it is 
understandable that artists and non-profit organizations often cooperate in 
keeping costs and income down by paying no, or very low, fees; the initiative 
for this can come from either side. For instance, a small theater company may 
approach the director of a non-profit telling him that they understand that he 
has a limited budget and that therefore they are, of course, willing to play for 
free if (in exchange) he will include them in his program. Or the director 
takes the initiative. He really wants the group in his festival. Therefore he 
explains to them that he has, of course, a very limited budget, but that he is 
willing to have them on his program and pay part of the transport costs, as 
long as (in exchange) they do not expect payment. 18, 19  
                                                
18  Another explanation for this behavior could be that, in working for low incomes, 
artists invest in a future in which they will be properly remunerated. Some artists 
probably believe this is the case or they are made to believe so, and this can partly 
explain their behavior, but because their chances are so small it is not at all a 
realistic investment. 
19  It is common that interns get paid less in the arts than elsewhere. Therefore, a 
similar but less extreme mechanism exists in their case. Because interns have a 
small but nevertheless much larger chance than artists to become successful and 
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All such behaviour leads to what can be called unfair competition. For 
instance, fringe festivals that often behave badly harm non-profit festivals 
that (try to) behave more decently. Likewise, artists who deliberately take less 
money than would have been possible harm artists who refuse to do so. In 
either case, the decent party may be forced to become more indecent or 
otherwise stop its activities. Another telling but less shocking example are the 
numerous competitions with no compensation for participating artists, with 
prizes which only come in the form of some recognition and publicity. 
Another example is the common practice of inviting artists to offer work or 
services for free for charity auctions or events. And poor artists are willing to 
do so. These behaviours also demonstrate the taking advantage of a group 
(artists) that is already in a weak position.  
All this is not to say that the exploitation in the for-profit art sector is less 
severe. Moreover, there as well it is often somewhat covered up by an 
‘everything for art’ logic. Especially in the relations of for-profits with 
somewhat successful artists, exploitation can be ruthless. Nevertheless, in 
day-to-day operations, often standards of proper business behaviour exist 
which do not exist in the non-profit sector. For instance, in most countries, 
publishers pay no less than 10% of their whole sale price in royalties. If 
fiction writers are prepared to accept lower or no royalties, or are willing to 
pay in order to have their work published, publishing houses generally refuse 
these arrangements. As always, exceptions do exist, but if they become 
known, the publisher will be shamed. Another example is that of dealers 
participating in art fairs. Artists are often prepared to pay part of the cost of 
the stall if the dealer will exhibit their work at the fair. Going along dealers 
could pass part of the risk on to the artist. But in most fairs and countries this 
is not done. And again, violators are shamed.  
Art consumers certainly profit from the willingness of passionate artists to 
work for low incomes. If artists would only work for decent incomes, ticket 
prices would be higher as would be the average price for visual art. In 
addition, firms that operate outside the arts take advantage of artists’ weak 
bargaining position. For instance, when the services of both an artist and a 
graphic designer are required for a project in the cultural industries, generally 
                                                
find comfortable jobs in the arts sector, the investment aspect in their willingness 
to work for low or no income is larger.  
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the artist gets paid far less than the graphic designer.20 However, the weak 
bargaining position of the artist is not caused by these industries but by the 
ethos of artists and art institutions, which is reproduced within the art world. 
6. An Art Ethos Enables Inner Art World Exploitation  
In the arts, commerce is denounced and, if necessary, denied or covered up. 
An art for art’s sake is incompatible with commerce. But it is unlikely that the 
strong denunciation of commerce in the arts only follows from this. The wish 
to separate art and entertainment is just as important. In order to derive 
distinction from one’s association with art, a strong boundary between art 
and entertainment must exist. Since entertainment (including popular art) is 
commercial, art cannot be commercial. Therefore, an opposite relation exists 
as well: there is a struggle for autonomy to maintain a boundary between art 
and entertainment. In the course of the 19th century, in the US, simultaneous 
processes of classification, isolation and framing vested this boundary. People 
were taught what was art and what was not; art increasingly was to be 
consumed in special venues; and people learned the ‘civilized conducts’ 
required for art consumption. In post-aristocratic times in Europe, the 
previously existing boundary was reproduced, modified and strengthened. 
The belief that art is not entertainment, and must not be entertainment, 
remains strong .21 
Art is not entertainment and therefore commerce in the arts is denounced, 
while a strong dedication to art and a striving for a maximum of autonomy is 
promoted or even required of artists. Beliefs and moral convictions – for 
example: that art is not entertainment, commerce in the arts is bad and 
autonomy and dedication to art are good – are all part of a more 
encompassing art ethos that is produced and reproduced throughout society. 
For instance, almost anybody will agree that artists must not compromise, 
that success may come late and that poverty in the arts is okay (even though it 
may not be okay in the case of individual older artists). Meanwhile, at the 
                                                
20  Habenundbrauchen (2012) presents other examples of exploitation of poor 
artists by for-profits.  
21  In fact in their critique of the ‘culture industry’, left wing people like Adorno and 
Horkheimer (2002) de facto reinforced this demand.  
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level of art education, additional moral convictions are installed and 
reproduced. As professional logics they become part of the mindset of artists. 
At this level, the conviction that dedicated artists must try to make work that 
is as autonomous as possible is particularly important. In addition, the notion 
that, if necessary, artists must be willing to work for very low incomes, for the 
sake of art, is part of the ethos. Depending on art form or style, other 
examples can be that artists must connect to existing traditions in their work, 
that art is complex, that people do not appreciate good art, and so forth. 
Nowadays, there is a small but growing number of artists who try to 
operate differently by striving for various goals at the same time like serving a 
larger audience, local communities or political goals, and so forth. 
Heteronomy replaces autonomy. But these more entrepreneurial and market 
oriented artists who, after a brief period of investment, are no longer willing 
to work for very low incomes and who care less about the boundary between 
art and entertainment, are regarded with suspicion and put down as 
commercial not only by artists making art for the art’s sake but also by critical 
artists. Nevertheless, the increase in the number of these kinds of artists may 
well signify an increasing uneasiness with the ‘everything for art’ mentality in 
the arts. These artists do not see themselves as an avant-garde in the 
resistance against the existing system of exploitation in the arts, nor are they 
regarded as such by critical artists, but, seen from outside, they do represent a 
real threat to the system. However, instead of being acknowledged for this, 
critical artists with their anti-commercial stance tend to criticise them. 
7. Strategies of Resistance 
Important differences in the causes of the exploitation of poor artists and of 
other knowledge workers and in the ways they are exploited exist. This has 
consequences for strategies of resistance. For instance, the promotion of a 
new art ethos, which allows or even encourages the pursuit of non-artistic 
goals as well, like reaching a larger audience, striving for political change and 
making a profit, and more generally a more entrepreneurial attitude among 
artists, could well represent an important form of resistance against 
exploitation in the arts while, in other sectors of knowledge production, this 




I think that, in any case, it is essential that critical artists and art theorists 
who want to fight against exploitation in the arts should revise their negative 
attitude towards moderate forms of entrepreneurship and a pursuit of profit 
in the arts, certainly if it concerns artist, since they anyway run small 
enterprises. Although there is no capitalism without a market economy and 
commerce, the opposite does not apply.22 Moreover, the pursuit of non-
artistic goals including the making of profit, and thus operating actively in 
markets, does not have to go together with an uncritical embrace of the 
notion of private property. Specifically, the fight against the increasing 
privatization of public space, in which artists often play a role today, probably 
strikes at a cornerstone of capitalism (see Habenundbrauchen, 2012). 
In this context, it is useful to assume that various constraints which come 
with so much feared heteronymous influences on the process of art making, 
can stimulate rather then hinder genuine creativity. For instance, the self-
imposed constraint of getting one’s art across to an audience wider than only 
a small group of primarily peers and people within an art world elite can well 
enhance creativity and innovation. In this respect, artists can learn from 
popular artists. The former could also make an effort to work within the 
popular arts more often. It could prove more rewarding and challenging than 
participating in Documenta and alike, even if the exhibitions feature critical 
art. The curators of such events de facto misuse critical art to celebrate art in 
general and to safeguard the existing privileged positions. 
What matters in the struggle against exploitation in the arts is not a 
noncommittal adherence to social criticism, but concrete action. A good 
example of the latter is the certification of art institutions that pay proper fees 
to artists. If they don’t, they run the risk of being shamed and, as a 
consequence, their reputation is tarnished. Presently in New York, the artist’s 
coalition W.A.G.E. actively and successfully pursues a gratification scheme of 
visual art non-profit organizations.23 Gradually, certification could be 
                                                
22  Moreover, one has to keep in mind that capitalism alternatively promotes and 
opposes a free market economy. A succession of periods with large-scale free 
trade and with large-scale monopolization and the restriction of trade by legal 
power is characteristic of capitalism.  
23 See http://www.wageforwork.com. Art Leaks (http://art-leaks.org/) is a 
somewhat comparable initiative that aims at exposing bad practices in the arts 
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extended to for-profit organizations, from galleries to commercial festivals. 
These and other concrete actions may well contribute to the gradual 
installment of standards of proper business behaviour, also among non-profit 
organizations who presently appear to believe that, for art, ‘anything goes’.24  
Most importantly, it would be useful for artists to develop a professional 
ethos and a mindset that prohibits working for ridiculously low incomes. 
They should increasingly refuse to do so and make clear to their customers 
and intermediaries, including art institutions, galleries and impresarios, that if 
they underpay artists, they can no longer count on their services. Since this 
often goes against the short-term interest of individual artists, it would, 
indeed, require a different mind set and practices and new forms of solidarity. 
However, the main causes of the artist’s continually precarious and 
exploited condition rest in art education. Here, the detrimental ‘everything for 
art’ mentality of artists is (re)produced. In order to change this situation, the 
mindset of teachers has to change fundamentally. Less emphasis on 
autonomy and an art for the sake of art and more on the possibility and 
attractiveness of having multiple goals is essential. (So far, the new curricula 
for instruction in cultural entrepreneurship primarily enable other teachers – 
the majority – to carry on in the old way.)  
As far as public cultural policies are concerned, we would need less 
emphasis on ‘excellence’ in the arts. There is sufficient interest in art that is 
supposed to be of very high quality. Government policies (and government 
money) promoting excellence among a small group of usually already 
successful artists primarily serve international cultural competition. Because it 
puts art for which there is little public demand on a footstall, it encourages 
artists to make also such art, and this is not in the interest of the average 
artist.  
More importantly, public support for institutions and initiatives which 
guide artists in their attempts to broaden their field of activities is called for. 
                                                
and at shaming of the institutions involved. The London based Precarious 
Workers Brigade (www.precariousworkersbrigade.tumblr.com) is also active in 
this area. 
24  Certification works better than formal government regulation, because regulation 
is experienced as just another legal obligation, while both parties willingly and 
actively take part in certification. 
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In this context, it is important that the status of activities in the sphere of 
community art, activities with amateurs, in prisons, in public space, in therapy 
and so forth becomes higher and comparable with art as it is traditionally 
provided. There are not necessarily too many artists, when the definition of 
art and artwork becomes wider and artists are prepared to offer their labour 
in markets that were traditionally not regarded as art markets.25  
I think that at the moment professionalization and the development of 
more entrepreneurial attitudes among poor artists (i.e. the majority) is a good 
thing; and government supported institutions as already exist in some 
countries can help artists in this. Being down to earth and developing an 
entrepreneurial and even somewhat commercial attitude can well be regarded 
as an act of resistance against the existing art-regime. Artists should not 
always be altogether dedicated to art and attempt to be as autonomous as 
possible. They should allow themselves to have non-artistic goals as well, 
including the making of some profit. However, this certainly does not imply 
that I propose a maximum of commercialization or privatization in the arts 
sector. On the contrary, striving for the continuation or establishment of 
public spaces where there is room for relatively autonomous art (including 
popular art!) is also a form of resistance; not only resistance against the 
exploitation within the art world itself, but also against the excrescences of 
capitalism. 
                                                
25  Nevertheless, at present a temporary decrease in the number of students of art 
academies and conservatories may be needed to improve the bad situation of 
artists. 
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The relationship between labour practices and craft-skill has once again 
become a topic of considerable importance, in the light of recent reflections 
on the growth of immaterial labour within certain sectors of the global 
economy (immaterial labour here being defined as labour that produces the 
creative informational content of a commodity, or labour that involves the 
routine processing and distribution of information within primary production 
or the service economy) insofar as both kinds of immaterial labour, creative 
and routine, have ‘intellectualized’ various aspects of manual and non-manual 
labour processes. Indeed, for Maurizio Lazzarato (1996), Toni Negri (Hardt 
and Negri, 2000), and Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello (2005) – to name the 
most prominent contributors to the debate – under these new conditions 
there has been a demonstrable increase in the cognitive and affective content 
of various sectors of the labour process across the productive and non-
productive labour divide. This is partly to do with the vast extension of 
computers into the workplace, but also the reorganization of labour-
management relations horizontally in response to the need for prompt, 
effective and creative solutions to problems at the point of production and 
distribution. Thus, in the ‘new creative’ sectors of the economy – which in 
many ways have been driving technological change at the point of production 
since the early 1990s – some aspects of the new workplace appear closer to 
the freedoms of artistic production than they do to customary forms of 
bureaucratic and top-down exchange between management and workers. 
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Among these transformations, particularly significant are the shared, 
processual involvement in autonomous activities, and the open engagement 
and dialogue with others in order to initiate a project or resolve a given 
problem. As Lazzarato argues, these new conditions require that workers 
combine ‘the results of various different types of work skill: intellectual skills, 
as regards the cultural-informational content; manual skills for the ability to 
combine creativity, imagination, and technical and manual labour; and 
entrepreneurial skills in the management of social relations and the 
structuring of that social cooperation of which they are a part’ (Lazzarato, 
1996: 137). Similarly, according to Negri, in retail and sales, and the new 
public services, the expansion of the affective aspects of non-productive 
labour – the qualitative increase in customer, client or patient care or 
attention – make the older bureaucratic forms of provision crude and 
inelastic. Negri makes two interrelated political points on the basis of these 
would-be changes. With the rise in processual skills and affective skills 
immaterial workers are able to share a skill base across the sectional divisions 
between productive and non-productive labour. However limited this sharing 
may be, the ‘computer’ as a facilitator of social exchange comes to operate in 
an unprecedented way as a universal tool within the labour process, allowing 
workers to establish greater and more flexible forms of interaction and 
support across sectional divisions than was hitherto possible. Indeed, Negri 
goes as far as saying that the nascent democracy provided by the 
incorporation of sections of the labour process into the new digital network 
culture possess an immanent proto-communist content (Hardt and Negri, 
2000). 
This debate on immaterial labour clearly revives, admittedly in a highly 
provocative fashion, the classical debate on the alienation of labour. In a 
tendentious rejection of the Marxist (and even social democratic) tradition, 
Lazzarato, Negri and Boltanski and Chiapello argue that these changes in the 
labour process weaken the usual picture of the worker as subject to the 
dissolution or fragmentation of his or her skills as a result of the refinement 
and increased specialization of the technical division of labour. On the 
contrary, workers in the new creative industries, retail industries and public 
services, provide what in fact is another picture of the industrial worker: the 
immaterially re-skilled worker. In this respect it is Negri who pushes the 
‘transformatory’ potential of the new labour processes the furthest, claiming 
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that given that many of the immaterial skills operative in the workplace are 
extendable and adaptable outside of the workplace, new forms of worker 
autonomy and resistance are emerging within a new work/life continuum 
(Hardt and Negri, 2004). 
Now, Negri’s wholly sanguine account of the immaterial worker has 
rightly come in for a great deal of criticism. The number of workers that fall 
under this category globally is relatively low, meaning that his political 
optimism is highly skewed in relation to the overall dynamic of the world 
economy. In addition, the idea that immaterial workers are not subject to the 
same forms of routinization and surveillance as traditional industrial workers 
is a fantasy, borne of a familiar ideological over-investment in emerging 
forms of technology. The new horizontal forms of network management only 
stretch so far, so to speak, and only under highly specialized, ‘blue-skies’ 
conditions. Yet in reply to his critics, Negri defends his views from an 
orthodox Marxist position: the rise of the immaterial worker is only a tendency, 
based on an analysis of the most advanced sectors of the economy globally, 
precisely the method adopted by Marx in the Grundrisse and Capital. As Marx 
asserts: ‘In all forms of society there is one specific form of production which 
predominates over the rest, whose relations assign rank and influence to the 
others’ (Marx, 1973: 106-107). 
When Marx was writing Capital there were more workers engaged in 
service in Britain than there were in the emerging factory system, but this 
didn’t mean that Marx was therefore best advised to focus on service 
workers. The emerging tendency was the rapid growth of wage labour within 
the big factories: it was this that reflected the deeper dynamic of the system. 
Similarly, the transition from feudalism to capitalism is best understood by 
focusing on the emergence of wage labour in the fledgling urban guild system 
(specifically Florence and Genoa) rather than on the majority of workers, 
who were landless serfs and tenants still working on the land. These new 
forms of wage-labour were eventually to have a profoundly transformative 
effect on class relations (in particular the movement of labourers from one 
job, one city, to the next)1, and on technological development in the 
                                                
1  There was, of course, a comparable movement in the countryside in the 14th and 
beginning of the 15th century in England, as free tenants moved from their place 
of birth and took up available plots of land, made increasingly available after the 
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fourteenth century. The guilds, as Steven A. Epstein (1991: 230) puts it, 
‘incubated’ technological development, insofar as they offered a basic 
institutional framework for generating and sustaining innovation. ‘Masters 
were able to enforce work rules and methods in their shops, and so they 
could make their employees adopt new techniques’ (ibid.: 247). Thus wages 
paid in the city had a qualitatively different set of expectations and outcomes 
than wages paid in the countryside. Wages in the city encouraged the division 
of labour, and with it the development and transmission of technical and 
artisanal knowledge.2 With the increased movement from the countryside to 
the cities in the fourteenth century there is, accordingly, no evidence that the 
compulsory labour practices of feudal manorial estates found any footholds 
in the handicrafts or trades. 
So Negri’s defence is admittedly not without certain orthodox credentials, 
and as such possesses a certain conviction. But at the same time, he drops 
from view what has remained crucial to labour process theory from Marx to 
Harry Braverman: in what ways is the improvement or amelioration of the 
conditions under which workers labour representative of substantive changes 
in the conditions of workers as such? In what ways do such transformations – 
here, immaterial and affective changes – contribute to, or allow us to re-think, 
the emancipation of labour generally? Now, historically this question of 
labour’s emancipation has been tied to a normative, or at least an ideal, 
evaluation of labour under various modes of production: classical slave 
labour, feudal villeinage, and capitalist free market labour. How might the 
labourer best labour, with what tools and materials and under what terms and 
conditions? And, accordingly, what elements of these three modes of 
production are best able to contribute to these possibilities?  
The debate within the Marxist and Romantic anti-capitalist traditions has 
tended to focus, therefore, on what has been lost or devalued in the transition 
from the classical mode of production and feudalism to capitalism. In what 
                                                
plague, by lapsed tenancies, in response to the demand for labour for the market 
in rural areas close to towns or cities, such as East Anglia with its strong 
connections to London (Hilton, 1969). 
2 One of the great examples of this transmission process handed down to us is 
Cennino d’Andrea Cennini’s (c1370-c1440) The Craftsman’s Handbook, written in 
Florence, most likely in the early 15th century (Cennini, 1960). 
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ways does capitalism destroy the craft-integrity of certain kinds of productive 
labour? For Marx, this loss of craft-integrity in the transition from feudalism 
to capitalism may reveal the limitations of industrialized labour in the struggle 
for the emancipation of labour, but it cannot in itself answer the broader 
question attached to the emancipation of labour itself: what forms might the 
freely determined content of non-alienated labour actually take? For Marx the 
question of what is lost in the transition from feudalism to capitalism, is not, 
therefore, the whole story. This is because – contrary to Romantic anti-
capitalism – craft-integrity is only one aspect of non-alienated labour. Let us 
look in more detail then at the status of the medieval craftsman, because it 
will offer us greater clarification around the issue of the alienation of labour 
today. 
Craft-Integrity 
To reiterate: reflections on the medieval craftsman in the Marxist and 
Romantic anti-capitalist tradition largely begin from the same premise. 
Although the classical mode of production and feudal villeinage share a 
reliance on various forms of coerced labour, the craftworker and artisan 
under feudalism are held to exhibit an extraordinary and admirable 
convergence between their skills and their social role. As Marx and Engels 
argue in The German Ideology [1846], in the medieval period: 
The limited intercourse and the weak ties between the individual towns, the 
lack of population and the narrow needs did not allow of a more advanced 
division of labour, and therefore every man who wished to become a master 
had to be proficient in the whole of his craft. Medieval craftsmen therefore 
had an interest in their special work and in proficiency in it, which was 
capable of rising to a limited artistic sense. For this very reason, however, 
every medieval craftsman was completely absorbed in his work, to which he 
had a complacent servile relationship, and in which he was involved to a far 
greater extent than the modern worker, whose work is a matter of 
indifference to him. (Marx and Engels, 1976: 66) 
In other words, because the medieval craftsman is assumed to identify his 
craft skills fully with a given task, his labour is held to be fundamentally 
unalienated. In the same way, the Romantic anti-capitalism of John Ruskin 
and the Romantic Marxism of William Morris both offer a highly garlanded 
interpretation of this medieval worker, as the fount of integrated creativity. 
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As Ruskin declares in The Stones of Venice (1854b), the Christian medieval 
craftsmen who built and ornamented the great Gothic cathedrals possessed a 
rough skill that was in harmony with their capacities. 
The Greek gave to the lower workman no subject which he could not 
perfectly execute. The Assyrian gave him subjects which he could only 
execute imperfectly, but fixed a legal standard for his imperfection. The 
workman was, in both systems, a slave. But in the medieval, or especially 
Christian, system of ornament, this slavery is done away with altogether; 
Christianity having recognized, in small things as well as great, the individual 
value of every soul […] And it is, perhaps, the principal admirableness of 
Gothic schools of architecture, that they thus receive the results of the labour 
of inferior minds; and out of the fragments full of imperfection, and betraying 
that imperfection in every touch, indulgently raise up a stately and 
unaccusable whole. (Ruskin 1854a: 6-7) 
And as Morris explains in Signs of Change [1888]:  
the medieval craftsman was free in his work, therefore he made it as amusing 
to himself as he could; and it was his pleasure and not his pain that made all 
things beautiful that were made, and lavished treasures of human hope and 
thought on everything that man made, from cathedral to a porridge-pot. 
(Morris, 2007) 
Admittedly, Morris did not believe such freedom was undetermined by the 
violence of medieval society: the Church and State ‘repressed art in certain 
directions’ (Morris, 2007). Yet even so, for Morris, the medieval craftsman 
took direct and unalloyed pleasure from his work.  
It is no surprise therefore, that the notion of the medieval craftsman 
determining the quality of his labour at the point of production becomes one 
of the key determinants of the debate on the emancipation of labour in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, as wage labour becomes massively 
concentrated in a narrow range of routinized, dangerous and oppressive 
occupations in the new factories and extractive industries. Marx, Ruskin, and 
Morris all deferred to some version of this vision of ‘integrated labour’, in 
order to open up an imaginative gap between would be bourgeois progress 
and other modes of production. But if all three shared a view of the medieval 
craftsman as ‘unalienated’, for Marx this ‘unalienated’ status is highly delimited 
in its freedoms, something that Morris and the Romantic anti-capitalists 
overlook or dismiss. Indeed, in an interesting Hegelian transcription of the 
problem of craft-integrity, in The German Ideology Marx and Engels invert the 
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would-be unfreedom of the industrial wage-labourer into something quite 
different to its image in Romantic anti-capitalism. The medieval craftsman 
may provide evidence of craft-integrity and he may take pleasure from his 
endeavours, but this is because he is unable to imagine alternatives to his 
present condition, or if he is able to do so, to freely act on them (Marx and 
Engels, 1976). The ‘admirable convergence’, therefore, between the 
craftsman’s skills and his social role is evidence, in fact, of a conspicuous lack: 
the ability of the worker to reflect on the outcomes of his labour as the result 
of his freedom as free economic agent. Hence Marx finds a hidden freedom 
in the formal freedom of the alienated, industrial worker under capitalism: 
that is, his or her capacity to disidentify with his role as worker, and therefore 
imagine his labour and creativity as distinct from the coercions of wage-
labour. This is a kind of freedom in alienation, because although the worker is 
separated from the integral skills that the medieval craftsman takes for 
granted – losing as a result his secure place in the collectivity of labour – at 
the same time he or she is able to envisage themselves as freely determined 
individual. Consequently, from the fourteenth-century guilds to the 
nineteenth-century factory system, the coercions of wage-labour provide the 
wider conditions of labour’s emancipation: in short, the eventual release and 
development of intellectual self-determination and creative singularity. Thus, 
if under capitalism the emergence of individuality progresses through the 
conditions of self-alienation, under communism or post-capitalism, 
individuality is secured through the subject’s free and fulfilled engagement in 
his or her daily labours. But this classical reading of the development of free 
labour of course raises more questions than answers. Indeed it raises a 
number of questions that Marx himself in his later writings was unable to 
answer, or found far more troubling than he first imagined, when he argued 
in The German Ideology that under communism, the freely determined labourer 
would hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, 
and criticize after dinner. 
Firstly, how do we square the massive and systematic tendency within 
capitalism to create forms of unsatisfying work with the creative possibilities 
of ‘freedom in alienation’? As Harry Braverman argued in Labor and Monopoly 
Capital [1974]: ‘The capitalist mode of production systematically destroys all-
round skills where they exist, and brings into being skills and occupations that 
correspond to its needs. Technical capacities are henceforth distributed on a 
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strict “need to know” basis’ (Braverman, 1998: 57). As a result, how does the 
vast landscape of alienated, deskilled labour under capitalism prepare a 
transition to actual forms of self-directed, unalienated labour? What 
conditions, resources and relations are currently in place in the labour process 
that would make this transition a realistic possibility, or not? In other words, 
how might the transition to a new mode of production support unalienated 
labour for all, given the fact that under capitalism labour is alienated mostly 
for all? 
Necessary Labour and Craft-Integrity 
This is a question that is rarely addressed these days, although it has a rich, if 
fragmented history, in anti-technicist thinking within the Marxist tradition in 
the 20th century (Rosa Luxemburg, Walter Benjamin, the Soviet Productivists 
Alexsei Gan and Boris Arvatov, Raniero Panzieri, Theodor Adorno, André 
Gorz). For this tradition a new mode of production has above all else to 
qualitatively transform the forces and relations of production, not just 
enhance productivity, efficiency and technical expertise. That is, the decisions, 
operational plans and targets, have to incorporate processes and outcomes 
that are creatively self-directed, individually and collectively. The poiesis of 
artistic production remains, as in Romantic anti-capitalism, as much as in 
early Marx and Negri, the key to this vision. In the absence of market 
discipline and production-for-profit, the vicissitudes of necessary labour are 
dissolved through democratic and non-instrumentally achieved ends. As Gan 
and Arvatov argued in the 1920s, the worker becomes an artist, and the artist 
becomes a worker. Hence in this model of unalienated labour artistic labour 
doesn’t just converge with productive labour; it redirects it (Gan, 1988). 
The actuality of this redirection, however, remains highly attenuated. The 
Productivists in their artist-in-factory experiments in the 1920s soon realised 
that the collaborative initiatives of artists in factories and, as such, the 
possibility of workers becoming artists – even under a fledgling revolutionary 
regime – were subject to the instrumental demands of the productive process 
itself. The call that the Productivists made to artists to train as engineers 
became precisely that, dissolving the aleatory aspects of artistic production 
into the disciplinary requirements of necessary labour. From an opposite 
perspective Morris’ development of a model of unalienated labour based on 
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the craft-integrity of the medieval period, could only be truly operational – 
that is generalisable – outside of mass production in a modern economy. Inside 
the economy it would be technically retarded and thus wholly impractical. 
Unalienated labour on this basis is something the worker possesses and 
develops in his or her own, leisure time. Similarly, Adorno’s model of 
liberated labour is confined in the abstract – as a kind of ideal horizon – to 
the labour of the artwork itself. There is no actual process of mediation 
between this autonomous labour and the vicissitudes of productive labour 
(Adorno, 2007). And again, Gorz offers a liberated model of labour 
independent from, and indeed in opposition to, the realities of the labour 
process: under conditions of structural unemployment, extended part-time 
work, and the increased routinizations of productive and non-productive 
labour, the liberation of labour is best conceived outside of labour itself 
(Gorz, 1985). In this light, Negri is actually quite right to describe himself as a 
classical Marxist, insofar as he retains the possibility that the emancipation of 
labour will come about through the immanent transformation of labour itself. 
(Thus, the integration of network culture into the labour process is a 
continuing indication of how capitalism produces and reproduces the 
conditions of ‘freedom in alienation’ and as such produces new forms of 
alienated singularity; from inside the routinizations of the new digital culture 
new and creative skills are born). But how ‘classical’, in fact, is Marx himself 
in this respect? That is, Marx may in The German Ideology talk about the 
‘freedom in alienation’ of waged labour under capitalism, as a precursor to the 
emancipation of labour under communism, but in his later writing he is less 
sanguine about ‘artistic labour’ shifting or unburdening the strictures of 
necessary labour. In volume 3 of Capital, the ontology of necessary labour 
asserts itself: 
… the realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is 
determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very 
nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production. Just as 
the savage must wrestle with nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and 
reproduce life, so must civilized man and he must do so in all social 
formations and under all possible modes of production. With his 
development this realm of physical necessity expands as a result of his wants; 
but at the same time, the forces of production, which satisfy these wants also 
increase. Freedom in this field can only consist in socialized man, the 
associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, 
bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the 
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blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy 
and under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature. 
But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity (Marx, 1972: 820, emphasis 
added). 
Now this is a less than optimistic view of the transformative or corrective 
powers of artistic process – or craft-integrity – on the labour process. Indeed, 
as the last line makes clear, because all economic systems are ultimately reliant 
on necessary labour, none can support unalienated labour for all, all the time, 
particularly in the light of having to meet the daily needs of hundreds of 
millions of people. Rather, unalienated labour is, in the end, that which is 
supplemental to productive labour, what is, in short, pursued through 
independent leisure.  
This, however, is not evidence of a political retreat secreted at the end of 
Marx’s labours on the capitalist system. There is nothing to suggest in Capital 
that anything short of the ending of private property and the dissolution of 
the value-form will release humanity from the burdens of capitalism’s 
recurring and chronic crises. But these late reflections do represent a shift 
away from Marx’s early Schillerian Romanticism that he shares with his 
Romantic anti-capitalist peers, insofar as he appears here to be stressing that 
not all forms of labour will be subject to aesthetic redemption – nor, more 
importantly, should they be. How might artistic process redirect street 
cleaning, animal slaughter, garbage disposal and sewage maintenance, the care 
of the elderly and a hundred other difficult, demanding or unpalatable 
activities? Thus, in the above passage, collective control over nature and the 
productive process is quite separate from the control and reduction of 
necessary labour, which is irreducible. The irreducibility of necessary labour 
then blocks the full entry of unalienated labour into the labour process, in as 
much as certain kinds of labour are instrumentally determined by pre-given 
outcomes and fixed processes, and as such are non-aestheticizable. Marx 
doesn’t discuss the implications of this blockage. In fact, it appears that he 
does not consider such implications at all, leaving the early Romantic model 
in political and philosophical abeyance (this is why when the subject of 
emancipation and labour comes up, the famous quote about hunting and 
fishing from The German Ideology tends to be revived, and not the quote from 
Capital vol. 3). 
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Yet the consequences of this later passage are clear enough – underwritten 
by suggestive comments on the emancipation of labour elsewhere in Marx’s 
writing. In a system freed of the hierarchical and competitive demands of the 
value-form the universalization of unalienated labour will, nonetheless, 
experience its own limitations and constraints. That is, there will remain 
forms of labour that will be impervious to the de-alienation of labour, and 
remain so. Now, this is not to say that certain tasks and processes in certain 
sectors of the productive economy will not be opened up to ‘artistic’ skills 
and decisions, or that previously unaestheticizable activities will become 
aestheticized, but many tasks inside and outside the productive base will not. 
This will set up a very different temporalization of labour than under the 
unilinear directives of the value-form. Firstly, access to unalienated labour, as 
primary labour, will be displaced from traditional patterns of career structure 
allowing those engaged in forms of necessary labour to share in this work, 
after relevant training. Indeed, the switch over from necessary labour to 
unalienated labour, and back again, will constitute the re-temporalization of 
labour generally. And secondly, this re-temporalization means that by 
requiring that all contribute at some level to the demands of necessary labour, 
necessary labour is removed from its inherited subordinate position within 
the system of unalienated labour as a whole. 
Under a system of use-values divorced from productivity for profit, 
necessary labour may provide something like ‘alienation in freedom’. That is, 
workers may actually take pleasure from the disproportionate exertions of 
necessary labour, knowing that their labours are contributing to the primary 
reproduction of the new society, and the generation of new use values. This is 
not as utopian as it may first seem. For, as Marx recognised, not all alienated 
labour can be dissociated from pleasure. Indeed, if there was not pleasure to 
be had from all kinds of freely alienated labour under capitalism, capitalism 
would not be able to secure the continuing adherence that it does. A post-
capitalist system will need to draw such adherence to the pleasures of 
alienation, as an important source of transformative energy for those workers 
involved in maintaining the forward movement of the new system.  
On this basis, therefore, the emancipation of labour is only tangentially 
related to the reconstitution of craft processes within the labour process. 
Certainly, the exercise of traditional craft processes implies a very different 
kind of work rhythm and control over material, of hand to machine, than the 
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discipline of the factory and office. As such, for many the reconstitution of 
craft-integrity requires a reconstitution of the non-linear temporal order of 
the early and late medieval period. Henri Lefebvre’s (2000) critique of 
capitalist time certainly draws on this connection, as does the pre-modern 
pastoralism of the potter Bernard Leach (1940), who placed a high value on 
handwork in his reflections on the emancipation of labour. But it is not the 
distended labour of the crafts that is able to drive the wider dynamic of 
labour emancipation. What is of greater importance is the control and disposal of 
time as such, and it is this in the end that has the greater efficacy in Marx’s 
writing. The emancipation of labour is not about winning back for the labour 
process the ‘unalienated’ labour of the medieval craftsman, but about winning 
control over the labour process itself, in order to reorganize production in the 
interests of securing the benefits of autonomous labour, where possible inside 
the labour process, and correspondingly, in the interests of expanding freely 
determined leisure time.  
In these terms, the re-temporalization of labour expands the quality of, 
and reduces the length of, the working day. Moreover, this produces a further 
qualitative change in the relations between the labour process/necessary 
labour and freely directed activities. The boundaries between work and life 
are recalibrated – which clearly has echoes of Negri’s reflections on the recent 
expansion of immaterial labour: skills developed freely outside of the labour 
process find a place of value in the labour process, just as skills developed in 
the labour process find a new home or value outside of the labour process. 
Yet, if this generates a liberated continuum between labour and freely 
determined activities, freely determined activities are precisely that: they are 
not the liberated home of labour, but the space where intellectual and artisanal 
activities are advanced without preconceptions. Thus, the realm of freely 
determined activities may, in fact, be the space where all images of 
productivity, intellectual, immaterial, or creative, are laid to rest. There is 
nothing to presuppose that the autonomous labours of the industrious artist 
will be the only model of emancipated labour developed outside of the 
‘unalienated labour’ and necessary labour of the labour process. Outside of 
the labour process human activities may have no charge and ambition other 
than the cultivation of laziness or one’s garden or the development of life 
skills: of caring for others, of talking and listening, of noting and taking 
pleasure from nature.  
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So where exactly does the ideal of craft-integrity sit within an 
emancipatory model of labour? For a hundred and fifty years this ideal has 
taken the form of an alternative or counter productivity to the one embedded 
in capitalist rationality. In the artisanal labour of the craftsman or 
craftswomen the elemental attributes of human creativity are supposedly laid 
bare. This is because, it is argued, the craftsperson exhibits a kind of 
perfected, or at least highly developed, expressive control over his or her 
materials. Accordingly, capitalism is held to be the very antithesis of the 
image of this self-discipline; or rather, very few people engaged in wage 
labour under capitalism achieve, or are in position to achieve, the requisite 
levels of concentration, repetitive discipline, and patience to master a craft. 
As Richard Sennett puts it, the ideal of craft-integrity is best defined as a 
‘temporary suspension of the desire for closure’ (Sennett, 2008: 221). This is 
why capitalism is so time-poor. It expands the realm of labour (of wage-
labour) yet reduces the capacity of the majority to labour – that is freely 
labour – hence the centrality, historically, of the time-rich craftsman to the 
critique of this sense of closure. Yet, as I have argued, seeing the 
reconstitution of craft-integrity in material or immaterial forms as the primary 
answer to this temporal-poverty is misconceived, because to focus on the loss 
of craft-skill under capitalism is to reduce the re-temporalisation of the 
capitalist labour process simply to a matter of reconstituted craft-skill, as if 
craft-skill itself will heal the vicissitudes of alienated labour. Whereas, in fact, 
the emancipation of labour needs to be seen as the outcome of a more 
fundamental shift: a control over time (of productive time) as such. Sennett, then, in 
the manner of much Romantic anti-capitalism, enforces a split between craft-
time – what he calls ‘slow craft time’ (Sennett, 2008: 295) – and the control 
over productive labour and necessary labour; craft-skills and the labour 
process do not connect in any transformative sense. The point is not that the 
development of craft-skill is unable to secure us some freely determined time 
and, as such, some respite from the alienations of capitalist time, but that 
there is no truly freely determined time without control over productive time 
as a whole.  
In conclusion, then, the Romantic anti-capitalist defenders of artisanal 
craft-skills have tended to lose sight of this distinction, fetishizing artisanal 
skills as the corner stone of the emancipation of labour and the critique of 
alienation. Similarly, Negri’s model of immaterial labour tends to fetishize 
John Roberts 
 114 
‘intellectual craft’ at the expense of the worker’s alienation and the temporal 
discipline of the value process. This is why there are losses and gains from his 
adaptation of Marx’s model of ‘freedom in alienation’. By arguing that new 
skills emerge through the new forms of intellectual and immaterial labour, he 
rejects the notion that capitalism destroys all forms of craft integrity. The 
qualitative expansion of the immaterial content of labour, for Negri, actually 
reconceptualises and redefines the notion of craft skill, in keeping with the 
changes in the relations of production since the 1960s: the increased scientific 
and technical inputs into the labour process. But this model is delimited 
because of the over-valorisation of these new forms of labour. Given that 
immaterial labour is not a separate part of the labour process and therefore is 
indivisible from material labour (from the wider constraints of the value-
form), it is subject to the same pressures of routinization as factory work and 
the service industries. Consequently, claims about the broader devaluation of 
workers’ skills across the system as a whole, and the alienation of both the 
new knowledge worker and manual worker, lose their critical leverage. And 
without these claims there is no sense of a temporality beyond the reach of 
capital. Accordingly, the development of new creative inputs into labour is 
not the answer to the systematic alienation of labour, even if a privileged 
minority of knowledge workers – the ‘creative class’ – have benefited from 
this shift, and at some level do match Negri’s and others’ view of the post-
Fordist labour process as an enhanced model of communication and 
organization for workers at the point of production. But only a minority of 
knowledge-workers benefit from these new processes of creative self-
valorization. There are two interrelated issues at stake therefore: firstly, there 
is no integral model of craft to be won back from the labour process; and 
secondly, whether immaterial labour is tendential or systemic, its creative 
expansion cannot fundamentally alter the downward pressures of capitalist 




THE CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF 
EXPLOITATION 
  117 
8 
Slavery, Contemporary Forms of Exploitation 
and Their Temporalities 
Massimiliano Tomba 
 
If there is a way to comprehend the phenomenon which today goes under 
the name of globalisation, it certainly involves the assumption that the 
distinction between the first, second and third worlds has been overcome. 
The inadequacy of a whole way of reasoning in terms of tendency and residue 
is now so obvious that one cannot disagree with the severe judgement of 
Chakrabarty when he affirms that to speak of a ‘survival of an earlier mode of 
production’ means to reason with ‘stagist and elitist conceptions of history’. 
Disagreeing with theories of ‘uneven development’, he maintains that it is 
historicist to consider ‘Marx’s distinction between “formal” and “real” 
subsumption of labour […] as a question of historical transition’ 
(Chakrabarty, 2000: 12-14, 261, footnote 37). But the same critique is also 
valid for many Marxisms, including one of the most intelligent theoretical and 
political traditions of European Marxism: l’operaismo (workerism). This 
tradition, which started from the perspective of the political centrality of the 
mass worker (operaio massa), went on to consider industrial labour as 
secondary and residual in that, according to Negri’s recent writings, we live ‘in 
a society characterised ever more strongly by the hegemony of immaterial 
labour’ (Negri, 1998: 8). Rejecting the law of value, Negri worked on an 
extension of the notion of productive labour, which comes tendentially to 
coincide with wage labour. In order to overcome the law of value, Negri 
pushed Marx beyond Marx: the Grundrisse’s greatest insight, according to 
Negri, is in the analysis of the ‘Fragment on machines’ in which he expressed 
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the ‘necessary tendency of capital’ towards the subsumption of the entire 
society (ibid.: 170; Bellofiore and Tomba, 2009: 407-431). At this point, Negri 
affirms, ‘the capitalist appropriation of society is complete’ (1998: 173). Negri 
follows Marx enthusiastically when Marx writes that ‘production based on 
exchange-value falls’; for Negri, it is a case of the ‘impossibility of the 
measure of exploitation’, of the ‘emptying out of the theory of value’ (ibid.: 
178). The evacuation of the ‘theory of value’ – a term which is not Marx’s – 
from every element of comparison transforms it into ‘pure and simple 
command, a pure and simple form of politics’ (ibid.). Because value would no 
longer be measurable, ‘the theory of surplus-value, in its centrality, eliminates 
any scientific claim to centralization and of domination conceived from inside 
the theory of value’ (ibid.: 30). 
That interpretation overrated some parts of the Grundrisse that become an 
‘extraordinary theoretical anticipation of mature capitalist society’, where 
Marx tells us that ‘capitalist development leads to a society in which industrial 
workers’ labour (insofar as immediate labour) is now only a secondary 
element in the organisation of capitalism’. When capitalism has subsumed the 
society, ‘productive labour becomes intellectual, cooperative, immaterial 
labour’ (ibid.: 7). The consequence that Negri draws is clear: ‘we live today in 
a society evermore characterised by the hegemony of immaterial labour’ (ibid.: 
7–8). If, on the one hand, according to Negri, ‘all forms of labor are today 
socially productive […] there is [nevertheless] always one figure of labor that 
exerts hegemony over the others’ (Hardt and Negri, 2004: 106-107). Thus the 
industrial labour of the nineteenth and twentieth century has lost its 
hegemony and, in the last decades of the twentieth century, ‘immaterial 
labour’ has emerged in its place (ibid.: 108). The general intellect becomes 
‘hegemonic in capitalist production’, ‘immaterial and cognitive labour become 
immediately productive’ and the ‘cognitariat’ becomes the ‘fundamental 
productive force that makes the system work’: the new hegemonic figure 
(Negri, 2006: 167, 183-184). 
I wanted to sketch out this interpretation, because it is representative of a 
historicist and Eurocentric perspective on global capitalism. In order to avoid 
surrendering to these historicist equations, according to which the industrial 
working-class today stands in the same relation to immaterial labour as the 
peasantry did to the industrial working-class in the nineteenth century, it is 
necessary to follow the chains of valorisation that, with delocalisation, not 
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only exit the factory but cross national frontiers, and thus the salary 
differentials from which capital profits. But a mapping of delocalisation 
would be only a faded photograph in black and white, without the vivid 
colours of living labour; of the migrant workers who, affirming their freedom 
of movement, clash with the capitalist interest to construct and preserve 
salary differentials within and outside Europe. 
From the Grundrisse  to Capital  
As is well known the incipit of the Grundrisse – ‘II. Money’ – refers to a first 
chapter, still unwritten, on value. It is therefore false to maintain that the 
‘Fragment’ celebrates the downfall of the law of value, if Marx’s reflection on 
value was still not yet mature at that stage. This theoretical work occurs in the 
manuscripts of the 1860s. It is important, however, for the question posed by 
the ‘Fragment’, that in the Grundrisse Marx had not yet defined his own notion 
of socially necessary labour as labour that, in a determinate quantity, is 
objectified in exchange-value. When he speaks of necessary labour, his 
reasoning remains blocked by difficulties that he continues to attribute to 
Ricardo, whose theory of value, still sometimes considered legitimate in 
18581, would be definitively presented as confused between values and cost 
prices in the middle of the writing of the economic manuscripts of 1861-3 
(Marx, 1986: 394). Grundrisse mostly looked at capital in general, but in the 
1860s Marx’s thorough analysis of the world market led him to investigate the 
competition of capitals, the history of non-capitalistic societies and their ‘early 
integration into the world market’. He concentrated on anticolonial revolts, 
and brought the unilinear models of historical explanation into question 
(Anderson, 2002: 93; 2010). Up to the end of the 1850s, Marx held a positive 
view of the ‘propagandistic (civilising) tendency’ (Marx, 1986: 466) of capital 
and believed in the thoroughness with which British industrial capital would 
destroy non-capitalist societies in the process of its worldwide expansion2. In 
                                                
1 Marx continued to work on value also during the different editions of Capital 
(Hecker, 1987). 
2 According to Mohri: ‘In the 1840s and 1850s Marx emphasized the 
“revolutionary” role of British free trade, basing himself upon a general 
expectation that it would destroy the framework of the old society which was an 
obstacle to the growth of productive forces, and would generate in its place the 
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the 1850s Marx’s pronouncements on colonialism were often more 
ambivalent. He wrote that English colonialism in India would have a ‘double 
mission […]: one destructive, the other regenerating – the annihilation of old 
Asiatic society, and the laying the material foundations of Western society in 
Asia’ (Marx, 1979c: 217-218). This historicism fascinated many Marxisms, as 
it indicated the development of the productive forces as the tendency that 
must be followed by all other forms which are defined as backward or 
residual. The supposed ‘regenerating’ aspect disappears from his writing of 
the 1860s, and the destruction of the native industry of India or Ireland by 
the British capital is no longer regarded as ‘revolutionary’3. 
By the end of 1858, seeing the ability of capital to metabolise the crisis, 
Marx was led to reconsider his analysis. In a letter to Engels dated 8th 
October 1858 he writes: 
There is no denying that bourgeois society has for the second time 
experienced its 16th century, a 16th century which, I hope, will sound its death 
knell just as the first ushered it into the world. The proper task of bourgeois 
society is the creation of the world market, at least in outline, and of the 
production based on that market. Since the world is round, the colonisation 
of California and Australia and the opening up of China and Japan would 
seem to have completed this process. For us, the difficult question is this: on 
the Continent revolution is imminent and will, moreover, instantly assume a 
socialist character. Will it not necessarily be crushed in this little corner of the 
earth, since the movement of bourgeois society is still, in the ascendant over a 
far greater area? (Marx and Engels, 1983: 347-348) 
In this letter one can find the coordinates of Marx’s theoretical and political 
work in the 1860s. One can already observe the difference with the Grundrisse. 
There are three important issues in this letter. First of all, the bourgeois 
society, Marx writes, ‘has for the second time experienced its 16th century’. 
                                                
kind of development that would lay the basis for a new society. However, this 
view was discarded by Marx himself from the 1860s onward, as he became well 
aware that the destruction of the old society would not necessarily give rise to the 
material conditions for a new society’ (Mohri, 1979: 40). 
3 Mohri remarks that ‘On the contrary, the destruction of native Irish industry is 
now looked upon as the first step toward demolition of the base for the Irish 
revolution itself, or, we may dare to say, it is obviously taken as “counter-
revolutionary” rather than as “revolutionary”’ (1979: 38). 
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This second 16th century of capitalism leads Marx to conceive of an enduring 
primitive accumulation, which one cannot confine to the beginning of 
capitalistic production (Bonefeld, 2001; Glassman, 2006; Wainwright, 2008). 
Secondly, both theoretical and political analysis must be done at the level of 
the world market. ‘The world is round’, writes Marx, and capitalism puts into 
relation different geographical areas and different forms of exploitation. One 
cannot analyse capitalism only by considering the countries where it is more 
developed. That being so, the third consideration is that Marx poses the 
‘difficult question’: whether a socialist revolution in Europe could be 
successful while the movement of capitalistic society is still ‘ascendant over a 
far greater area’. From this moment a eurocentric point of view on capitalism 
and working class movements is directly reactionary, as were all attempts to 
construct socialism in one country. 
Still, in the celebrated ‘Preface’ of 1859 Marx delineates the progressive 
process of universal history according to definite stages. The Asiatic, classical, 
feudal and bourgeois modes of production are qualified as ‘progressive 
epochs’, with respect to which the bourgeois is ‘the last antagonistic form of 
the process of production’ (Marx, 1987: 263-264). Marx liberated himself 
from this historical-philosophical (geschichtsphilosophisch) legacy with difficulty, 
perhaps only during the maturation of the conceptual structure of Capital4. 
Directly confronting the Asiatic modes of production and the Russian 
populists, he understood that there are not predetermined stages of capitalist 
development. In a letter at the end of 1877 to the Editor of ‘Otecestvennye 
Zapiski’, he wrote that his sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western 
Europe could not be transformed ‘into a historical-philosophical theory of 
universal development, predetermined by fate, for all peoples, regardless of 
the historical circumstances in which they find themselves’. He had learnt that 
one could never understand historical phenomena ‘with the passe-partout of 
a philosophy of history whose supreme virtue is to be suprahistorical’ (Marx 
and Michajlovskij, 1989: 201). Marx arrived at this understanding by refining 
an idea of the development of the forces of production in the light of the 
concrete replies of history; that is to say, the histories of the struggles that, 
interacting with the atemporal historicity of capital, co-determine its history. 
                                                
4 Marx overcomes his own eurocentrism towards the end of the 60s, opening 
himself to the problematic of ‘peripheral’ Russia. See Dussel (1990a, 1990b).  
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It was an error to read the development of capital in evolutionist terms: 
politically, this view has coincided with that of progress. Thus not only is any 
society denied the possibility of leaping over the ‘natural phases’ of its 
development, but forms of exploitation are laid out diachronically, when they 
are instead completely complementary. This can be seen in the case of 
absolute and relative surplus-value, that is, of the extortion of surplus-value 
by means of a lengthening of the working day and the intensification of 
labour through the introduction of machines. The passage from formal 
subsumption to real subsumption, from the extortion of absolute surplus-
value to relative surplus-value, does not take place according to a paradigm of 
stages in which the first gives way to the second. The passage from the third 
part (‘The production of absolute surplus-value’) to the fourth (‘The 
production of relative surplus-value’) is marked by the final lines of chapter 
ten, where the workers, ‘as a class’, succeeded in establishing legal restrictions 
on the duration of the working day. If in fact ‘the creation of a normal 
working-day is […] the product of a protracted civil war, more or less 
dissembled, between the capitalist class and the working-class’ (Marx, 1996: 
305), capital responds to the war with an augmentation of the productive 
force of labour by means of machines. ‘Progress’ is measured by this 
intensification of exploitation. For this reason, it is unrealistic, even when not 
acting in bad faith, to prophesise the liberation of labour by means of 
machines within capitalist relations of production, when the use-value of 
labour remains intrinsically capitalist. Innovation is a response to the 
insurgency of living labour. That means that capital introduces new 
machinery because it is compelled to, both by the unruliness of the workers 
and the physiological limit reached in the exploitation of labour power.  
On the Differentials of Surplus-Value 
It is important to understand exchange-value, beyond some logical-
conceptual shifts present even in the writings of the mature Marx, not as the 
objectification of labour immediately spent in the production of a 
determinate commodity, but as an expression of the quantity of social labour 
objectified in the commodity: ‘that which determines the magnitude of the 
value of any article is the amount of labour socially necessary, or the labour 
time socially necessary for its production’ (Marx, 1996: 48). It is in Capital 
that we find the highest level of conceptual determination of social labour, 
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and it is this determination that needs to be assumed in order to test Marx’s 
entire theoretical edifice. What needs to be clear, and what also contains a 
moment of real difficulty, is that the labour objectified in the exchange-value 
of a commodity does not correspond to the quantity of labour immediately 
spent in its production. Instead, it is the fruit of mediation with socially 
allocated labour. In this sense, the expression ‘individual value’ (individueller 
Wert) is a contradiction in itself: not only because, as Marx emphases in the 
‘Marginal notes on Wagner’ in 1881-82 – the dates are important in this case 
– ‘exchange-value in the singular does not exist’ (Marx, 1989: 531-562), but 
because it presupposes a value determined quantitatively by labour 
individually employed in the production of this commodity, and not by social 
labour. This value, on the other hand, does not have a definite size. Rather, it 
is variable, and its variability retroacts on the determination of the quantity of 
social labour contained in a commodity. If the general conditions in which a 
certain quantity of commodities are produced change, Marx affirms, a reverse 
effect (Rückwirkung) takes place on them (Marx, 1990: 75). It is possible that a 
determinate quantity of labour time already objectified in a commodity 
changes due to a change in the social productivity of labour, which reacts on 
the exchange-value of the commodity itself. 
The notion of retroaction allows Marx to explain a change in value that 
has its origins outside the process of production, and specifically following a 
change of the cost of raw materials or the introduction of a ‘new invention’ 
(Marx, 1996: 318). This important Marxian understanding is possible only 
within a constellation that is clear on the social character of the labour that 
valorises value: ‘The value of a commodity is certainly determined by the 
quantity of labour contained in it, but this quantity is itself socially 
determined. If the amount of labour-time socially necessary for the 
production of any commodity alters… this reacts back on all the old 
commodities of the same type, because […] their value at any given time is 
measured by the labour socially necessary to produce them, i.e., by the labour 
necessary under the social conditions existing at the time’ (ibid.). In other 
words: the changes in the intensity and power of social labour react back on 
the commodities already produced, causing a change in the labour time 
objectified in them (De Angelis, 2005). 
If Capital represents the high point of categorical elaboration, it is here that 
we must find the most mature consequences of this way of understanding 
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social labour and exchange-value. As we have already seen, according to Marx 
‘the real value of a commodity is, however, not its individual value, but its 
social value; that is to say, the real value is not measured by the labour-time 
that the article in each individual case costs the producer, but by the labour-
time socially required for its production’ (1996: 324). If therefore the value of 
a commodity depends upon the labour time objectified in it, it should be kept 
in mind that this labour time is not that which is effectively employed for the 
production of a given use-object, but can be either greater or smaller than 
that. The generic human labour time objectified in the substance of value 
must be adjusted to the time that social labour would need to carry out that 
same job. Surplus value is not a quantifiable amount within the accounting of 
a single firm. 
The idea, recurring in numerous places in Marx’s analysis, according to 
which surplus-value would be determined by the labour time that exceeds 
that which would be necessary for the worker employed by an individual 
capital to produce his own wages, is a simplification. This is an abstract 
representation of capital in general, that does not take into consideration the 
competition between capitals. The value is an objectification of socially 
necessary labour and it is not deductible from the labour actually expended in 
a single productive process. If the productive force of the latter is below the 
productivity of social labour, it is possible that, despite the depression of 
wages and the increase in labour time in this particular sector, the production 
of surplus labour remains very low. In such cases an hour of work of high 
productivity corresponds to two hours of social labour, in the places where 
the society as a whole still does not make use of a technological innovation. 
This exchange, where one is equal to two, violates only the intellectual 
principles of grade-school mathematics; the value of commodities in general, 
and therefore also of those produced with new technology, is its social value, 
that is, the quantity of social labour objectified in it. This phenomenon 
imposes itself violently in the world market, where an increase in the 
productive power of labour through the introduction of a new machine 
counts as an increase in the intensity of labour if the capitalist can sell the 
commodities at a higher price, equivalent to the labour necessary to produce 
the same commodity for other capitalists who still lack that machine. The fact 
that the labour time effectively expanded is inferior to that which is socially 
necessary changes nothing in the relationship, except that the capitalist, 
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selling the commodity at its value, appropriates social surplus value, and 
therefore exchanges one hour of labour for two. ‘If therefore, the capitalist 
who applies the new method, sells his commodity at its social value of one 
shilling, he sells it for three pence above its individual value, and thus realises 
an extra surplus-value (Extramehrwert) of three pence’ (Marx, 1996: 324). 
Beyond numbers, the Extramehrwert that is appropriated by the capitalist 
corresponds to the quantity of social surplus value that he can withdraw from 
the society; he is an extractor of relative surplus value. 
In this way a greater number of hours of work physically performed pass 
through the hands of the capitalist, who utilises a greater productive power of 
work without violating the law of equivalence. The difference between 
capitalists who exploit work of differing productivity is therefore necessary so 
that it will be possible to extract relative surplus value from the advantage 
that springs from the technological innovation. This can be seen not only on 
a worldwide scale, where capital is continually in search of masses of absolute 
surplus value, but also within the western metropolises and even within the 
same corporation, broken up into apparently independent productive 
segments and in competition with each other: capital is in any case searching 
for the maximum gap possible between the intensity of labour in phases that, 
even if they are part of the same cycle, are recomposed through circulation. 
The differential quota between a given productivity of labour and social 
labour is realised through a transfer of value from production spheres in 
which the intensity of labour is low relative to those in which capital exploits 
labour at an intensity that is higher than the social average. The immediate 
repercussion of a technological innovation is a prolongation of labour time 
wherever the innovation is not yet employed: ‘One of the first consequences 
of the introduction of new machinery, before it has become dominant in its 
branch of production, is the prolongation of the labour-time of the labourers 
who continue to work with the old and unimproved means of production’ 
(Marx, 1990: 323). The introduction of a new machine generates an increase 
in relative surplus value, an increase that, in order to be realised, must be 
sustained by a proportional increase in the extraction of absolute surplus 
value where the innovation has not yet been employed. It is in this sense that 
relative surplus value is relative, because, to be real, it must be placed in 
relation to absolute surplus value. To the extent to which the capitalist that 
takes advantage of a technological innovation realises at least a part of the 
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relative surplus value that is potentially his, this surplus value takes form 
through a social transfer of value from productive areas of high absolute 
surplus value to those of high relative surplus value. The relative increase in 
the labour productivity and of the surplus value in some sectors of 
production leads to a de-valorisation of labour-power that could also 
manifest itself as growth of the exploitation of reproduction work whether 
waged or unwaged. Indeed, we should always keep in consideration the 
quantity of labour that is indirectly commanded by capital through a wage.  
Only when Marx clarified further the nature of exchange-value was he able 
to show that the machine not only does not create value, but that it also does 
not produce surplus value: ‘As machinery comes into general use in a 
particular branch of production, the social value of the machine’s product 
sinks down to its individual value, and the following law asserts itself: surplus 
value does not arise from the labour-power that has been replaced by the 
machinery, but from the labour-power actually employed in working with the 
machinery’ (Marx, 1996: 530). When a technological innovation becomes 
widespread, the growing intensity of labour obtained through its employment 
becomes socially dominant and there is less chance of extracting quotas of 
social surplus value from the means of production of relative surplus value. 
The production of surplus value make use of machines in at least two 
ways: indirectly, through the devalorisation of labour-power following the 
expulsion of workers replaced by machines; and in relative surplus value sensu 
stricto, exploiting the sporadic introduction of machines. The latter 
circumstance is that which allows the exploitation of labour of a greater 
productivity than the social average, such that the individual labour 
objectified in this commodity is less than the quantity of socially average 
labour (ibid.). We know by now that only the latter determines exchange-
value. When the productivity of labour obtained by a technical innovation 
becomes socially dominant, it unleashes ‘the most ruthless and excessive 
prolongation of the working day, in order that he may secure compensation 
for the decrease in the relative number of workers exploited by increasing not 
only relative but also absolute surplus labour’ (Marx, 1996: 531). The 
extraction of relative surplus value generates, in those parts of the world 
where workers’ resistance is lower, a great mass of absolute exploitation. This 
means that the introduction of new machinery is not a pre-determined route 
in the history of all countries, but on the contrary different capitals in head-
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to-head competition with each other in the world market must seek out or 
create geographic areas where different labour powers have different wages 
and productive powers (Marini, 1991: 8-10). If the reciprocal implication of 
the various forms of surplus value are grasped, then it is only out of faith in 
some progressive and Eurocentric philosophy of history that it is possible to 
consider some forms of production as backward, and wage labour, extended 
to the whole world, as residual. 
Historical Multiversum: High Tech Production and Slavery 
Formal subsumption is the basis of capitalist production as the creation of 
surplus value in a process whose end is the production of commodities for 
the market; real subsumption presents itself instead as a specifically capitalist 
form because it doesn’t allow the previously existing social relations to 
remain, but revolutionises the technical processes of production and the 
formation of social groups (Marx, 1996: 645). To these two forms should also 
be added a third, rarely studied: that of the hybrid or intermediate forms 
(Zwitterformen) of subsumption (Murray, 2000; 2004). Marx speaks of them for 
the first time in Capital. They are forms in which surplus labour is extracted 
by means of direct coercion (direkter Zwang), without formal subsumption of 
labour to capital. Marx observes how they can indeed be understood as 
transitional, but can also be reproduced in the background of large-scale 
industry. The hybrids, though they are not formally subsumed to capital and 
though labour is not given as wage labour, fall under the command of capital. 
That allows us to comprehend the contemporaneity of apparent 
anachronisms like slavery, which are not mere residues of past epochs, but 
forms that, though with an altered physiognomy, are produced and 
reproduced in the background of the current capitalist mode of production. 
The exploitation of child labour in Asian countries, and working hours of 
up to eighteen a day5, are not cases of capitalist underdevelopment, but 
express the current levels of production of social surplus value6. If we 
                                                
5 On the conditions of labour in China, see Chan and Xiaoyang (2003). 
6  Globalization makes political command capitalistically productive that asserts 
itself along the borders to conserve the valorising potential of wage differentials. 
See Gambino (2003), Sacchetto (2004). 
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consistently assume the reciprocal co-penetration between absolute and 
relative surplus value, the distinctions between North and South of the world, 
between first, second and third world, or if one prefers, between core, semi-
periphery and periphery with ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’ capitalisms, lose a 
great part of their significance. It is no longer possible to reason in terms of 
tendencies and residues: the various forms of exploitation are to be 
understood in a historical-temporal multiversum, in which they interact 
within the contemporaneity of the present. This interlinking should be 
followed materially along the lines of the differences between national 
salaries. Analysis and practical intervention here should fuse together. 
Absolute and relative surplus-value are not to be thought in a diachronic 
succession, but synchronically in a historical-temporal multiversum. Relative 
surplus-value is such only in relation to absolute surplus-value: relative 
surplus-value not only does not replace absolute surplus-value, but 
necessitates, for its own realisation, an increase in the quantity of socially 
produced absolute surplus-value. As we will see, the production of absolute 
surplus-value, far from being an archaic form of capitalist exploitation or a 
residue of the nineteenth century, is a form of extortion of surplus-value 
absolutely adequate to our times. The existence of conditions of labour where 
the working day is much longer than eight hours and the wages are below the 
level necessary for survival – that is, high absolute surplus-value – is not to be 
attributed to past capitalist forms that live on only in economically depressed 
zones. Rather, it is a case of the result and the presupposition of the 
‘progress’ of capital. The more capital uses technology, and thus machines, 
and therefore the more elevated the mass of surplus-values that is produced, 
so much more must the direct extortion of absolute surplus-value increase. 
The question doesn’t in fact examine the co-presence of diverse forms of 
exploitation, but rather how the production of relative surplus-value gives 
way to the production of enormous masses of absolute surplus-value. The 
different forms of exploitation aren’t set beside one another in a sort of 
postmodern universal exhibition. Rather, capital must continually produce, 
through the use of extra-economic violence, differentiations of wages and of 
productivity of labour. 
Capitalistic modernity was born globalised in the entanglement of 
colonialism and slavery. As the case of the American colonies shows, 
workers’ escape or exit constituted the principal problem of capitalistic 
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accumulation between 1500 and 1800 (Moulier-Boutang, 2002: 26). The 
purpose of English legislation during the 16th and the 17th centuries was the 
immobilisation and discipline of the labour-force, even through slavery. This 
wasn’t an anomalous case in the colonies but was a common authoritarian 
answer, to the question of how to control the mobility of European and 
North-American living labour on the market (ibid.: 158). According to 
Moulier-Boutang, it is not trade that produced slavery but rather bonding 
wage labour which produced its modern forms (ibid.: 232). Modern slavery is 
a disciplined variant of ‘free’ wage labour. Slavery is not a dark moment 
confined to the protohistory of capital but is continually reproduced from the 
capitalistic mode of production7. 
The colonial system supported the development of the industrial system. 
Marx’ editing of historical materials shows different counter-histories and the 
dark side of a ‘progress’ whose focus was ‘a vast, Herod-like slaughter of the 
innocents’ (1996: 745). Capital asserts itself on world-history, showing its 
deadly face at once. This violence was extreme in ‘plantation colonies 
destined for export trade only, such as the West Indies, and in rich and well-
populated countries, such as Mexico and India, that were given over to 
plunder’ (ibid.: 741). Through this violence capital was able to pull out a 
labour-force to be employed on plantations, and the intensity of labour was 
set to the clock of the world stock exchange. For this reason ‘the negro 
labour in the Southern States of the American Union preserved something of 
a patriarchal character, so long as production was chiefly directed to 
immediate local consumption. But in proportion, as the export of cotton 
became of vital interest to these states, the overworking of the negro and 
sometimes the using up of his life in 7 years of labour became a factor in a 
calculated and calculating system (ibid.: 244). 
To be understood, the world market requires a historiographical paradigm 
which is able to comprehend the combination of a plurality of temporal strata 
                                                
7  The overall number of human beings forced to leave the African coast amounts 
to about 11 million. The slaves actually introduced in the Americas between 1519 
and 1867 would be 9.599.000 (Pétré-Grenouilleau, 2004). There was a 
progression in the slave population of the Americas, which reached 33.000 in 




in the violent synchronising dimension of modernity. The post-modern 
juxtaposition of a plurality of historical times, where slavery is contiguous 
with high tech production in the overcoming of the dualism of centre and 
periphery, doesn’t explain anything, and is even concealing. The post-modern 
mosaic of temporalities and forms of exploitation, even though it represents 
them as interconnected, poses the different times in a state of indifference to 
each other, when the very problem is their combination through the 
mechanisms of synchronisation in the world market. The nexus of value and 
socially necessary labour is now the most adequate category to comprehend 
the mechanism in which the labour-time of computer-based production 
requires and is combined with compulsory labour in several parts of the 
world. From this point of view, George Caffentzis does not exaggerate when 
he argues that ‘the computer requires the sweatshop, and the cyborg’s 
existence is premised on the slave’ (Caffentzis, 1999). 
Slavery becomes something new when it is subsumed to the world market, 
as with its development all people are entangled in its net (Marx, 1996: 750). 
The net of the world market holds together not only different forms of 
exploitation while combining them synchronically, but – and this is the other 
history – it bridges over different working classes. The very important issue 
that Marx posed at end of the 1860s concerns the synchronic combination of 
different forms of exploitation, their entwinement starting from the relation 
between absolute and relative surplus value (Tomba, 2013). Capital needs to 
create geographical areas or productive sectors where it can produce an 
enormous quantity of absolute surplus value to support the production of 
extraordinary surplus-value; relative surplus-value produced through 
mechanical innovations. 
Globalisation renders the political command that it exercises along the 
borders capitalistically productive in order to conserve the valorising potential 
of differential wages. This command is manifested over migrant workers 
without any niceties. Sovereignty, rights of citizenship and control of the 
borders operate economically in order to delineate different wage areas that 
can be preserved only by reducing to a minimum the movements of labour 
power from one area to the other. The chains of valorisation cross a 
multiplicity of wage areas, national and intranational, using those differentials 
of profitably. Delocalisation makes the difference of the productivity of 
labour and of wage levels capitalistically productive: that would not be 
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possible without political command over migrant flows. These migrant flows 
therefore justly rank highly among the forms of workers’ resistance to control 
and the forms of self-determination of the wage against capital. The migrant 
workers are not bare life (Colatrella, 2011) but forces of labour that, violating 
the borders, tend to disrupt the division of labour and national differentials of 
wages. The policies of regulation of the migrant flows, on the other hand, are 
economic policies of segmentation of the labour market and of the 
demarcation of wage differentials. As if the assembly lines had left the factory 
in order to undertake a long world tour, the chains of valorisation cross the 
borders of states, profiting from the national differentials of wages. In this 
context, political command over the borders and capitalist command over 
labour power are fused. Contemporary forms of the removal of wage 
differentials should thus be investigated together with subjective insurgencies 
in different part of the world. 
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A Brief History of Labour: From Subsumption 
to Multitude 
Alexander Neumann 
We are living in a time of global crisis, in the middle of a theoretical paradox. 
European governments say they are trying to save their key industries, to 
avoid systemic collapse of a so-called post-industrial society, yet the state 
intervention in Europe and the United States has recently focused on the 
rescue of the automobile sector and other industries. Mass protests respond 
to mass unemployment and precarious living conditions, while ‘cognitive’ 
capitalism presents itself as a post-material or immaterial entity. These 
paradoxes point to a major theoretical gap in the social sciences since 1980, 
between the concept of wage labour and the concept of political action. This 
kind of debate reminds us of the philosophical oppositions from before the 
French Revolution, or Stalinist doxa: materialism versus idealism. Over the 
last thirty years, all intellectual efforts have focused on the conceptual 
opposition between labour and politics (or wage labour and the public 
sphere, as in Habermas’ theory of communicative action: Habermas, 1981), 
which artificially separated labour and communication (or culture). Touraine 
in France, Giddens in Britain and many others have reproduced this basic 
pattern, exploiting the theoretical potential of the linguistic turn. This 
movement coincided with the burial of traditional Marxism, which believed 
that work and politics converge naturally through the collective action of the 
industrial working class. It is true that nowadays this class exists only as a 
historical relic in the form of bureaucratic trade unionism or working class 
parties without a significant proletarian base. Most labour studies and 
sociological surveys focus on isolated situations of specific companies, or on 
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specific groups like the unemployed. This contributes little or nothing to 
global social critique. The great defeat of the European working class from 
1978 to 1983 was consequently coupled with defeat on the theoretical 
battlefield, when the critique of wage labour was identified as a variety of the 
ideological Marxism of the weakening labour parties. However, the critique of 
labour was always the opposite of traditional Marxism and its positive attitude 
towards labour value. In fact, this critical approach was expressed at the 
margins of the great public debates, in journals such as Futur Antérieur (see 
also Brandt, 1990) at the University Paris 8 Vincennes, or in sociological 
research inspired by the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School. The main 
thesis of this intellectual tendency is that no one can envisage his or her life 
by identifying herself or himself as a variable part of capital, given that wage 
labour is defined by Marx as variable capital.  
There is a school of thought that has built a rich conceptual network of 
relations between labour, action and global capitalism. This set of ideas, from 
the first Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, was carefully avoided by 
doctrinaire Marxism as well as by the institutional successors of the Frankfurt 
School, Habermas and Honneth. This lineage, which linked the critique of 
political economy to Critical Theory, includes such remarkable thinkers as 
Theodor W. Adorno, Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Gerhardt Brandt, Jean-Marie 
Vincent, Oskar Negt, and more recently Nancy Fraser and John Holloway 
(see Neumann, 2010a; 2010b; 2014). 
They have all been attacked by mainstream academics as doctrinaire 
Marxists, and at the same time were denounced as bourgeois idealists by 
communists. One of the main theoretical concerns of this tendency is to 
clearly distinguish industrial labour as an empirical object on the one hand, 
and the theory of wage labour as a critical counterpoint on the other. So this 
type of Critical Theory is at once with Marx and against Marx. Marx himself 
believed it impossible for his concepts to account for the possibility of global 
capitalism, given that he looked forward to the socialist world revolution 
rather than to neocapitalism. However, his concept of ‘real subsumption’ 
(‘reale Subsumption’ in German) of wage labour to capital sketches a picture 
of completely commodified societies that consider any kind of labour as a 
market value. In an additional chapter of Capital entitled ‘Results of the 
immediate process of production’, published a century after the first version 
of the book, Marx explains how key industries have to mobilise 
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transportation networks, communication structures, various services, 
scientific knowledge and financial supports, on a worldwide scale, leading to a 
global market and capitalist globalisation (Marx, 1976). Within this theoretical 
framework, the opposition between productive and unproductive labour is no 
longer important, as there are many services needed in different places and at 
different moments of global value extraction. At the end of the story, and of 
this conceptual development, there is no longer any ‘mortal contradiction’ 
between productive forces and relations of production, which should lead to 
world revolution in the mind of Marx. Fully developed capitalism is 
characterised by the fact that its organisational principles are at work in the 
whole society and the whole world. In this unpublished chapter, Marx 
develops his observation on the basis of industrial production, but this is only 
the starting point of his analysis. The new type of organisation and 
cooperation, called real subsumption involves all economic sectors, and thus 
extends over the entire society, by the use of technology, scientific 
knowledge, stock markets, electrical grid, communiucation systems (telegraph 
etc.) and modern transportation systems (Marx, 1976: 220). Marx explicitly 
leaves the field of industrial labour, with a theoretical orientation that directly 
leads us to today’s phenomena of capitalist globalisation as network 
management and electronic exchanges. Without these exchanges and global 
flows, no businesses could work today. In a sense, the Marxian concept of 
subsumption abolishes Marx’s own theoretical distinction between productive 
and unproductive labour. Abstract labour, fully commodified, mobilises both 
material and immaterial acts at different times, different places and different 
levels of the world market. 
There is an extension of this idea in the third volume of Capital, where 
Marx leaves the theoretical framework of the industrial factory, in order to 
review the modes of generating value that are not dependent on industrial 
production. Marx explicitly considers the shareholders, global trade (and the 
unequal exchange that it maintains), economies of scale and technical 
innovation, as well as luxury consumption. Similarly, he mentions the effects 
of government intervention on surplus value production (Marx, 1979b: 247-
250, 494). Despite his own convictions, Marx anticipated a situation 
throughout this argument in which the proletariat would no longer be outside 
bourgeois society, but would be directly involved and integrated as variable 
capital, as wage labour socialised by the market, via organisational networks 
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and mass communication. This is probably the reason why the concept of 
real subsumption is absent from three books of the Capital, and only appears 
in later manuscripts, published in 1970. As global capitalism became a 
historical reality, we have to overcome conceptual oppositions that Marx 
considers central to Capital, between productive and unproductive labour, 
concrete and abstract labour, etc. It also means abandoning the false 
opposition between an industrial and a post-industrial society, given that, at 
the analytical level, in a global capitalist market it does not matter if an iPhone 
is produced in a European or Chinese factory.  
Even if Theodor W. Adorno was unfamiliar with Marx’s unpublished 
chapter on real subsumption, he came to the same conclusion in his famous 
essay on late capitalism in 1968, in which he asserted that the working classes 
of the western world had been integrated into the capitalist regime, which 
meant that the theoretical opposition between productive forces and relations 
of production was no longer relevant. He underlined the fact that the concept 
of ‘industrial society’ was not appropriate to describe the global development 
of capitalism. Adorno and Horkheimer first followed this approach when 
they examined the Hollywood culture industry, but they did not directly 
analyse the market and organisational arrangements that are at stake here. 
This view deserves to be expanded, in my opinion, to take in the current 
arrangements of globalisation: computerisation of production and 
distribution, international dispersion of production stages, globalisation of 
capital and financial markets, marketing, advertising, consumption and credit, 
state reform, and so on. Adorno understands the global nature of capitalism, 
but he does not track down the process of incorporation and mediations of 
living labour; he goes directly into the company’s total fetish, without 
exploring the fields that I have mentioned, which are held in a multiplicity of 
conflict, resistance and experience. 
The main sociological invention of Adorno, at the German Congress of 
Sociology in 1968, was that sociology must formulate the critique of 
capitalism, not of ‘industrial society’, and countered the assertion that any 
reference to Marx was outdated (Adorno, 1971: 149-166). Key critical 
concepts from Marx, such as the fetishism of commodities or abstract 
exchange, are used by Adorno to weaken both the ongoing neoliberal and 
traditional Marxist schemes. This interpretation of Adorno, that I sketched in 
my book Conscience de casse (Crash consciousness), has been systematically 
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followed by Dirk Braunstein, in a book devoted to the critique of the political 
economy of Adorno, published in 2011. Conceptually, Adorno clearly 
distinguishes the Marxian concepts of the Marxist tradition, which he 
underlined in an article on ‘Marx and the basic categories of sociology’ 
(Adorno, 1997). 
According to Marx, developed capitalism breaks the concrete link between 
the worker and his employer, creating a situation where objectified labour 
uses living labour. Capital, as objectification of living labour, subjugates all 
persons depending on work by reducing them to wage labour. From the 
perspective of an individual employee, his insertion into a large production 
process makes him definitely lose track of his relative contribution to the 
economy as a whole. Market and capital appear as an abstract totality that lie 
beyond his or her control. In the unpublished chapter of Capital, we find 
arguments that show how capitalism works as a well organised and market 
driven global network, for instance by using economies of scale, modern 
transportation and communication systems, worldwide commerce, stock 
markets, and by making great use of scientific knowledge. To put it in one 
word: globalisation. All persons working within those processes, at different 
places, times and levels are part of the real subsumption. As a consequence, 
cognitive skills and electronic exchange are part of abstract labour, no matter 
if we call a Notebook an industrial product or not. 
Adorno wrote of the unprecedented nature of this social aggregation, 
which mixes the false representation of reality and the objective existence of 
the market:  
Although we are able to break through the facade of the company, this does 
not change the aspect of commodity fetishism: any merchant that calculates 
business is obliged to behave in a manner consistent with this fetish. If he 
does not, he will sink. (Adorno, 1997: 509, author translation) 
Similarly, if employees want to live, they must agree to be paid, which means 
that they take part of the abstract representation of capitalism. Any worker, 
whether employee, self-employed, freelance designer or other precarious 
networker, is defined as variable capital of capitalism, regardless of the type of 
employment contract or compensation available to him. Marx explicitly 
emphasises this fact in the unpublished chapter of Capital, where he says that 
the formal submission of contract workers has historically been supplanted 
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by the commodification of any kind of labour. Jean-Marie Vincent has 
pointed out the characteristics of this universal constraint:  
to sell himself, to be appreciated as a bearer of measurable labour power, to 
involve others in commodification, to develop strategic business activities 
trumping all others (including emotional aspects) (Vincent, 1998: 80, author 
translation). 
Far from being an illusory perception of reality, the abstract representations 
describe an ultimate form of social reality, by validating the priority of 
commodified relations. Marx calls them the ‘objective ways of thinking’ 
(‘objective Gedankenformen’, Marx, 1979a: 90), as thinking must take 
account of the objectivity of the social situation. 
From this perspective, the critical analysis of capitalism, led by Marx, is 
paving the way for a sociological critique of social forms and practices. The 
enchantment of the suggestive power of the commodity, fetish performances, 
the mode of consumption and possessive individualism, based on the real 
submission of wage labour, are trumping other principles of social life. 
Vincent summarises:  
The lives of individuals are marked by the logic of commodified development 
of value, and their life forms (daily life) fit forms of value or social things 
(ibid.: 231, author translation).  
This is an interpretation of the Marxian concept of commodity fetishism 
which tries to understand how social experiences get involved in capital 
development. 
The finding of Vincent, that life forms adapt to social objects, updates the 
analysis of Adorno and Horkheimer, who emphasised that modern 
individuals no longer have space to harvest ‘authentic’ experiences under the 
conditions of abstract representations, mass media and the cultural industry. 
The sensory experience is influenced by a mode of social exchange that is 
regulated by things (goods, money, technology), while culture, creation and 
communication are filtered by commodified standards. 
Indeed, Adorno and Horkheimer’s thesis on the culture industry directly 
and explicitly refers to the Marxist concept of commodity fetishism in the 
original version of the Dialectic of Enlightenment of 1942 (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 1990: 128). The reference to Marx was then erased for political 
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reasons; namely for fear of anti-communist frenzy. In Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
Adorno and Horkheimer point out the regressive burden of Western 
civilisation, which is able to return to barbarism. 
To Adorno, the social abstractions that form modern reality, identified by 
concepts such as the real subsumption of wage labour, and the culture 
industry, form a repressive totality which leaves little room for an 
autonomous life, despite the liberal discourse of freedom of choice. The 
General trumps the Particular. Adorno’s vision here again finds common 
ground with Marx, who had insisted that the market value depends on the 
subjective mobilisation of workers paid for their ability to work, not for the 
work itself. The degree of effectiveness of the work is, in fact, closely related 
to the moral, cultural and symbolic motivations of employees. As a 
consequence, capital depends on subjectivity, and is exposed to resistance and 
revolts, no matter if they take place within companies or within the system of 
the culture industry, once the players are projected into the world with their 
own conflicting interpretations. The ‘totality’ mentioned by Adorno when he 
talks about the Verblendungszusammenhang is much more fragile than it appears 
at first glance. Shifts, historical discrepancies and differences between the 
general movement of society on one side, and individual lives on the other, in 
my opinion make it possible to think of the individual experience of the loss 
of sensitive human encounters that are now covered by the real abstractions 
of modern society. 
However, the Frankfurt thinkers neglect the discrepancy between sensory 
experience and overall socialisation through abstract exchanges. Even if we 
can follow Jean-Marie Vincent when he shows the persistent connections 
between ‘the logic of capitalist development and the forms of life’ (Vincent, 
1998: 231), the fact remains that this connection frequently crumbles to 
pieces, due to the emergence of significant social actors, experiencing the 
contradictions, inconsistencies and discontinuities of the dominant values. 
The question of whether the congruence between market value and forms 
of social life can be achieved, or whether separations, conflicts and 
disharmony will prevail, is at the heart of the debates of Critical Theory. At 
his conference of 1968 on late capitalism, Adorno contradictsed Marx’s 
Communist Manifesto, as he found that there was no explosive, mortal 
contradiction between the productive forces and relations of production (or 
between the production and distribution of wealth), but rather a dialectical 
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tension that links the two intertwined aspects. Thus, capitalism will not be 
abolished by its own logic. On the other hand, he highlighted the potential 
for ‘resistance’ within capitalism. This was a more fundamental critique of the 
social forms of ‘late capitalism’, than the mainstream model of ‘industrial 
capitalism’ that later turned into ‘post-industrial capitalism’. In other words, 
Adorno seeks to save the Marxian critique from Marxism, while Honneth 
tends to remove ‘economism’ from the concepts of Marx’s Capital by treating 
them as Marxist economics. 
The limitation of the position Adorno took at the Congress of Sociology 
in 1968, in my opinion, is a lack of articulation of commodification on the 
one hand, and the constitution of society as a whole on the other. Soon, 
Adorno is just drifting through a critical pessimism which interprets society as 
a blinding connection, and does not highlight the sources of resistance to 
conformity. The convergence of productive forces and relations of 
production he observes, is correct in principle, but does not allow for 
understanding of social conflicts and mediations which constantly recompose 
profit-driven societies. 
It seems possible to extend the conceptual dynamics of Adorno, by using 
his own concept of ‘non-labour’ (Nicht-Arbeit, which is an intuition seen 
within his sociological essays). The first opposition of Marx between 
productive and unproductive labour has to be replaced with a more radical 
opposition between wage labour and non-labour, as a practical and aesthetic 
principle of resistance to instrumental and commodified action. This concept 
of non-work has already been raised rapidly by Pierre Naville in his critical 
sociology, and recalls the rebellious subjectivity Negt and Kluge talk about in 
their book Geschichte und Eigensinn (Naville, 1953, Negt and Kluge, 1993). 
In this approach, the opposition to capitalism is not produced 
spontaneously by the social forms of capitalism itself, but it may arise from 
the creative principle of resistance. Herein lies a major difference with the 
Communist Manifesto, in which Marx believed that capitalism had made its own 
gravedigger in the form of the proletariat, while Adorno noted in 1968 how 
the proletariat was subsumed under late capitalism. For the same reason, 
there is an irreducible difference between the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt 
School and Hardt and Negri. Jean-Marie Vincent, mentioned in the thanks at 
the beginning of Empire, outlined Negri’s position in his Critique of Labour, 
where he sums up Marx’s Grundrisse and Negri’s interpretation of it (Vincent, 
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1987: ch. 4). While Marx expects a dialectical reversal of deprivation and 
frustration suffered under capitalism towards working-class solidarity, 
socialism and world revolution, Negri hopes that the precarious workers of 
the multitude will spontaneously produce a new revolutionary subjectivity 
within cognitive capitalism. While Marx finally gave up the idea, giving 
emphasis to the historical formation of labour movements, Hardt and Negri 
think they can do without the principle of resistance and democratic debate 
that is otherwise required, in order to arrive directly at the global shift. The 
two authors assert that the multitude will turn into a political subject, ‘without 
any form of mediation’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 393). The complexity of 
public discussion in recent oppositional movements, from Tunis to New 
York and Athens, shows that this desire will again be disappointed. Critical 
Theory has proposed the concept of oppositional public sphere to name the 
ongoing process of sensitive experiences and public debates that produce a 
distance to the market players, the State and the mass media. 
The global crisis which began in 2008 – comparable to the global crisis of 
1929 – calls for a revival of original sociological concepts that are today 
placed at the margin of European sociology. With the collapse of the self-
regulation of financial markets, the theory of systemic self-regulation (from 
Luhmann to neoclassical economics) has clearly reached its limit. 
Theoretically, this finding also questions the import of these approaches in 
the communicative action theory of Habermas. 
Applied to phenomena in Europe, the critical shift that I propose could 
occur, ultimately, as a moment in which sociology refocuses on its own 
critical legacy, which was originally marked by the global crisis of 1929. 
Today, the erosion of collective norms, the problems of legitimacy of 
capitalism and the massive collapse of democratic representation within the 
State are empowering, or could empower oppositional public spheres.  
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However surprising it may seem, the man at the table on the picture above 
(Le Chevallier, 2008) is… an artist at work! His name is Martin Le Chevallier. 
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And the man behind him is a consultant auditing him. This picture is actually 
artwork. It was part of an exhibition – called ‘The Audit’ – that simply 
displays this photo with a voice-over reading the conclusions reached by the 
consultant’s assessment. When listening to the audit report, the visitor of the 
exhibition was thus invited to follow the dialectic curves of the business mind 
being applied to artistic activity to the point of absurdity. Thereby, Le 
Chevallier wanted to pinpoint – not without a sense of humour – both the 
convergences and the contradictions between business logic and artistic 
approach nowadays. 
In 2008, Martin Le Chevallier indeed appealed to a consulting firm in 
order to be subjected to an ‘artistic performance audit’, which would evaluate 
his approach and design a success strategy, just like for any other company. 
In doing so, he was of course wilfully ironic. However, the audit process was 
carried out very professionally and seriously (Le Chevallier, 2008). Therefore, 
the consultant identified the target in terms of financial value, market rating 
and fame. The goal was to establish the artist perfectly within the market by 
means of a business plan. To this end, the audit process followed a four-step 
approach: 
 first, the consultant established what he called a ‘Balanced Scorecard’, 
which is a kind of dashboard providing not only traditional financial 
metrics but also non-financial performance measures and strategic targets;  
 second, he assessed the current situation of the artist, his commercial and 
artistic position in relation to what was offered by competitors. In other 
words, he conducted a ‘competitive analysis’ which resulted in the 
emphasis on a ‘competitive gap’; 
 third, he projected performance goals so as to close the gap between the 
artist and his competitors. To reach these goals, guidelines and 
monitoring indicators were recommended; 
 finally, all these tools and processes were put together in a business plan, 
as if the artist was an individual enterprise and his artistic work something 
likely to be rationally manageable, just like any corporate activities.  
For instance, according to the marketing plan, the artist should ‘reinvent 
himself’ to be more attractive and so, more marketable. Specifically, he was 
advised to ‘rebrand’ himself: Martin Le Chevallier was not catchy enough, so 
he was advised to change his name, for example. Likewise, according to the 
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strategic plan, if Martin’s ambition was to become a key artist, a leader in his 
market, he should have a vision and be risk-taking like any other 
entrepreneur. And like any other enterprise, his organization should always be 
searching for the ‘best practices’ to be competitive. Management has a saying 
about all that. It says: ‘If you want to better yourself, you have to measure 
yourself; if you want to be the best, you have to compare yourself’. To this 
end, a special technology was developed that is called benchmarking. 
To some extent, what the consultant advised Martin Le Chevallier was to 
benchmark himself, that is to compare himself with competitors; to measure 
the gap between his results and those of the best performers; to set quantified 
targets for closing this gap; to search for the ‘best practices’, for benchmarks in 
order to improve his performance. This approach, which is not conceived as 
a one-shot experience but a relentless discipline, is indeed called 
benchmarking. 
Benchmarking Process Steps 
This process seems quite harmless since it merely consists in measuring and 
comparing oneself – apparently nothing new. It is, in fact, more far-reaching 
and powerful than it seems. Why? Because it aims at improving any 
performance in any organization by identifying and applying the best 
demonstrated practices, which can be found externally or internally, 
potentially everywhere. Unlike traditional competitive analysis, benchmarking 
does not limit the comparison to direct competitors in a specific industry or 
marketplace. In doing so, it opens an unlimited space of commensuration and 
of competition, integrating all organizations whatever are their activities, their 
size or their members, be they factory workers, engineers, researchers, 
teachers, students, doctors, pensioners, volunteers, citizens, or… artists. 
Everyone is a potential competitor, even where there is no economic 
competition, strictly speaking, as long as there is an organization that can be 





Benchmarking Process Steps (Camp, 1989: 17). 
 
Consequently, benchmarking has been devised and promoted as a 
universal method, applicable everywhere and useful in every kind of 
organisation. The goal of benchmarking is simply to find examples of 
superior results and to understand the processes driving that performance in 
order to tailor and incorporate these best practices into one’s own operations. 
Not by imitating, but by innovating. Benchmarking thus consists in steering 
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social creativity through the pressure of examples and numbers, of peers and 
of emulation. It underpins power relations that are evidence-based, 
depersonalised, mediated by hard facts and so-called ‘unquestionable’ data. In 
addition, this kind of power is all the more efficient since it is neither 
coercive, nor legal. Obedience relies on willingness and incentive, rather than 
on constraint and punishment. What is at stake is no longer doing things well 
or improving them, but being the best, always. The strength of benchmarking 
lies in this competition-oriented rationality, which makes an endless race to 
the top possible. It is often spoken of as ‘a race without a finish line’.  
To put it differently, benchmarking is a technology of agency and of 
involvement, which softly governs behaviour by framing practices of liberty 
(Haahr, 2004: 209-230). Foucault once spoke of the ‘environmental 
technology’1 specific to neoliberal governmentality, which consists in 
equipping actors to enable them to be creative and competitive. Hence the 
toothless reputation of benchmarking, according to those who failed to 
understand that neoliberal governmentality produces freedom because it 
needs to consume it. It feeds on freedom of information, of cooperation, of 
creation. But we shouldn’t delude ourselves; the liberty produced by 
neoliberal devices like benchmarking is closely channelled and controlled to 
be market-friendly and profit-oriented. That’s why it may be enlightening to 
take benchmarking seriously. 
At first sight, benchmarking is nothing but a buzzword, or a passing fad. 
Of course, there is no denying that management tools go in and out of 
fashion, and that they are a business in themselves: they are trademarked and 
sold by consultants. Benchmarking is no exception. It’s even a profitable 
business. However, it would be misguided to boil down benchmarking to a 
trivial gizmo, because it has much to say about cognitive capitalism and its 
new spirit. To quote Foucault, we could say about benchmarking that: ‘In 
                                                
1 ‘On the horizon of this analysis [of neoliberal governmentality] we see instead the 
image, idea, or theme-program of a society in which there is an optimization of 
systems of difference, in which the field is left open to fluctuating processes, in 
which minority individuals and practices are tolerated, in which action is brought 
to bear on the rules of the game rather than on the players, and finally in which 
there is an environmental type of intervention instead of the internal subjugation 
of individuals.’ (Foucault, 2008: 259-260) 
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appearance, it is merely the solution of a technical problem; but, through it, a 
whole type of society emerges.’ (Foucault, 1995: 228). 
It is worth noting that benchmarking has proliferated for the last thirty 
years and, far from vanishing, it is now deep-rooted and widespread in all 
kinds of organizations. According to ten thousand executives surveyed 
around the world by the business consulting firm Bain & Company since 
1993, benchmarking is always among their ‘top ten tools’, if not the ‘number 
one’.  
Top Ten Tools 2009 
 
Top Ten Tools of 2009 (Rigby and Bilodeau 2009: 3). 
 
Since its first experimentations at Xerox Corporation at the turn of the 1980s, 
benchmarking has proliferated throughout the world and throughout sectors. 
In this regard, taking a glance at the titles of the review Benchmarking: An 
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International Journal2 is quite revealing. ‘Successful implementation of Six 
Sigma: benchmarking General Electric Company’; ‘Benchmarking the port 
services: a customer oriented proposal’; ‘Airport benchmarking: a review of 
the current situation’; ‘Association-sponsored benchmarking programs’; 
‘Benchmarking in the non-profit sector in Australia’; ‘Benchmarking: 
achieving best value in public-sector organisations’; ‘A system dynamics 
framework for benchmarking policy analysis for a university system’; 
‘Benchmarking the best practices of non-corporate R&D organizations’; 
‘Benchmarking in health services’; etc. Here are some examples displaying the 
wide scope of benchmarking, which has been implemented both in big firms 
and SMEs (small and medium enterprises), in manufacturing or services, in 
associations and non-profit organizations, in the public sector, and especially 
in universities, R&D organizations and health services. 
Moreover, benchmarking has been disseminated worldwide. After the 
USA and Japan, benchmarking first reached ‘the Commonwealth’: New 
Zealand (‘Using routine data for benchmarking and performance 
measurement of public hospitals in New Zealand’), Australia (‘The role of 
benchmarking within the cultural reform journey of an award-winning 
Australian local authority’), and the United Kingdom (‘The burgeoning of 
benchmarking in British local government’). Then, continental Europe: for 
example, Germany (‘Benchmarking concepts in the UK and Germany’), Italy 
(‘The benchmarking of information systems supporting the university 
administrative activities. An Italian experience’) or Slovenia (‘Benchmarking 
the Slovenian competitiveness by system of indicators’). France, as always, 
was first reluctant but followed suit (‘Perceptions about benchmarking best 
practices among French managers: an exploratory survey’). And countries 
outside the OECD – like India (‘The propagation of benchmarking concepts 
in Indian manufacturing industry’) or Kenya (‘Key performance Indicators in 
the Kenyan hotel industry’) – are not safe either. 
Furthermore, benchmarking is not limited to business processes. 
Everything is a potential object of benchmarking. Some weird titles illustrate 
the supposed universality of benchmarking: ‘Cross-laboratory benchmarking 
                                                
2 First entitled Benchmarking for Quality Management & Technology from 1994 to 1999 
and published by MCB University Press, Benchmarking: An International Journal is 
now published by Emerald. 
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in pathology’; ‘Benchmarking government’s roles to assure the cooperation in 
collaborative technology innovation’; ‘Benchmarking the impacts of US 
magnet schools in urban schools’. ‘Benchmarking organizational commitment 
across non-profit human services organizations in Pennsylvania’ is indeed 
quite unexpected. Even more unexpected are ‘Policy benchmarking: a tool of 
democracy or a tool of authoritarianism?’; ‘Benchmarking the presidential 
election of Barack Obama’; and ‘Benchmarking of thesis research’. Last but 
not least, ‘Benchmarking the benchmarking models’! That’s the height of 
benchmarking. 
As one can guess, there is nothing natural and self-evident about the 
dissemination of benchmarking. Its ‘success story’ cannot be explained by its 
great effectiveness and common-sense usefulness. A genealogical 
investigation would lead us from the U.S. Department of Defence to post-
war Japanese employers; from the CEO of Xerox Corporation, David 
Kearns, who joined the U.S. Department of Education under Bush Sr., to the 
European Roundtable of Industrialists; from PUMA, the public management 
service of the OECD, to the European Union. To make a long story short, 
the spreading of benchmarking was not supported by the weight of evidence, 
but by powerful institutions, networks and leaders, who endeavoured to 
promote it as a multi-purpose and policy-neutral method.  
For example, this text is extracted from the proceedings of a joint seminar 
on benchmarking co-organized in Brussels by the European Commission and 
the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) in order to induce policy-
makers to use benchmarking3. It dates back to 1996. From then on, 
benchmarking has been used to compare national performances first in the 
domain of industrial policies, then in the economic and monetary fields, and 
finally in all domains where member states need to co-operate in order to 
establish framework conditions favourable to business and conducive to 
international competitiveness of both European companies and countries. 
This political program, in terms of competitiveness, was adopted by the 
Heads of State and Government in March 2000. It is known as the ‘Lisbon 
strategy’, and its ambition was to turn the European Union into the ‘most 
                                                
3 ‘This event was attended by over eighty senior representatives of national 
governments, European Union institutions and the business sector’ (ERT, 1996: 
inside front cover). 
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competitive knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010’ (European 
Council, 2000: §5). These ideas of the ‘knowledge-based economy’, ‘full 
employment’ and ‘boundless prosperity’ – as unrealistic as they may seem 
today – were in the air at that time. On the other hand, what was striking at 
that time was the new method of co-ordination that would replace the 
traditional Community Method. Since its inception, European integration has 
proceeded from the production of Community Law.  
 
‘Benchmarking for policy-makers in a nutshell’ (ERT, 1996) 
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In order to carry out the Lisbon strategy, a new methodology was 
designed and named ‘Open Method of Coordination’ (OMC). Unlike 
traditional methods, the OMC was neither legal, nor compulsory, but soft and 
incentivising. It was supposed to help Member States to progressively 
develop their own policies. How so? 
 First, by ‘fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific 
timetables for achieving the goals which they set in the short, medium 
and long terms’. 
 Second, by ‘establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative 
indicators and benchmarks against the best in the world and tailored to 
the needs of different Member States and sectors as a means of 
comparing best practice’. 
 Third, by ‘translating these European guidelines into national and regional 
policies by setting specific targets and adopting measures, taking into 
account national and regional differences’. 
 Lastly, through ‘periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review 
organised as mutual learning processes’ (European Council, 2000: §37). 
Of course, comparing statistical indicators and exchanging best practices were 
not unprecedented. But it remains that implementing such a disciplined and 
systematic way of coordinating national policies by means of comparable 
statistics, quantified targets and scoreboards, marked a turning point in the 
history of the European Union and of sovereign states. According to Jens-
Henrik Haahr, the OMC is the European manifestation of advanced liberal 
government. It enables European policy-makers to ‘contract, consult, 
negotiate, create partnerships, empower and activate forms of agency’. But, at 
the same time, these very practices also bring about ‘norms, benchmarks, 
performance indicators, quality controls and best practice standards, to 
monitor, measure and render calculable their performances’ (Haahr, 2004: 
216). Needless to say, this methodology was not invented from scratch. As 
one may notice, the OMC approach is broadly in line with the four-stage 
process of benchmarking (see above). In short, the OMC is nothing else but a 
benchmarking exercise applied to countries – as meaningless as it is.  
The case of the research policies is particularly emblematic. From the very 
beginning, ‘establishing a European Area of Research and Innovation’ was at 
the top of the Lisbon agenda (European Council, 2000). That is why 
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benchmarking national systems of research and innovation was prioritized by 
the European Council. And as soon as 2002, a benchmark of ‘3%’ had been 
established:  
In order to close the gap between the EU and its major competitors, there 
must be a significant boost of the overall R&D and innovation effort in the 
Union, with a particular emphasis on frontier technologies. The European 
Council therefore agrees that overall spending on R&D and innovation in the 
Union should be increased with the aim of approaching 3% of GDP by 2010. 
(European Council, 2002: §47) 
It is worth noting that ‘Two-thirds of this new investment should come from 
the private sector’ (ibid.), that is to say essentially from companies which are 
induced to do so through tax credits for example. 
This is in keeping with the overall project that aims at building a market, a 
‘knowledge market’ with the sacrosanct principle of property. It’s written in 
black and white in the magazine published by DG Research, which spoke of 
nothing less than achieving a ‘cultural revolution’4. In order to populate this 
‘knowledge market’, entrepreneurs are needed. More precisely, the scholar, 
the scientist, the committed intellectual should move over and let ‘the 
researcher-entrepreneur’ take care of knowledge in Europe5. By the same 
token, universities are subjected to the same transformation, insofar as they 
are caught in the crossfires of the Lisbon strategy and the Bologna process. 
In short, the Lisbon agenda projected a ‘knowledge market’, populated 
with ‘researchers-entrepreneurs’, ‘innovative teachers’ and ‘mobile students-
consumers’, who embodied the neoliberal subjectivities. Now everyone agrees 
that the Lisbon strategy ended in failure. Obviously, the 3% benchmark, like 
the Lisbon strategic goal as a whole, is still far from being achieved. As 
                                                
4 ‘The days when knowledge acquired in academic scientific circles was handed 
down and available for all are well and truly over. In today’s knowledge circles, 
acquisition goes hand in hand with protection and exploitation. Patents and, 
more generally, intellectual property rights (IPR) are very much the “hot topic” in 
the world of public research’ (European Commission, 2002b: 16). 
5 ‘The time when universities and businesses regarded each other with mutual 
suspicion is well and truly over. In recent years, the symbolic figure of the 
researcher-entrepreneur has become central to the organisation of research’ 
(European Commission, 2002a: 6). 
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expected, the European Union is not ‘the most competitive knowledge-
economy in the world’, and the spending on R&D has even been declining 
for the past ten years. As a matter of fact, it was no big surprise. European 
leaders were perfectly aware of that from the outset. A string of assessment 
reports kept sounding the alarm since the mid-term audit (European 
Commission, 2004). Nevertheless, no doubt was ever cast over the method 
itself. Benchmarking was never challenged, quite the opposite. The Open 
Method of Coordination has been streamlined; lists of indicators have been 
reduced to focus on even fewer benchmarks.  
The new strategy, ‘Europe 2020’, emphasises further the key role of 
benchmarking in monitoring results and thereby sustaining the drive of 
competition. Why this? Why such obstinacy since the device has been 
ineffective so far? Because the ‘3% objective’ – like the overall goal of 
competitiveness – was not made to be attained, but to spur policy-makers on 
to greater efforts towards economic reforms and social ‘modernization’, 
especially towards a ‘knowledge market’. Plainly, the very function of 
benchmarks is to be unreachable: they are fugitive targets. In other words, 
benchmarks are like the dangled carrot that the donkey can never reach. And 
the stick is the subtle discipline of peer pressure, as well as of public opinion 
when league tables hit the headlines and your country lags behind in the 
ranking. The Lisbon strategy aims at coordinating national systems through 
an endless cooperation through competition, to which managers refer as ‘co-
opetition’. It plays on the ‘indefinite discipline’ of competitiveness.  
Why indefinite? Because the norm of competitiveness is endogenous to 
the endless competition in which benchmarking engages its users. The 
benchmark, i.e. the reference point identified as a goal, is a moving target that 
cannot be reached once and for all. It is ideally fugitive, and hence 
unattainable, set only to be caught up and replaced by the latest ‘best 
performer’. Setting competitiveness as the aim to achieve by means of 
benchmarking, which precisely consists in measuring gaps of performance so 
as to close them, amounts to strive to reduce a distance while reproducing it 
in(de)finitely. This expression of ‘indefinite discipline’ is taken from Foucault 
who coined it to refer to ‘a procedure that would be at the same time the 
permanent measure of a gap in relation to an inaccessible norm and the 
asymptotic movement that strives to meet in infinity’ (Foucault, 1995: 227). It 
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captures very well how ‘cognitive capitalism’ condemns social creativity to 
overkill, just like other common resources6. 
 
                                                
6 I elaborated on this in Bruno (2009). 
  157 
11 




1. Hardt and Negri: Controversy around Immaterial/Biopolitical 
Labour 
The concept of biopolitical labour, introduced by Hardt and Negri in the 
Empire trilogy, seems to be the most promising for contemporary 
anticapitalist struggles, as it brings to light the fact that life as such, in its 
various manifestations, is a productive force. However, it is precisely this all-
encompassing character and universality that is the source of the 
controversies it raises and of its potential limitations. One of the most 
important and controversial aspects of Hardt and Negri’s stance in Empire is 
the thesis of the unification of the social factory, caused by the passage from 
Fordism to post-Fordism. The hegemony of immaterial/biopolitical labour – 
a form of labour that has as its basis cooperation and communication – 
constitutes the autonomy of the production process and the unity of the 
working class or multitude that provide the objective conditions for 
communism (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 31-34; Hardt and Negri, 2004: 107-115). 
The power of living labour is the consequence of its status as the most 
advanced form of production that renders obsolete other forms, deprived of 
its political potential. 
This nexus of the notions of hegemony, degrees of advancement of the 
forms of labour and productivity of life itself is so tightly intertwined that it’s 
not possible to use one of the concepts separately. And this is precisely what 
should be achieved, because not all parts of this nexus are equally useful. 
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Some – and I mean especially the concept of the unity of the multitude on 
the basis of the traits of the production process – seem to be nothing other 
than dead ends from the perspective of working class struggle. 
My thesis is that in order to make the category of biopolitical labour, 
introduced by Hardt and Negri, more useful (theoretically and practically), it 
should be supplemented with the analysis of the internal diversity of the 
social factory – a feature that was underlined by Harry Cleaver in his Reading 
Capital Politically (2000: 70-71, 113) – and with the description of the particular 
forms of surveillance/exploitation in different economic sectors. 
This attempt will also amount to the necessity of modifying the thesis, 
maintained by certain advocates of cognitive capitalism, on cognitive labour 
as the most advanced form of production. As I claim, it would be better to 
perceive it as a form specific to the centre of the world economy. The 
condition of its existence and its higher status is exploitation of the periphery 
(understood not only geographically, as regions of the capitalist world-system, 
but also structurally, as less advanced forms of labour). 
Following George Caffentzis and Silvia Federici, I will maintain that we 
cannot describe tendencies of contemporary capitalism through the lens of 
the most advanced sectors of production. Caffentzis and Federici stress that 
establishing hierarchies between sectors of the economy and between 
geographical regions, as well as the creation of underdevelopment, are vital 
for capitalist accumulation: 
True, we need to identify the leading forms of capitalist accumulation in all its 
different phases, and recognize their ‘tendency’ to hegemonize (though not to 
homogenize) other forms of capitalist production. But we should not dismiss 
the critiques of Marxian theory developed by the anti-colonial movement and 
the feminist movement, which have shown that capitalist accumulation has 
thrived precisely through its capacity to simultaneously organize development 
and underdevelopment, waged and un-waged labour, production at the 
highest levels of technological know-how and production at the lowest levels. 
In other words, we should not dismiss the argument that it is precisely 
through these disparities, the divisions built in the working class through 
them, and the capacity to transfer wealth/surplus from one pole to the other 
that capitalist accumulation has expanded in the face of so much struggle. 
(2009: 127)1 
                                                
1 See also De Angelis (2007). 
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I would make an even stronger statement: the most advanced sectors do not 
embody the tendency of the system; they cannot serve as a model for the 
explanation of the evolution of the whole system. It is a practical/political 
mistake to conceive the capitalist system in terms of the linear order of 
sectors, from the most backward to more advanced.2 Instead, we should 
always look at the system as a whole and the place of certain sectors in it, as 
well as their divisions and hierarchies. 
The thesis on the exceptional role of knowledge production can 
strengthen existing hierarchies of the labour force, as it maintains the 
physical-intellectual labour distinction – a distinction that from the earlier 
stages of capitalism served to establish hierarchies, introduce divisions and 
occlude common experiences, and in consequence to set parts of the working 
class/multitude against each other. 
The hypothesis of the passage to social capital should then be detached 
from the concept of immaterial labour. Therefore we could assume that 
immaterial/biopolitical labour as we experience it every day does not 
constitute the common and does not provide in itself the basis for 
communism. 
The dominant trait of the capitalist system today is the imposition of 
precarity; however, it takes on diverse forms and is implemented by means of 
different techniques of surveillance/exploitation, depending on a given 
sector’s position in the global economy. It may consist in the exploitation of 
creativity, but it can also take the form of a traditional disciplinary regime; the 
presence of these ‘underdeveloped’ forms of surveillance/exploitation is 
necessary for the system to function. I will demonstrate the importance of 
this diversity by referring to four examples of militant research, undertaken in 
different sectors of the social factory. These are: research on factory 
production by Pun Ngai; research on services (call centres) undertaken by the 
collective Kolinko; the analysis of some trends in the sector of intellectual 
                                                
2 The strategic role of the university is a fact, but, as Caffentzis and Federici 
comment with respect to the edu-factory project: ‘We are concerned, however, 
that we do not overestimate this importance, and/or use the concept of the edu-
factory to set up new hierarchies with respect to labour and forms of capitalist 
accumulation’ (2009: 126). 
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labour in the traditional sense by Ursula Huws and Michael McNally; and 
research on precarised care workers by the collective Precarias a la Deriva. 
I will focus on the following criteria: 
 terms of employment (flexible contracts); 
 privatization of the costs of reproduction as a form of control; and 
 techniques of surveillance/exploitation in the workplace (disciplinary 
regime, exploitation of knowledge and affect). 
The analysis of techniques used in each of the sectors reveals common 
features, the existence of similar tendencies that is nevertheless realized by 
means of different techniques. What is most striking in these examples (and 
what was the reason for choosing them) is the fact that they demonstrate the 
extent to which Fordist/Taylorist techniques of management are used in 
diverse sectors of our supposedly post-Fordist economy. 
2. Surveillance/Exploitation 
As we have learned from Foucault, techniques of control are productive. This 
productivity is, primarily, not economic, but rather, metaphysical. Taking into 
consideration the fact that Negri underlines the importance of Foucault’s 
method for his own work3, we could expect to find traces of this important 
motif in it. But despite these declarations the influence is not clearly visible. 
The interview in which Negri admits this influence is an example of his 
persistent attempt to describe Foucault’s work in terms of a one-dimensional 
passage from modernity to postmodernity, from discipline to control: 
However it is true that even though Foucault uses thereafter the model of 
biopowers in his attempt to outline a critical ontology of the present, you will 
seek in vain analyses devoted to the development of capitalism and to the 
determination of the passage from the Welfarestate to its crisis, from the 
                                                
3 Negri writes: ‘… to assume the Foucauldian perspective also entails putting a style of 
thought, identified as the genealogy of the present and always open in so far as it deals 
with the production of subjectivity, in touch with a given historical situation. And this 
given historical situation is a historical reality of power relations’ (Negri, 2004; see also 
Hardt and Negri, 2000: 23). 
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Fordist to the Post-Fordist organization of labour, from the Keynesian 
principles to those of neo-liberal macro-economic theory. But it is also true 
that in his simple definition of the shift from the regime of discipline to that 
of control at the beginning of the XIXth century [sic! – J.B.], we can already 
understand that the post-modern does not represent a withdrawal of the State 
domination on social labour, but it is rather an improvement of its control 
over life. (Negri, 2004) 
Moreover, Negri openly disposes Foucault of his main thesis: that of the 
productivity of power, in favour of the statement of the autonomous 
organization of production. This is partly because Negri replaces a 
Foucauldian perspective on biopolitics, as a nexus of techniques of power, 
with a Deleuzian notion of biopolitics as a productive unfolding and self-
organization of life itself. But it is certainly not Deleuze who is responsible 
for the use that Negri makes of this concept, stating that life/living labour is 
unified and autonomous due to the form it takes in the era of 
immaterial/biopolitical labour. As Nicholas Thoburn stated in Deleuze, Marx 
and Politics, Deleuze underlines that life is always already alienated; resistance 
rests in its ability to cross, by means of lines of flight, the boundaries and 
limitations established earlier (Thoburn, 2003). 
The source of Hardt and Negri’s stance can be situated mostly in Negri’s 
earlier work from the 1970s, where he formulated the thesis that the passage 
to the stage of social capital amounts to the end of the validity of the law of 
value. In consequence, capital ceases to be productive and transforms into a 
principle of repression: ‘at a certain level of capitalist development, capitalist 
command ceases to be necessary’, ‘… [t]he form of value is pure and simple 
command, the pure and simple form of politics’ (Negri, 1991: 159,148). 
The effect of this unfortunate combination of Deleuze’s theory and 
Negri’s earlier theses from Marx beyond Marx is the idea that living labour 
organizes its production autonomously, with no need for the help of capital. 
The latter becomes merely an obstacle to the full development of the 
multitude’s productivity – a parasite. 
Here the question emerges: what is actually the status and nature of the 
capitalist mechanisms of exploitation? Are they really merely repressive? At 
this moment appears the possibility (and the need) of introducing the 
category of surveillance/exploitation. My inspiration here is the concept of 
the fractal-panopticon, introduced by Massimo De Angelis (2001a). The 
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fractal-panopticon is a single regime that organizes the entire capitalist 
system. De Angelis states that the world market operates according to the 
rule of fractal-panopticism, whose features are: 
 individualization – isolation of individuals 
 modular character 
 prices as indicators of productivity 
 limitation of knowledge: no subject has the complete knowledge of the 
whole process, yet the system is supposed to work in perfect harmony 
The function of the fractal-panopticon is the extraction of labour from the 
entire social field, as well as the disciplining of individuals/economic subjects. 
This will be especially important to me, as I am preserving from De Angelis’ 
article only the basic intuition that there exist mechanisms whose function is 
at the same time surveillance, discipline or control and the extraction of 
surplus value. I’m also proposing something much more modest than De 
Angelis’ concept, more limited in scope and more down-to-earth: a 
description of some tendencies of the capitalist system of 
surveillance/exploitation, based on selected examples of militant research. 
3. Pun Ngai: The Dormitory Labour System as a Foucauldian 
Disciplinary Regime 
Pun Ngai is a researcher and a founder of the Chinese Working Women 
Network, an organization whose goal is the empowerment of the migrant 
women workers. I will refer to the participative research undertaken by her in 
the 1990s in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in Southern China. This 
research is a testimony of profound changes in class composition in this 
country: the replacement of the Maoist working class with the dagong class 
(migrant rural workers): 
… the global process shatters the China’s old socialist pattern of industrial 
ownership and China’s old workforce composition, the latter of which has 
constantly been under restructuring since the mid 1990s. (Ngai, 2005: 2) 
Ngai’s research is a proof that discipline is not something obsolete and 
belonging to the previous stage of the development of capitalism. On the 
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contrary, it is vital for the expansion of the sector of industrial production in 
China. What we might call the Fordist model of production is still important 
for the modern economy. It is, however, supplemented and transformed by a 
specifically ‘post-Fordist’ feature: the imposition of precarity. 
This imposition is visible first of all in the legal status of the workers. They 
have no possibility of getting permanent residence in the city they work in 
(because residence is connected to the place of birth); they only have the 
entitlement to temporary residence, connected to the workplace, without the 
right to marry or to register a child (obviously, they also have no possibility of 
going on maternity leave). Although the workers are not supposed to marry 
or have children, the management often refers to the ideal of femininity in 
order to pacify them. No paid sick leave is allowed: 
Employers provide no paid sick leave, despite the fact that most employees 
contribute their share to social insurance – the central insurance fund 
contributed to by both employers and employees at the city level. (Ngai, 2005: 
10) 
Permanent health damage, which occurs very often, is to be dealt with after 
the girls stop working and return to the countryside (which they are supposed 
to do, though they would rather stay in the city). 
The temporary character of work is inscribed into the legal system of 
Chinese Special Economic Zones: ‘This newly forming working class is 
permitted to form no roots in the city’ (ibid.: 4). The system is organized in 
such a way as to ensure that reproduction of the labour force is completely 
externalized (Ngai, 2004). 
The second trait of this regime is the detailed management of life by 
means of discipline. The workers live in dormitories that belong to the 
company employing them. Since housing and employment are provided by 
the same subject, and the workplace is at the same time ‘home’, a detailed 
organization of their lives becomes possible. Life itself can be organized and 
managed in such a way as to limit the possibility of subversion: activities 
comprising the work process are decomposed into small and simple 
components, and timetables predetermine most of the possible activities. 
This factory/dormitory discipline, combined with the privatization of the 
costs of reproduction of the workforce, is a powerful testimony to the fact 
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that Fordist techniques of management are still one of the most important 
ways of organizing and exploiting of work. 
4. Kolinko: Taylorization of Services in the Call Centre Sector 
The second case will be an inquiry undertaken by the German collective 
Kolinko in the years 1999-2002. The reasons for starting the inquiry were the 
strike at a Citibank call centre as well as the expansion of the sector in Europe 
in the 1990s. The researchers describe call centres as ‘communication 
assembly lines’ and see them as a part of a more general process of deskilling 
of the labour force: 
especially in the banking sector the new work organisation of a call centre 
made it possible to attack the white collar employees’ position. The tasks of a 
‘formally highly qualified’ bank worker with several years of training are now 
executed by call centre workers, after two days of training, for about two 
thirds of the white collar wage and subject to much stricter controls as well as 
much higher workloads. … The problem for management is that often they 
are not able to see what is really happening in complex workflows and thus 
are not able to measure, control, and ultimately increase the amount of work 
delivered. Therefore they have to divide those complex processes into simple 
single tasks. The transition from artisans to the factory went like that, and it’s no different 
in the call centre, even if customer cases are being processed, rather than metal or wood. 
(Kolinko, 2002, emphasis added) 
The members of the collective state that the same processes take place in 
industrial and in service sectors. No wonder they are very sceptical about the 
concept of immaterial labour, seeing it as a part of capitalism’s attempt of 
presenting deskilling as a passage to the ‘new economy’: 
There has been a lot of ideological drivel concerning call centres.… they re-
packaged capitalism as a ‘service society’ and emphasised how much we need 
call centres as a ‘new kind of service’.… call centres were sold as a kind of 
new economy for the unskilled. (Kolinko, 2002) 
Workers – human interfaces between a database and the customer – are 
subjected to insecure working conditions: time-limited contracts, sometimes 
one-day contracts (as in Audioservice in Berlin) or even, as in the case of 
Atesia in Italy, imposition of self-employment. The fluctuation of staff 
prevents the exchange of knowledge and the building of solidarity. The call 
centre sector is also feminized (about 60% of the employees are women). 
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Call centres use technologies that ensure both the control of workers’ 
activities and the intensification of work; they prescribe the pace of work, as 
well as determine the sequence of steps undertaken by the worker: 
The connection of computer- and telephone devices allows a higher call 
rhythm and a strict control of the workers (through statistics on the call 
amount, breaks, etc.). The computer-software only allows us certain 
operations and a certain chronological order which we have to perform them 
in. The calls are automatically put through to our phones (‘Automatic Call 
Distribution, ACD’ – [central, computer-controlled telephone machine]), 
sometimes even without us picking up the phone – straight to the headset 
(‘direct-to-ear’). That way they want to prevent us having any control over the 
amount of calls we accept. In outbound, after finishing one call, often the 
computer starts dialling up the next customer so we have no time to take a 
breath (‘power dialler’).… Many call centres… register every step the worker 
does on the phone – accepting the call, duration of the call... – and the worker 
has to push buttons on the ‘Call Master’, a kind of telephone with loads of 
buttons. There is a button for every kind of break: official break, loo, training, 
post-processing. (Kolinko, 2002) 
The double task of surveillance and the maximization of productivity is also 
facilitated by performance quotas that entail: arbitral set ratios of calls per 
hour or per day and statistics used to create new norms; personal statistics of 
each worker; and daily statistics displayed in the workplace. In addition, 
workers are inspected individually by way of mystery calls. The organization 
of work serves the same purpose. Teamwork, for example, makes employees 
control each other: 
the teams are just a way to form smaller, ‘easy-to-control’ units out of the 
mass of workers. That way the management has less difficulties getting 
through measures to intensify work. Teams are formed to channel conflicts 
and, if possible, to sweep them under the carpet. (Kolinko, 2002) 
The concentration of workers in one place is also part of the 
surveillance/exploitation system. Technically, call centre agents could work at 
home; but concentration, making training and surveillance easier, is eventually 
better than isolation, which could amount to granting them too much 
autonomy. It also enables direct cooperation between workers and between 
workers and management – but this applies only to some call centres; in 




Creativity is not well received in most call centres; the workers are 
supposed to use standard phrases or the script prescribing the content of the 
whole conversation: ‘A conversation is supposed to be ninety percent pre-
phrased from the script. Not only the words are pre-phrased but also what 
you emphasise, how you raise and lower your voice’ (Kolinko, 2002). 
This is problematic, as in many cases the employees feel forced to diverge 
from the scripts, not only because using them is unnatural and embarrassing, 
but also because it leaves a bad impression with the customer. A ‘natural’ way 
of talking is perceived by them as a better way of establishing a relation with 
the customer. Scripts seem to be counterproductive, serving only to limit 
workers’ creativity. This phenomenon seems to support Hardt and Negri’s 
thesis on the autonomy of biopolitical labour. Still, many call centres 
persistently rely on standard phrasings; this may indicate that it is an 
important feature of the productivity of this sector. Why? The answer could 
be the following: the requirement of using standard phrases and the script, 
besides being the most efficient way of guaranteeing that the employee will 
present the whole offer to the customer, are a part of the brand identity, and 
this identity, in addition to the particular goods or the advice, is what is really 
sold by the call centres. 
There are exceptions to this picture: creativity and the interest in software 
are encouraged in some of the call centres (mostly in those that belong to 
software producers); even private activities are tolerated to some extent: 
Everyone is surfing and e-mailing but it’s not forbidden either. After all, it’s 
part of your ‘training’.… A lot of people do it because they’re interested in it... 
or because they want to show the team leaders that they’re interested... or to 
pass time. (Kolinko, 2002) 
But sometimes this private interest in software is used to limit the 
communication between employees: 
In the call centre where I work lots of workers loaded PC games onto their 
computers or surfed the internet during breaks or wrote private e-mails or 
stuff like that. That didn’t necessarily make the breaks shorter so management 
restricted the use of the internet to certain sites and deleted all games from the 
computers. The only thing they left was some paint program. First we 
wondered why they left us a fucking paint program that we really don’t need 
for work. Then you could see that during the breaks a lot of people played 
with the paint program thus remaining at their desks, while others loitered 
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around the coffee machine talking to each other. That showed us why. 
(Kolinko, 2002) 
5. Huws and McNally: The Taylorization of Intellectual Labour 
Michael B. McNally (2010) provides an analysis of Enterprise Content 
Management (ECM) systems, a type of software that focuses on unstructured 
content and makes possible the coordination of all the steps in the 
production of documents. He interprets the introduction of these systems 
using Harry Braverman’s thesis of the deskilling of the industrial and, later, 
white-collar labour force: 
While an employee may have been free to perform a wide range of tasks 
before the deployment of an enterprise content management system, such 
software ultimately casts the employee’s role within a narrow range of simple, 
scheduled functions. (McNally, 2010: 367) 
ECM systems make possible the decomposition of the work process into 
small simple steps; they also offer the possibility of tracking every change in a 
document’s history. The ability to access the documents can be 
predetermined by management. It is also possible to set automatic expiration 
dates; every simple task can be assigned a deadline. The Taylorization of the 
work process made possible by ECM is openly praised by its producer: 
IBM uses Taylorist language such as, ‘processes can be broken down into 
their component parts for subsequent analysis’,… and ‘BPM’s graphical 
process definition provides consistent, comprehensive view of the processes 
under management’ … in promoting their ECM software. (McNally, 2010: 
363-364) 
As a consequence of the introduction of ECM, workers are deprived of a 
broader knowledge of the work going on within their own institutions: 
‘Knowledge is taken and separated from employees and reified into capital in 
the form of the ECM system’ (ibid.: 365). 
Generally, ECMs implementation entails three dimensions of deskilling: 
loss of skill; loss of knowledge about the work process and loss of tacit, 
private knowledge. As McNally stresses, it is precisely the capture of this 
knowledge that was the main goal behind the project of ECM: 
an intellectual worker’s most important resource, his or her own knowledge, is 
transformed from tacit knowledge, which is theirs exclusively, to the legally 
Joanna Bednarek 
 168 
protected property of the employer. The ability of ECM systems to capture 
tacit knowledge is one of their primary attributes, with IBM noting that their 
system can, ‘capture critical undocumented information from the aging 
workforce’. (McNally, 2010: 364) 
ECM has the power to deskill workers and control them, as well as to 
facilitate the creation of an intellectual assembly line. This has, as McNally 
observes, disastrous consequences for intellectual work, because it 
contributes to the reification of the human process of content creation. 
Of course, ECM implementation also requires the upskilling of some 
employees, especially those in IT departments, or the system administrators; 
but this is tantamount to the introduction of hierarchy that privileges small 
groups at the expense of the disempowerment of the many. As McNally 
remarks, theoretically some features of ECM could transform employees that 
use them intp a ‘collective worker’ – but in reality this rarely is the case. And 
even with this proviso, they remain profoundly ambiguous: 
While a review of the technical literature on ECM systems identifies the 
potential for deskilling, there also exists a potential for upskilling and using 
the collaborative features of such software including blogs, wikis and instant 
messaging, to make work more social, though workers must remember that 
even new mechanisms for social exchange created by information systems can 
fall under the panoptic control of management. (McNally, 2010: 368-369) 
Ursula Huws in the article Expression and expropriation: The dialectics of autonomy 
and control in creative labour (2010) describes current trends in the restructuring 
of knowledge-based work. The main change consists in the intensification of 
the pace of work. The trends become exacerbated by the global division of 
labour (as an example from the fashion industry shows: the longer the 
transport from the countries where the manufacturing takes place takes, the 
less time is left for creative work). The dominant trend is also standardization 
(the fashion industry again: the pressure to use image processing software 
packages forces the designers to choose between standardized shapes instead 
of creating them). 
The imposition of precarity onto the creative workers is visible in the 
increase of the requirement to work in response to customer demands and 
the expectation that they absorb the impact of customer dissatisfaction. 
Flexibility is here something that constrains rather than empowers the 
workers, and can be understood only in a negative way. Huws also points 
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toward the emergence of two-tier structures, with small numbers of 
specialists and great numbers of easily replaceable generic workers. 
The overall conclusion from McNally’s and Huws’ research would be the 
following: capital has to standardise some aspects of creative work in order to 
increase efficiency. This limitation of creativity definitely contributes to 
productivity: 
The management of creative workers is widely recognised as a challenge for 
capital. A recent Economist article put it like this: ‘Managing creativity involves 
a series of difficult balancing acts: giving people the freedom to come up with 
new ideas but making sure that they operate within an overall structure, 
creating a powerful corporate culture but making sure that it is not too 
stifling’. (Huws, 2010: 517) 
6. Precarias a la Deriva: Precarity as Existential Category 
Spanish collective Precarias a la Deriva (‘Precarious Women Workers Adrift’) 
takes inspiration from the tradition of autonomist feminism and feminist 
economy. They also use drift, a practice taken from the Situationists, as an 
exercise in militant research. Theirs is a modified, ‘situated’ drift that 
concentrates on daily routes of the workers. 
According to the members of the collective, nowadays precarity becomes a 
condition of life: it concerns life in general, the whole of existence, not only 
the terms of employment; moreover, it concerns the whole of society, not 
only the poorest. Instability, popularity of fixed-term contracts and 
deterioration of the social networks that ensure care become the norm. 
Precarias introduce the notion of the sex-care-attention communicative 
continuum: its function is to elicit the common traits of different forms of 
care work. The goal that Precarias set for themselves is to underline, in their 
practice as well as theory, the continuity between the work of language 
teachers, migrant domestic workers and sex workers; to stress the aspect of 
creativity in care labour, as well as the phenomenon of exploitation of life in 
its mental and bodily capabilities. This ‘continuum’ is of course a political, not 
merely descriptive, category: the common of these all types of work has to be 
articulated. 
Precarias emphasize the everyday and omnipresent character of affective 
labour, as well as the fact that it consists of activities that were traditionally 
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assigned to women; as they remark, women always were precarious workers 
(Precarias a la Deriva, 2003). Biopolitical labour is at the same time material, 
emotional and intellectual – all three dimensions are intertwined. Precarias 
also turn our attention to the corporeal character of communication that is 
the basis of affective labour: ‘these three elements (sex, attention and care) 
create relationships; they are modes of corporeal communication’ (Precarias a 
la Deriva, 2006). 
At the centre of the collective’s research practices is the present crisis of 
care, connected with neoliberal restructurisation. Their attention is focused 
on two important aspects of this process. The first one is the specificity of 
the commodification of attention in the so-called service society: 
attention as a differentiated activity constitutes a new element. This capacity 
of listening and empathy, just as associated with models of femininity but also 
with the concrete activities historically reserved for women (in the areas of 
care as much as in sex), is isolated as a specific function and put to work for 
the nascent attention industry, in its different variants: telemarketing, telesales, 
teleassistance, customer service… In this manner, attention, exchanged for 
money in function of a temporal pattern of measure, is separated from 
incarnated communication, that which produces lasting relations, trust, and 
cooperation, and turns to a functionalized and uninvested exchange of codes 
(words and gestures). (ibid.: 35) 
The second one is the commodification of domestic work, and, more 
broadly, the phenomenon of the ‘externalization of home’, imposed by the 
decline of the welfare state. As they notice, the necessity of outsourcing of 
domestic labour tasks, combined with the global division of labour, bring 
about the generalized instability of the conditions of living: ‘Uncertainty for 
periods of illness and old age, above all for those who do not have the money 
to buy care at the market prices’ (ibid.: 38). 
Despite the emphasis put on the similarities, Precarias also point towards 
the internal divisions present in the sex-care-attention continuum. One can 
identify in it three types of care labour, each of whom has its specific goal and 
form of resistance or struggle: 
 Repetitive work – telemarketing, supermarkets, form of resistance: 
absenteeism 
 ‘Fulfilling’ precarious jobs like nursing or teaching: demand for change of 
form and content, conditions of labour 
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 Invisible work: domestic workers, sex workers: struggle for recognition 
(Precarias a la Deriva, 2004) 
Surprisingly, Precarias a la Deriva refer to Negri in a positive way, treating 
him as a critic of the limited notion of immaterial labour – which is quite rare 
among feminists. Quoting Hardt and Negri, they suggest that one of the 
biggest errors of such an analysis of immaterial labour resides in: 
the tendency… to treat the new labouring practices in biopolitical society only 
in their intellectual and incorporeal aspects. The productivity of bodies and 
the value of affect, however, are absolutely central in this context. (Hardt and 
Negri, 2000: 29-30) 
But, contrary to Hardt and Negri’s thesis on the autonomous organization of 
production in the stage of social capital, Precarias a la Deriva state that care 
and ‘biopolitical labour’ understood as the precarisation imposed by the 
present system represent two opposing logics and thus stand in direct 
opposition. The present regime, operating through the isolation of individuals 
and the privatisation of the activities necessary to sustain life, is a 
combination of macropolitics of security and micropolitics of fear, whereas 
the bases of care are interdependence and affective virtuosity. The latter 
category was introduced as a means of conceiving of care not as private 
service, but as work requiring certain qualifications and skills (but not 
commodified work in capitalist sense). 
7. Conclusions 
The tendencies in surveillance/exploitation that I have tried to reconstruct 
consist at least of two dimensions: the Taylorization of the labour process 
and the imposition of precarity (the privatisation of reproduction costs). 
The labour process is not open to employees’ creativity and initiative; on 
the contrary, it subjects workers to very precise rules of performance. 
Workers’ autonomy and creativity is rarely valued in itself; even in the case of 
intellectual labour the norm is its standardisation and subjection to rigid rules 
concerning efficiency as well as provided content. Certainly, creativity is 
valued in some limited, relatively small sectors, where it is a condition of the 
valorisation of capital. The examples can be art, the media sector or the 
activities of internet users. But techniques of surveillance make even the 
freedom present in these sectors questionable. 
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Flexibility does appear in this regime, but entirely concerns the status and 
the desired behaviour of the workforce: people are forced to accept the 
demand of flexibility, mobility and social insecurity, and to cover the costs of 
reproduction of themselves and their children (as feminist economists, like 
Rachel Kurian, Lourdes Beneria and Spike V. Peterson for example, have 
already stated some time ago). 
Now the key question is: do the Taylorist techniques described by Pun, 
Kolinko, McNally and Huws contribute to the increase of productivity? Or 
are they only means of controlling the working class, disempowering it, 
ensuring its obedience to capital? This is not merely a metaphysical question 
whose aim is to at introduce some scholastic differentiation – or, to be more 
precise, it is a metaphysical question, but one that can have interesting 
practical consequences. If the latter was the case, we should agree with Hardt 
and Negri’s statement that the labour of the multitude directly produces the 
common, and that capital, with its regimes of surveillance, only controls and 
exploits living labour, without contributing in any way to its productivity. But, 
as the examples I referred to above demonstrate, capital frequently uses 
techniques that either stifle creativity and cooperation or mould it in such a 
way as to ensure that it would serve the valorisation of capital and not of the 
working class. Thus,from this perspective we cannot speak of the 
productivity or creativity of the working class as of something autonomous; 
and even less as of something that leads to its self-valorization. 
Taking this into consideration, we can conclude with the statement that 
two interpretations of Hardt and Negri’s thesis are possible. The following 
distinction between these interpretations will be introduced by using the 
Deleuzian distinction between the virtual and the actual (see Deleuze, 1990; 
Deleuze and Guattari, 1987): 
1. The multitude/working class organizes its work autonomously: this 
should be understood literally, as applying to work in its actual dimension, in 
present conditions, conceived of empirically. The work process as we 
experience it is the outcome of living labour’s potentia. 
This interpretation is not only counterintuitive, but also has rather 
upsetting consequences for resistance and politics. This is because the 
cooperation we now experience in the work process is the final form of the 
organization of the multitude, there is no such thing as exploitation, and 
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alternative forms of labour are unthinkable. The interpretation of the 
autonomy of living labour as actual leaves us with the reality of work as it is 
under capitalism (as the imposition of efficiency and productivity) as the 
ultimate horizon. 
One of the examples of militant research quoted earlier provides us with 
remarks that can cast some light on this problem. Kolinko write about call 
centre workers complaining about the software used, the management or the 
organization of work not letting them perform their work properly: 
Most workers want to help the customer, but they fail due to the work-
organisation and required work speed… If the information the customer 
demands is not available the worker has to start improvising, lying or trying in 
other creative ways to wriggle themselves out of the sticky situation. This 
determines how a lot of call centre-workers relate to their ‘service’: ‘I can’t 
change the organisation of work. Some things just don’t work and I’m the 
fool who has to compensate for them by talking!’ (Kolinko, 2002) 
But, as the inquiry makes obvious, the organization of work is not bad by 
accident; the company is not supposed to provide genuine advice given by 
experts; what is sold is rather the illusion of such advice. A similar 
observation was made by Barbara Ehrenreich, who writes in Nickel and Dimed: 
I was amazed and sometimes saddened by the pride people took in jobs that 
rewarded them so meagerly, either in wages or in recognition. Often, in fact, 
these people experienced management as an obstacle to getting the job done 
as it should be done. Waitresses chafed at managers’ stinginess toward the 
customers; housecleaners resented the time constraints that sometimes made 
them cut corners; retail workers wanted the floor to be beautiful, not cluttered 
with excess stock as management required. (2001: 116) 
The possibility of efficient organization of work by the employees themselves 
appears here as a constitutive illusion of exploited workers; an illusion that 
enables the internalization and subconscious acceptance of the capitalist 
dictate of efficiency. 
It is very hard to find in the realm of the actual any unequivocal 
confirmation of the thesis on the multitude’s self-organization in the work 
process. The only thing we do find is this illusion of pure efficiency that 




2. Autonomous production exists virtually, not actually: it is involved in 
the actual form of work processes. It is accessible under certain special 
conditions, but not in our everyday experience of work, which is, as our 
intuition rightly gives us a hint, organized by and for capital. 
The virtual has no other being than the forms in which it is actualized. 
But, though it is always present in the actual, it also is inaccessible for us 
under normal circumstances; we can access it only by way of certain practices. 
And these practices are, in our case, nothing other than the practices of 
resistance, or workers’ struggles (against work). This is completely congruent 
with the basic assumption of operaismo (an assumption that Hardt and Negri 
sometimes seem to forget about) that work is never a neutral, purely technical 
process, but always a place of struggle. It could then be stated, in good, old 
school ‘refusal of work’ style, that the work process is the proper space in 
which we could seek the political potential of the working class only if it is, at 
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The Artistic Mode of Revolution: From 
Gentrification to Occupation 
Martha Rosler 
A discussion of the struggles, exoduses, and reappropriations of cognitive 
labor, especially in the field of visual art, and especially when taken as the 
leading edge of the ‘creative class,’ while critically important, is trumped by 
the widespread, even worldwide, public demonstrations and occupations of 
the past year, this year, and maybe the next. I would like to revisit the 
creative-class thesis I have explored in a recent series of essays (published in 
e-flux journal [Rosler, 2010; 2011a; 2011b], and republished as part of the 
volume Culture Class [Rosler, 2013]), in order to frame my remarks in light of 
these occupations and to make a few observations about the relationship 
between artists, the positioning of the creative class, and the Occupy 
movement. in order to frame my remarks in light of these occupations and to 
make a few observations about the relationship between artists, the 
positioning of the creative class, and the Occupy movement. 
Even before ‘the multitude’ became a common touchstone for dreams of 
revolution, there was, famously, Seattle 1999, when anti-corporate protests 
brought environmentalists and community activists together with organized 
labor to block a meeting of the World Trade Organization, a scenario 
repeated at multiple locations in several countries in the years since.1 It is not 
                                                
1 The movement generally pegged as anti-globalization is more properly referred to 
by its members and supporters as the ‘alt-globalization’ movement or some 
variant of that term and is anti-corporate more than alter-globalization – although 
globalization is a term derived from its enthusiasts; see the discussion of 
Theodore Levitt below. 
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news that the processes that go under the name of globalization, which center 
on the flows of capital, goods, and labor, create a unity that does not always 
serve the interests of capital or the capitalists. 
Nouriel Roubini (2011a), channelling Marx, wrote in ‘The instability of 
inequality’ that ‘unregulated capitalism can lead to regular bouts of over-
capacity, under-consumption, and the recurrence of destructive financial 
crises, fueled by credit bubbles and asset-price booms and busts.’2 
Roubini is saying that capitalism tends toward catastrophic collapses – no 
news here. But the point is that neoliberalism and its rampant financialization 
have created a capitalism that eats its young. Roubini goes on to remind his 
readers that even before the Great Depression, the enlightened bourgeoisie 
realized that worker protections and a redistributive system providing ‘public 
goods – education, health care, and a social safety net’ were necessary to 
prevent revolution.3  
Roubini (2011) remarks further that the modern welfare state grew out of 
a post-Depression need for macroeconomic stabilization, which required ‘the 
maintenance of a large middle class, widening the provision of public goods 
through progressive taxation, and fostering economic opportunity for all’; but 
all this went under during the massive Reagan-Thatcher deregulation, which 
Roubini – no Marxist after all – traces in part to ‘the flaws in Europe’s social-
                                                
2 See Roubini 2011a, 2011b. Roubini begins the blog post of October 14, 2011, by 
alluding to ‘social and political turmoil and instability throughout the world, with 
masses of people in the real and virtual streets’: ‘The Arab Spring; riots in 
London; Israel’s middle-class protests against high housing prices and an 
inflationary squeeze on living standards; protesting Chilean students; the 
destruction in Germany of the expensive cars of “fat cats”; India’s movement 
against corruption; mounting unhappiness with corruption and inequality in 
China; and now the ‘Occupy Wall Street’ movement in New York and across the 
United States.’ (Roubini, 2011b) 
3 I addressed this issue in an essay of 1981 on documentary photography (‘In, 
around, and afterthoughts: on documentary’, first published in Martha Rosler: 3 
Works [Halifax: Press of the Nova Scotia College of Art & Design, 1981]).). I was 
pointing out that ideological images were employed in the United States, during 
the Great Depression, to mobilize support for the very poor under the Roosevelt 
Administration, with the understanding that alleviating suffering would forestall 
revolt. 
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welfare model [...] reflected in yawning fiscal deficits, regulatory overkill, and 
a lack of economic dynamism.’ (ibid.)4. 
Roubini, unlike most, goes on to proclaim the failure of this ‘Anglo-
American economic model’ of embracing economic policies that increase 
inequality and create a gap between incomes and aspirations, accompanied by 
the liberalization of consumer credit and thus rising consumer debt, as well as 
public debt because of decreased tax revenues, all of which is then followed 
by counterproductive austerity measures. This is precisely the financial model 
that seized the imagination and drove the policies of former Eastern bloc 
governing elites, many of whom in implementing the prescribed austerity 
measures, are destroying their present and future middle classes (see Latvia)5, 
as is neo-Thatcherite Great Britain.6 
                                                
4 I am using Roubini here as a convenient figure, since one might quote from quite 
a few other economists, particularly Joseph Stiglitz, Dean Baker, Paul Krugman 
of the New York Times, or Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the 
Internatiomal Monetary Fund, to outline the fears of the left-liberal wing of 
Western economists. 
5 Latvia, a tiny Baltic country that (like the other two Baltic states, Estonia and 
Lithuania) broke free of the collapsing Soviet Union in the early 1990s, is so far 
the sharpest example of this syndrome; one might also cite Ireland and possibly 
Greece, Spain, and Portugal in the coming year – all of which stand in contrast to 
the course of Iceland (the tiniest economy of all of these, but, as luck would have 
it, not a member of the Eurozone), which was promptly to reject any terms 
imposed by international financial agencies and instead defaulting on its debt and 
pursuing their top bankers for criminal fraud. In the early 2000s, Latvia’s center-
right government instituted aggressive neoliberal measures in large part to join 
the Euro and escape the dominance of Russia. After the financial crisis of 2008, 
Latvia experienced the most precipitous financial decline of any nation, losing 
about a quarter of its GDP in 2 years. Its government then applied stringent 
fiscal austerity, including slashing pensions and wages. The budding middle class, 
in a familiar story, had been induced to buy homes on cheap credit, but this 
mortgage debt (owed largely to Swedish and German banks) cannot be repaid, 
while property values have also plunged. The austerity measures have failed to 
improve Latvia’s balance sheets but has sent the middle class, not to mention the 
poor, into subsistence mode – or emigration. Tens of thousands of Latvians have 




In the United States, Citibank, which required two US government rescues 
after the financial crisis of 2008, posted record quarterly profits of $3.8 billion 
in the fall of 2011, a 74% increase over the previous quarter, while its CEO, 
Vikram Pandit, expressed his sympathy with the Occupy Wall Street 
protesters and offered to meet with them.7  
The ongoing round-the-world occupations, which have drawn inspiration 
from the uprisings across the Arab world in 2011, are driven by the 
frustration of the young educated middle classes – in the Arab case fairly new 
ones – confronting societies controlled by hugely rich ruling elites but having 
little hope of a secure future for themselves, despite their university 
educations. These are societies that had made no effort to create modern 
welfare or even neoliberal states, nor to control corruption, bureaucratic 
indifference, and flagrant nepotism, nor to institute more than the appearance 
                                                
from 2011, http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/18/lats-ofluck/. Yet, 
like Ireland, Latvia is bizarrely hailed as a successful example of austerity 
budgeting. (Krugman [2011] writes: ‘A few more successes like this and Latvia 
will be back in the Stone Age.’) 
6 The European Commission in 2011 voted in ‘the six pack’ – a group of measures 
that overrides member states’ abilities to control their budgets, reinstituting the 
Maastricht Treaty’s limit of 3 percent on deficits and 60 percent of GDP on 
debts, beyond which large fines will be levied, among other penalties. According 
to economist Susan George , the Commission is also engineering a shift in 
worker protection leading to longer work weeks, lower pay, and later retirement. 
See Susan George, ‘A Coup in the European Union?’ CounterPunch, Oct. 14, 2011, 
online at http://www.counterpunch.org/2011/10/14/a-coup-in-the-european-
union/. The still-developing situation in regard to Greece (which will have EC 
monitors in place enforcing austerity measures) shows the antilabor direction, a 




ortune/; and for JPMorgan Chase’s CEO Jamie Dimon, making essentially the 
same point, see http://video.foxbusiness.com/v/1450365871001/dimon-
policies-made-recovery-slower-and worse/?playlist_id=87247. 
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of democratic governance. Protesters in the developed world are aware of 
sharing conditions that are functionally quite similar.8 
Such protests – as in France in 2006, which saw widespread mobilization 
against ‘precarization’, as well as the subsequent uprisings in the Paris banlieues 
or in England in August 2011 – also reflect the anger of working-class youths, 
especially their rage against racist police violence. In the English case, these 
young people were out there smashing and looting together with young 
                                                
8 Although Western European protests in response to the prospect-less future, 
such as the indignados or encampados in Spain and the many demonstrations in 
Greece’s Syntagma Square, were critical examples, and the uprising in Tunisia was 
ultimately at least a partially successful one, the sheer scale and unlikely success 
(similarly only partial) of the occupation in Cairo’s Tahrir Square made it the 
touchstone for the movement, and it remains so regardless of its as-yet unfulfilled 
aims. In recognition of its role, veteran occupiers of Tahrir Square sent a message 
to Occupy Wall Street: ‘The current crisis in America and western Europe has 
begun to bring this reality home to you as well: that as things stand we will all 
work ourselves raw, our backs broken by personal debt and public austerity. Not 
content with carving out the remnants of the public sphere and the welfare state, 
capitalism and the austerity state now even attack the private realm and people’s 
right to decent dwelling as thousands of foreclosed-upon homeowners find 
themselves both ‘home- less’ and indebted to the banks who have forced them 
on to the streets. So we stand with you not just in your attempts to bring down 
the old but to experiment with the new. We are not protesting. Who is there to 
protest to? What could we ask them for that they could grant? We are occupying. 
We are reclaiming those same spaces of public practice that have been 
commodified, privatized and locked into the hands of faceless bureaucracy, real 
estate portfolios and police “protection”. Hold on to these spaces, nurture them 
and let the boundaries of your occupations grow. After all, who built these parks, 
these plazas, these buildings? Whose labor made them real and liveable? Why 
should it seem so natural that they should be withheld from us, policed and 
disciplined? Reclaiming these spaces and managing them justly and collectively is 
proof enough of our legitimacy.’ (Comrades from Cairo, 2011). 
[http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/oct/25/occupy-movement-
tahrir-square-cairo] 
 As we go to press in late 2013, the Egyptian revolution is in the process of 
complete collapse, and the country has fallen back under military control; 
revolutionary processes are inherently unstable. 
Martha Rosler 
 182 
members of the middle class. Some of the latter group had mobilized months 
earlier – as young Chileans are doing still – thanks in no small part to 
crushing increases in school fees driven by the Tory/Liberal Democrat 
governing coalition. The protests of these groups, these classes, have been 
fired by the recognition that there are likely no secure jobs for them, or 
perhaps any employment at all. 
But precarization is not a necessary consequence of any particular form of 
labor. 
Precarization now joins mechanization (the replacement of workers with 
machines), delocalization (capital’s worldwide search for the weakest labor 
and environmental regulations), and financialization (the maintenance of 
excess value in the stock market as opposed to surplus value extracted from 
manufacturing) as one of the great strategies used to restore profitability since 
the late 1960s. These strategies supplement the more widely noted assaults on 
the welfare state and worker’s rights (Marazzi, 2010b). Many of the protesting 
students and young postgraduates, for their part, were preparing for jobs in 
what we have come to call the knowledge industries, or, more recently, the 
creative industries, a branch of the former. 
1. University as engine, lifeways into lifestyle 
Let me step back a bit, to the consolidation of this sector in the newly 
dawning information age of the early 1960s. Clark Kerr, labor economist, first 
chancellor of the University of California’s elite Berkeley campus, and then 
president of the entire UC system, saw the university as a site for the 
production of knowledge workers. In 1960 he oversaw the creation of an 
expansive Master Plan for growth into the twenty-first century that 
harmonized the state’s higher education institutions and organized them into 
three tiers: research universities, state colleges, and two-year ‘junior colleges’ 
(renamed ‘community colleges’). This ‘benchmark’ plan acknowledged a need 
to unify the training and administration of the entire knowledge sector, from 
the elites to the working classes, in a politically divided world. In his widely 
influential work, The Uses of the University (1963), Kerr called the university a 
‘prime instrument of national purpose’, and he envisioned the ‘knowledge 
industry’ (his term) as eventually supplanting the industries surrounding new 
modes of transportation – railroads in the nineteenth century and 
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automobiles in the twentieth – in unifying the nation, acting as its economic 
masthead, and serving as the motor of US world dominance. 
The foundational student protest movement of the 1960s, Berkeley’s Free 
Speech Movement, was triggered in part by Kerr’s educational and managerial 
policies and goals. It was a movement of a leading sector of the middle class 
who were destined to become the elite workers of the new knowledge 
industries, if not their leaders. Ironically, today the UC system is almost 
broke, confirming the exemplary use of college campuses by Apple’s 
dictionary, in defining the term ‘bellwether’, that ‘college campuses are often 
the bellwether of change.’9 
In contrast, the 1970s Britain punk subculture was arguably a working-
class response to a diminished future, despite its partial traceability to art 
school, which in any case was a newly experimental repository for working-
class misfits. As Dick Hebdige described it:  
Despite the confident assurances of both labor and conservative politicians… 
that “we never had it so good” class refused to disappear. The ways in which 
class was lived, however, the forms in which the experience of class found 
expression in culture, did change dramatically. The advent of the mass media, 
changes in the constitution of the family, in the organization of school and 
work, shifts in the relative status of work and leisure, all served to fragment 
and polarize the working-class community, producing a series of marginal 
discourses within the broad confines of class experience. (Hebdige, 1979: 78) 
Punk was anti-commodity and anti-corporate, and followed a tactic of 
uglification and self-mutilation, a fuck you! response to bourgeois culture; the 
fact that it was quickly commodified and heavily promoted in the music 
industry is beside the point… until, at least, it became the point. For the post-
1970s generations, lifestyle politics became almost indistinguishable from 
either politics or daily life, and that frame of reference has now spread around 
the world. 
Indeed, lifestyle has been intensively developed as a major marketing point 
for consumer goods. In a prime nugget of lifestyle marketing analysis offered 
in 1984 (when the thinking was new), Theodore Levitt, Harvard professor of 
business administration and marketing, commented on the failure of the 
                                                
9 The New Oxford American Dictionary has since 2005 come installed on Apple 
computers using version OS X. 
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Hoover corporation to sell washing machines in Europe: ‘It asked people 
what features they wanted in a washing machine rather than what they 
wanted out of life’10. Levitt, editor of the Harvard Business Review, is credited 
with popularizing the term ‘globalization’. In The Marketing Imagination, his 
bestseller of 1983, Levitt pointed out that as a result of media expansion 
worldwide, the United States was in a unique position to market its goods 
everywhere, making its so-called high touch goods – jeans and Coca-Cola – 
right up there alongside high tech ones (and integrally, along with them, 
Americanism and the English language) into the world’s most desirable 
possessions.  
A powerful force drives the world toward a converging commonality, and that 
force is technology… . Almost everyone everywhere wants all the things they 
have heard about, seen, or experienced via the new technologies. (Levitt, 
1984: 2) 
In short, without naming it but simply placing it under the rule of the 
‘imagination’, Levitt defines the new key to marketing dominance as a 
wholesale subordination of rational product claims to universalized 
Bernaysian psychological modeling, which is the basis of lifestyle marketing. 
Levitt refers to homogenization as both the means and the result of 
globalization.11 He differentiates multinationals from the more forward-
thinking global corporations, which, he says, 
sell standardized products in the same way everywhere – autos, steel, 
chemicals, petroleum, cement, agricultural commodities and equipment, 
                                                
10 Levitt (1984: 13) writes, in distinguishing what he considers a multinational mind 
set from a global one: ‘The Hoover case illustrates how the perverse practice of 
the marketing concept and the absence of any kind of marketing imagination let 
multinational attitudes survive when customers actually want the benefits of 
global standardization. The whole project got off on the wrong foot. It asked 
people what features they wanted in a washing machine rather than what they 
wanted out of life. Selling a line of products individually tailored to each nation is 
thoughtless. Managers who took pride in practising the marketing concept to the 
fullest did not, in fact, practise it at all. Hoover asked the wrong questions, then 
applied neither thought nor imagination to the answers.’ 
11 In the homogenizing world market, certain goods, such as pizza, tacos, and 
bagels, become near-universal signifiers of difference. 
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industrial and commercial construction, banking and insurance services, 
computers, semiconductors, transport, electronic instruments, 
pharmaceuticals, and telecommunications, to mention some of the obvious. 
(ibid.: 4) 
Thirty years on, we have placed many of these categories in Levitt’s rather 
jumbled array under the rubric of the knowledge industries, including the 
management of Fordist industrial production (of ‘autos, steel, chemicals, 
petroleum, cement, agricultural commodities and equipment,… computers, 
semiconductors, [...] electronic instruments, pharmaceuticals’). Thirty years 
on, lifestyle politics, as both a unifier and a differentiator, help determine how 
we live or are supposed to live. People form alliances based on taste, above all 
via the tribalism of appearance-as-identity. Commodified lifestyle clusters 
include not merely possessions but persons, achievements, and children, and 
they tend to be costly to acquire and maintain.  
Punk is now another lifestyle choice, albeit an urban romantic one. Along 
with Goth and other ways of life associated with New York’s East Village, 
punk also provides the preferred uniform of suburban and small-town mall-
dwelling malcontents, while the ‘Bronxish’ hip-hop style, which is popular 
worldwide, does the same for working-class people of color. In this 
taxonomy, hipsterism is the lifestyle of arty types – the triumph of surface 
over substance – and is a direct consequence of the easy availability of 
cultural goods through technological means. 
But there are times when the professionalization of art training in colleges 
and universities, combined with the capture and branding of artist-led, artist-
run initiatives – the ones which used to reside outside the purview of art 
institutions – can broaden the social network and the vocabulary of action. It 
is a commonplace that in a post-industrial economy virtually all work falls in 
some sense under the reign of language and symbolic behavior. Certainly, all 
cultural products are flattened into ‘information’, mashing together writing, 
research, entertainment, and, of course, art. The popular reception of art and 
its greatly expanded audience have allowed, in the present moment, a mutual 
visibility between artists and other underemployed groups, both educated and 
undereducated. 
Or perhaps more directly, looking for a series of master texts, the newly 
professionalized discourse of artistic production settled on Continental 
theories of aestheticized capital. How else to explain the peculiar position of 
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artists at or near the vanguard of capitalist organization? Thus, even if the 
tendency may be toward the professionalization and embourgeoisement of artists, 
along with other members of the symbolic sector, when the future hits a 
brick wall, those ideas and alliances in potentia can have revolutionary 
consequences. The artists and artist-run groups, and others belonging to the 
creative-class demographic – which often overlaps with the group of those 
who identify as grass-roots activists, whether or not they have been to art 
school – have been at the center of instituting, strategizing, and energizing the 
Occupy Wall Street movement at New York’s Zuccotti Park – renamed 
Liberty Park. 
 A way of life that relies on virtue and secular good living, as sold to a 
generation raised on school and media campaigns promoting civic 
responsibility and morality – such as Just say No to Drugs12, Smoking Kills, 
and Save the Earth – is no doubt more likely to be adopted by urban art-
school grads than any other demographic group. These are young urban 
professionals, perhaps, but not the ‘yuppies’ of the past (though I am 
interested to see that the term has returned). The latter were high-earning 
lawyers, ad-agency honchos, and magazine editors, while these new young 
urban professionals are low-level workers and wannabes in their field. City 
life appeals to members of these industries, which themselves are made up of 
networks of small shops that benefit from face-to-face relations and the 
excitements of the urban environment. 
2. The new creative city 
This wave of renewed preference for the city can be traced to the postwar 
economic boom in Western industrial democracies – I am looking at the 
United States – which led to the rising affluence of the middle class. 
Immediately after the war, many city dwellers, having gained some measure 
of financial security, migrated to small towns and freshly built suburbs, 
causing urban shrinkage13. One effect of this depopulation was the evacuation 
                                                
12 Drugs, that is, not considered part of the approved Big Pharma formulary. This is 
important because among other things it allowed adolescents to make 
distinctions between good and bad drugs, but often based on criteria other than 
legality. 
13 I am minimizing the all-important role of capital flight and runaway shops here. 
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of many city business centers and the failure of many urban industries. But 
the direction of migration began to be reversed as bored children of the 
suburban middle class (along with corporate managers and the newly defined 
yuppies) were drawn to the organized pleasures of city life, not least the 
museums and theatres, as well as the dizzying mixture of anonymity, 
community, diversity, and possibility that fills the urban imaginary. To point 
out the obvious, the stultifying, homogeneous experience of life in the 
suburbs, with its identical malls and fast food joints, doesn’t offer the would-
be creative much in the way of identity formation; and insofar as the local 
exists today, it is found either in the city or in rural small towns, not in 
fenced-in suburbia. 
 This repopulation and transformation of cities – from spaces bereft of 
shops and manufacturing, starved of resources, and inhabited by poor and 
working-class people or squatters living in ill-maintained housing stock, into 
spaces of middle-class desire, high-end shopping, and entertainment – took at 
least a generation. It also required the concerted effort of city leaders. New 
York’s Soho and East Village had proved, by the late 1970s, that the 
transformation of old warehouses and decaying tenement districts into 
valuable real estate could be accomplished by allowing artists to live and work 
in them – if nothing else, city government recognized or identified with such 
people and understood their needs. Those elected officials who might, in an 
earlier era, have supported organized labor, found that such constituencies 
were fading away. Artists, in addition, were not going to organize and make 
life difficult for city governments. In the following decades, the Soho model 
became paradigmatic for cities around the world. (Another popular tactic was 
to attract small new industrial shops, mostly high tech ones.) But no matter 
how much the arts (whether the performing arts or the institutionalized visual 
arts in museums) have been regarded in some cities as an economic motor, 
                                                
 Since racism was an important motivator, the resulting urban shrinkage is often 
attributed in no small part to ‘white flight’. Small towns often became dormitory 
towns for city workers. The small town has remained the preferred location of 
US residents for most of its history and was idealized during the high point of 
American sociology that spanned the Second World War. 
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that remedy is not applicable everywhere, and not every city has proved to be 
a magnet for the arts. A new urban theory was required.14 
The civic usefulness of educated but often economically marginal young 
people was first popularized by a young professor of urban planning at 
Carnegie-Mellon University in post-industrial Pittsburgh. What Professor 
Richard Florida saw around him in that declining city was neighborhoods 
made cozy and attractive by the efforts of recent grads, who were setting up 
coffee shops and small businesses in low-rent locations. The customer-
friendly environment – friendly to middle-class customers – emphasized 
shared tastes passed down since the mid-1960s via schools, music, movies, 
and magazines, tastes that define a particular niche among the educated, 
professional middle class. Elements of what might ironically be seen as 
suburban virtue, from recycling to gardening to arts and crafts (perhaps 
rescued from the lore of small-town Edens by nostalgic lifestyle magazines), 
were now being brought back to decaying city neighborhoods. 
Professor Florida developed a new theory based on selling these congeries 
of young, generally underemployed people – as well as such subcultural 
categories as gays, who also tended to congregate in what used to be called 
bohemian neighborhoods – to urban planners as a sure-fire remedy for urban 
desuetude. (Or apparently selling them, for there is a bait and switch tactic at 
work here.) His book (Florida, 2002) The Rise of the Creative Class: And How It’s 
Transforming Work, Leisure, Community, and Everyday Life offered a crafty new 
turn in business evangelism, creating a catchy new way of thinking about city 
marketing as lifestyle marketing – much as Theodore Levitt had done for 
brand marketing – and throwing a lifeline to often desperate city managers.15 
With his apparently systematic analyses, Florida parlayed his popular book 
into a new job and a consulting career. He is now the head of the Martin 
                                                
14 Although the demonization of working-class and poor residents in areas ripe for 
real-estate harvesting is a tactic of long standing, the in-coming ‘good people’ 
have only recently been granted a profile of their own; previously, class privilege 
was taken for granted as a deserved entitlement. 
15 Florida did not come up with the idea of the creative class, but he did populate it 
with statistical categories. According to his thesis, the creative class makes up 
about 30 percent of U.S. workers, but as we shall see, the groupings he uses are 
problematic. 
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Prosperity Institute at the University of Toronto, and he is consultant to 
cities, corporations, museums, and nonprofits around the world. Prosperity, 
like the lovely name Florida, is a keyword. His website says 
The Creative Class Group is a boutique advisory services firm comprised of 
leading researchers, communication specialists, and business advisors. CCG 
combines a pioneering approach of global thought leadership and proven 
strategies offering clients worldwide the market intelligence critical for 
competitiveness and greater economic prosperity16. 
I have addressed Florida’s ‘creative class’ thesis in a series of earlier articles 
(see Rosler, 2013); here I offer an abbreviated digest, to flesh out the 
argument. There is a certain irony to revisiting this matter now, as the long-
term financial downturn has cast some doubt on the appeal of creative-class 
theorizing in the areas under financial strain, but the thesis has had a decade 
to catch hold, and catch hold it has.17 Florida’s analyses have struck a chord 
with city managers by appearing to promote diversity in ways that often 
replicate what is already in place. Many who have scrutinized his data have 
demonstrated the insufficiency of his analyses and thus his conclusions.18 
Critics point out that in relying on standard census categories, he sweeps into 
the creative class all knowledge-industry workers, from those in call-centers 
                                                
16 Creative Class Group, 2013, http://www.creativeclass.com/. 
17 Toronto, Florida’s base, is currently afflicted by a mayor with a take-no-prisoners, 
right-wing populist style, complete with racist and anti-gay pronouncements and 
actions. In repudiating the previous government’s agenda, Toronto’s suburbanite 
Mayor Rob Ford has cut funding for bike lanes and light rail. Asked about 
Florida’s response, Torontonians with whom I spoke said that he has been largely 
silent but has quietly complained that the city was cutting all the things that made 
Toronto ‘his city’. 
18 Recently Florida has been criticized again for sloppy interpretation and 
aggregation of polling data and economic statistics in his article ‘Why America 
keeps getting more conservative’ published in the venerable magazine The Atlantic 
(these days politically center-right), where he is one of 19 editors (Florida, 2012). 
Many other commentators read the data quite the opposite way and claim that 
the US electorate is, on the contrary, growing increasingly liberal in its beliefs 
while US politics, thanks to the radicalization of the Republican Party, have 




to professional data analysts, scientists, and mathematicians – hardly 
artists.19A consensus on his conclusions is that they amount to the well-
established ‘human capital’ thesis of urban development placed within new 
linguistic frames, and most importantly with the ‘creative’ moniker generously 
washing over everyone in the knowledge industries. A small, relatively poor 
group of urban dwellers, the ones offering consumer friendliness and local 
color, becomes the face of the other, larger, richer, but basically invisible 
members of Florida’s ‘supercreative core’ grouping.20 In his shell game, 
creatives are defined under one shell as people whose mental engagement is 
at the heart of their work and under another as people who know how to live 
nicely, decoratively, and cheaply, and under yet another as primarily a high-
earning, tax-paying economic grouping. As policy follows prescriptions, 
inconvenient, poorly accoutered working-class people are marginalized, 
pushed further out to the edges of the city or to the suburbs, while in the 
newly reclaimed city precincts, bourgeois predilections – of ego-centered, 
commodified, and mediated rituals – enfold every milestone in life, from 
                                                
19 Florida ingeniously includes in his mix a statistically small bohemian group, which 
includes gay people, but as Harvard economist Edward Glaeser has reluctantly 
noted, his data regressions suggest that in only two cities – in, yes, the state of 
Florida – does the gay population help the economy. 
20 ‘[T]o harness creativity for economic ends, you need to harness creativity in all its 
forms. You can’t just generate a tech economy or information economy or 
knowledge economy; you have to harness the multidimensional aspects of 
creativity. […] there are three types of creativity: technological creativity […]; 
economic creativity, […] turning those things into new businesses and new 
industries; and cultural and artistic creativity, […] new ways of thinking about 
things, new art forms, new designs, new photos, new concepts. Those three 
things have to come together to spur economic growth. The creative class is 
composed of two dimensions. There is the supercreative core, […] scientists, 
engineers, tech people, artists, entertainers, musicians – so-called bohemians that 
are about 12 percent of the workforce […] the supercreative core is really the 
driving force in economic growth. In addition to the supercreative core, I include 
creative professionals and managers, lawyers, financial people, healthcare people, 
technicians, who also use their ideas and knowledge and creativity in their work. I 
don’t include people in service or manufacturing industries who use creativity in 
their work’ (Florida and Dreher, 2002). 
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birth to premarital stag and hen parties, weddings, baby showers, births, 
communions, and maybe even deaths. 
3. The limits of creativity, and of liberalism 
Many critics naively fail to realize that Florida, like Clark Kerr, is a social 
liberal. Like most neoliberals, he is out there on the rhetorical barricades 
arguing for tolerance, subsidies, and the right of the creative class to perform 
the work of the patrician class for little or no compensation. In a strange way, 
then, he can be taken as the collective projection of a certain branch of the 
liberal elite. Liberals are happy to celebrate artists, or even better, ‘creatives’ – 
that amorphous group of brewers, bakers, urban farmers, and baristas – as 
long as their festivals and celebrations can be sponsored by banks, 
corporations, and foundations and their efforts civically branded. 
Architectural institutes hold meetings and publish newsletters touting ‘livable’ 
cities. Arts institutions benefit from the attention of governmental agencies 
and foundations, but the costs are also worth considering. 
Artists, already complicit (wittingly or unwittingly) in the renegotiation of 
urban meaning for elites, were called upon to enter into social management. 
Real-estate concessions have long been extended to artists and small 
nonprofits in the hopes of improving the attractiveness of ‘up-and-coming’ 
neighborhoods and bringing them back onto the high-end rent rolls. The 
prominence of art and ‘artiness’ allows museums and architecture groups, as 
well as artists’ groups, artists, and arts administrators of small nonprofits, to 
insert themselves into the conversation on civic trendiness. 
Artists are hardly unaware of their positioning by urban elites, from the 
municipal and real estate interests to the high-end collectors and museum 
trustees. Ironically, perhaps, this is also the moment in which social 
engagement on the part of artists is an increasingly viable modality within the 
art world and young curators specialize in social practice projects. Many 
artists have gone to school in the hopes of gaining marketability and often 
thereby incurring a heavy debt burden. Schools have gradually become the 
managers and shapers of artistic development; on the one hand, they prepare 
artists to enter the art market, and on the other, through departments of 
‘public practice’ and ‘social practice’, they mold the disciplinary restrictions of 
an art that might be regarded as a minor government apparatus. These 
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programs are secular seminaries of ‘new forms of activism, community-based 
practice, alternative organization, and participatory leadership in the arts’ that 
explore ‘the myriad links between art and society to examine the ways in 
which artists… engage with civic issues, articulate their voice in the public 
realm’21. 
To look again at the United States – but not only there – arts and 
architecture institutions are quite pleased to be swept along by the creative-
class urban-planning tide. The distinctly old-economy, luxury-vehicle maker 
BMW has joined with the Guggenheim Museum to create ‘a mobile 
laboratory traveling around the world to inspire innovative ideas for urban 
life’, with the names of some high-profile artist and architect attached.22 
The ‘Lab’ firmly ties the corporation, the museum, architecture, art, and 
entertainment to the embourgeoisement of cities. Urban citizenship has replaced 
other forms of halo-polishing for so-called corporate citizens. By the way, 
they all like bikes. As does Urban Omnibus – which also likes ‘Art as urban 
activator’. The Urban Omnibus is an online project of New York’s venerable 
Architectural League and is funded by foundations, the city of New York, 
and the federal government.23 Its recent feature, ‘Civic action: A vision for 
                                                
21 These quotes are from a job announcement put out by a department at a major 
university that offers ‘a Master’s Degree in Arts Politics which treats, in an 
activist key, the nexus between the politics that art makes and the politics that 
make art’. Despite my skepticism, I don’t want to dismiss the potential of such 
training and network formation; the problem lies in the short life span that such 
initiatives can have before the institution render them zombies. See the latter two 
installments of my Culture Class essay for a discussion of the culturalization 
argument of Fredric Jameson and its adoption by George Yúdice to argue that art 
that can be framed as social practice may put the artists in the position of 
unwittingly serving the aims of the state and, by focusing on melioration, of 
abandoning the possibility of critique. See also footnote 4, above. 
22 See http://www.bmwguggenheimlab.org/ (accessed 24.04.2012). There was an 
unsuccessful effort by artists to occupy the lab during a day of artists’ actions. 
23 See http://urbanomnibus.net/ (accessed 24.04.2012). Urban Omnibus is funded 
by the Rockefeller Foundation’s New York City Cultural Innovation Fund, the 
National Endowment for the Arts, the New York City Department of Cultural 
Affairs, and the New York City Council. The Architectural League was founded 
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Long Island City’, describes a new venture, developed by two local 
contemporary art museums, that ‘invites artist-led teams to propose visions 
for the future of Long Island City’, a neighborhood in the borough of 
Queens, New York, that is a post-industrial ruin with new high-end 
waterfront residential development. Another feature, ‘Making Room’, is ‘a 
research, design, and advocacy project to shape New York’s housing stock to 
address the changing needs of how we live now’24. In March 2012, as I was 
writing this section, there was a feature on the site in which a freelance writer 
described an open house at the newly renovated jail, The Brooklyn House of 
Detention, an event designed to placate the neighborhood gentrifiers that all 
will be well (Sohn, 2012). I am here using the Lab and Urban Omnibus to 
represent the myriad efforts of city agencies and elite institutions – and some 
free-standing ones or those attached to public universities that still follow a 
non-corporatized path, to adopt the now virtually naturalized creativity and 
hipster-friendly memes posed in terms of imagination, design, and advocacy, 
just as in some respects I am using the name Florida to represent the creative-
class thesis that his work has helped turn into dominant policy lingo. 
The Florida version of the Soho urban transformation model, as I have 
argued, fails to capture the agency of the actors in his transformational 
scenarios. Just as science has been seen in the capitalist mind as a necessary 
steppingstone to technology (a business term), creativity is regarded as the 
necessary ingredient of ‘innovation’. The creative classes as constructed by 
Florida operate strictly within the world view pictured by the capitalist 
imaginary; even those who are not simply employees in high tech firms are 
seen to be instituting small businesses and learning to deliver retro boutique 
services that bear echoes of pre-war American neighborhood shops and 
delicatessens or even nineteenth-century ‘purveyors’ (next up, the milk wagon 
and the seltzer-delivery man!) or idealized French or Italian shops in cities 
and villages. They have no agency outside the application of their imaginative 
abilities to the benefit for the gentrifiers and the well-to-do. They have no 
agency in respect to large-scale political and social transformation. It is true 
                                                
in 1881 by Cass Gilbert and has long sought to recognize the importance of the 
arts in relation to architecture. 
24 The phrase ‘how we live now’ evidences a predictable set of assumptions about 
who constitutes the ‘we’.  
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that the Florida model is not strictly interested in those whom the present 
readership recognizes as artists. But here the picture of agency is even worse 
in respect to the market artists whose potential social worth is quite directly 
to serve the interests of the international clientele inhabiting the most rarefied 
income heights, a service role to which several generations of artists have 
been trained to aspire. 
But this is not the picture of ourselves that most of us artists, curators, 
critics, wish to recognize. Like other participants in the movements taking 
place around the world, and like participants in earlier ones, artists tend to 
want to lend themselves and their energy and abilities to social betterment 
and utopian dreaming, but not necessarily as participants within the 
sanctioned institutionalized frames. The artistic imagination continues to 
dream of historical agency. In a protracted economic downturn such as we 
are experiencing now, while the creative-class thesis is showing its limits in 
respect to saving cities, it becomes clearer that artists and other members of 
the art community belong to the pan- or non-national class whose 
composition is forged across boundaries and whose members are inclined, as 
the cliché demands, to think globally and act locally. 
Political movements are perpetually dogged by accusations of 1960s 
nostalgia and even Luddism, a result of the antimodernism of much 1960s 
counterculture. People on the left are routinely derided by the Right as dirty 
fucking hippies, and once the occupations began, the Right was not slow to 
use this picture to discredit the occupiers. But the constellations of dissent 
have largely changed since the 1960s. If people are aiming to secede from 
modernity, they do so with a different range of continental theorists to draw 
upon, and without the three-worlds model of political contestation, in which 
the land-bound peasant figured strongly as an ideal, or the tribal nomad for 
those not inclined to socialist revolution. Revolution now looks more 
anarcho-syndicalist, or perhaps council communist, than Marxist-Leninist. 
The city is not simply the terrain to be evacuated, nor is it the site of guerrilla 
warfare; it is a conceptual puzzle as well as a battleground in which the stakes 
are slow-motion class war, and farming is brought to the city not by dreamers 
in homespun clothing but by those who might adopt the garb of the 
professional landscape architect or beekeeper. ‘Creatives’ may bring not only 
training in design and branding, and often knowledge of historical agitprop 
and street performance, but also the ability to work with technological tools 
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in researching, strategizing, and implementing actions in virtual as well as 
physical spaces. Actually or functionally middle class, they are at ease with the 
discourses and modes of intellectual endeavor required in higher education, 
or in college prep. Craft and skill are enfolded in a framework that differs 
significantly from their earlier understanding; but the hegemonic role of the 
knowledge industries and the ‘devices’ of electronic production and 
communication render that framework near-ubiquitous.25 The often flexible 
schedules of artists and other members of the precarious sectors of Florida’s 
creative/bohemian classes also permits a freedom to come and go at 
encampments and meetings, an ability to shift time and work commitments 
that is not available to all. 
                                                
25 The most prominent sign of technological sophistication is the frequent visual 
reference to Anonymous, an amorphous group of hackers, or hacktivists (of 
which one small international groupuscule, LulzSec, was arrested in February 
2012), in the form of the Guy Fawkes masks from the V for Vendetta franchise 
(worn by protesters and occupiers and used on signage). ‘Anonymous’ apparently 
has carried out denial-of-service attacks against the websites of the governments 
of Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain during the attempted revolutions there, and it has 
expressed or enacted support for Occupy. See: http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=l6jdkpQjueo&feature=g-vrec&context=G27aba48RVAAAAAAAACg 
(accessed 24.04.2012). 
 I do not have the space here to dissect further the possible role of this pointedly 
anarchic, often playful, assemblage of hackers. But in more workaday fashion, a 
range of technological ease is suggested by the facility with which the Occupy 
movement has made use not only of the widely know popular media sites such as 
Facebook and Twitter but also of less well known ones, sites such as Vibe, the 
older IRC, the now indispensable Livestream, Reddit, or internet relay chat, 
according to PC Magazine (see Strange, 2011) as well as Tumblr and Google 
Docs. See: http://mappingthemovement.tumblr.com/ (accessed 24.04.2012). 
 To quote an early assessment: ‘We set up shared google docs so we could 
communicate […] and we set up google voice numbers for everyone. […] One 
Tumblr page, We Are The 99Percent (http://wearethe99percent.tumblr.com/) 
reveals the plight of people who see themselves as far outside the top 1 percent 




We can see the occupation activists as staking a claim, creating a presence, 
setting up a new public sphere, demanding the reinstatement of politics by 
refusing to simply present demands to representative governments and 
instead enacting democracy themselves. (Democracy has long been part of 
the American particular brand, albeit usually combined with double-barreled 
neoliberalism – or neoimperialism.) While welcoming the new, I can’t resist 
pointing back to the old, not to the eighteenth-century demands for self-
governance led by a group of bourgeois colonial rebels in the American 
colonies but to the American Civil Rights Movement and one of its children, 
the Free Speech-inspired, anti-war, worldwide student movement of the 
1960s, for which democracy – direct democracy, without representation – 
was a foundational idea, at least as the degree zero of the movement in the 
early years.26 In this current iteration, the contributions of celebrity artists 
such as Shepard Fairey (made famous by his Obama/Hope campaign poster 
of 2008) have been politely greeted but are beside the point, as it is not hard 
to see the occupations themselves as grand public works of process art with a 
                                                
26 Here I am looking not only to the town meetings of the early days of the 
American colonies but explicitly to the model of nonviolent participatory 
democracy propounded by one of the groups central to the Civil Rights 
Movement, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, or SNCC. Many of 
the young student activists had joined SNCC’s Freedom Rider campaign to 
disrupt racial segregation in the American South, which influenced the principles 
outlined shortly after in the Port Huron Statement, a foundational document of 
the student/antiwar movement. Naturally enough, the history, origins, and 
influences of these movements are more complex than I can sketch out here. The 
widely noted, galvanizing speech of Berkeley student leader Mario Savio, 
delivered in the Berkeley campus quadrangle on Dec. 2, 1964, during a stand off 
with university police, includes the following in its preamble: ‘I ask you to 
consider – if this is a firm, and if the Board of Regents are the Board of 
Directors, and if President Kerr in fact is the manager, then I tell you something 
– the faculty are a bunch of employees and we’re the raw material! But we’re a 
bunch of raw materials that don’t mean to be – [to] have any process upon us. 
Don’t mean to be made into any product! … Don’t mean to end up being 
bought by some clients of the University, be they the government, be they 
industry, be they organized labor, be they anyone! We’re human beings!’ 
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cast of several thousand.27 The vast majority of artists – forming the core of 
the underpaid, unpaid urban army whose activities Florida acolytes wish to 
harness – live in a state of precarity that may lead them to seek social 
solutions in new and unexpected ways. This is where the so-called artistic 
mode of production comes in. 
Urban sociologist Sharon Zukin, writing in 1982, identifies this 
precariousness of bohemian life as one of the five major ways in which this 
artistic mode of production affects the urban environment. The others 
include the ‘manipulation of urban forms [and] the transfer of urban space 
from the old world of industry to the “new” world of finance, or from the 
realm of productive economic activity to that of nonproductive economic 
activity’; diminishing expectations about the provision of housing resulting 
from the substitution of ‘bohemian’ living arrangements for contemporary 
housing; and, finally, the ideological function:  
While blue-collar labor recedes from the heart of the financial city, an image is 
created that the city’s economy has arrived at a post-industrial plateau. At the 
very least, this displaces the issues of industrial labor relations to another 
terrain. (Zukin, 1989: 180) 
If the creative-class thesis can be seen as something of a hymn to the 
perceived harmony between the ‘creatives’ and the financiers, together with 
city leaders and real-estate interests, guiding the city into the post-industrial 
condition, perhaps the current grass-roots occupations can be seen as the 
eruption of a new set of issues related to a new set of social relations of 
production. The mode of production, we remember, includes the forces of 
production but also their relations, and when these two come into conflict, a 
crisis is born. If the creative-class thesis can been seen as something of a 
hymn to the harmony between the creative forces of production and the 
urban social relations that would use them to the benefit of cities bereft of 
industrial capital, perhaps the current grassroots occupations can be seen as 
the inevitable arrival of the conflict between the creatives and the city that 
uses them. It is interesting, in this respect, that the battle cry has been 
                                                
27 Artists’ groups are increasingly making this point, for good or ill; see Fellah 
(2011), Schwendener (2011). See, for example: http://newamericanpaintings. 




‘Occupy’ (which echoes Florida’s similar injunction to gentrify), that is, to 
occupy space, to occupy the social and political imagination, in a way 
analogous to the way previous movements radicalized freedom into 
emancipation, republic into democracy, and equality into justice. Florida says 
gentrify, we say Occupy. 
That leads us to the next step, now under way. What the occupations have 
done is to make members of disparate groups – neighborhood advocacy 
groups, immigrants’-rights groups, and working-class labor groups, both 
organized and not, visible to each other – and in Occupy’s first phase put 
them into temporary alliances. It is these alliances that form the nuclei of the 
occupation of the present and future.  
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The Composition of Living Knowledge: Labor, 
Capture, and Revolution 
Gigi Roggero 
0. From Struggles to Struggles: Situating the Concepts 
Starting from the struggles and coming back to the struggles: only in this 
movement are concepts embodied, becoming an expression of the creative 
potentia of the multitude. This means that there is no theoretical practice 
outside political practice. From a revolutionary point of view, there is no 
production of knowledge that is not immanent to the composition of living 
labor and its historical determination. We will shortly focus on three of these 
concepts that are part of a collective experience: 1) autonomy of living 
knowledge; 2) communism of capital; and 3) institutions of the common.1 
In the global crisis, our thesis is that the latest transnational struggles over 
the last years are determined by the convergence and differentiation of a 
downgraded middle class and a proletariat whose poverty is directly 
proportional to its productivity: they are put in common by the irreversible 
end of the progressive promise of capitalism, the definitive collapse and 
exhaustion of the school and university as an elevator for social mobility and 
the generalized perception of precariousness and indebtedness as a 
permanent condition. Be careful: talking of a common composition of the 
global struggles does not at all refer exclusively to Europe. In Tunisian and 
                                                
1 These collective experiences have, first of all, the names of UniNomade 
(uninomade.org), Commonware (www.commonware.org), and edu-factory 




North African insurrections, as well as in the Chilean movement or Occupy 
Wall Street, the central subject is exactly the young, highly educated (in a 
formal or informal way, i.e. full of knowledge), and impoverished person. 
From this point of view, in contemporary capitalism, the Marxian definition 
of the poor comes true: the poor is living labor, the form of life that produces 
the others’ wealth and its own poverty. In fact, in struggles within the global 
crisis, cognitive labor is becoming a political subject, or it is becoming class – 
if we define class not in economist terms, but as the formation of the 
collective subject in the struggle within social historically determined 
relationship. To use Mario Tronti’s (2008) words: there is no class without 
class struggle. And it is becoming class immediately on a transnational plane, 
because today there is no possibility of political action limited within the 
nation-State borders: this is a fact. 
On this base, we want to make the opposing aspects of our analysis 
explicit right away. On one side, there is a picture of global capital through 
the re-proposition of the dialectic between centre and periphery, for which 
the former shows the image of its own future, according to a progressive line 
of development. The corresponding idea of class is founded on homogeneity, 
for which the subject most advanced in the capitalist hierarchies is, in a 
deterministic way, the most advanced one in the struggles. On the other side 
– we are thinking mainly of the constellation of the postcolonial studies – 
there is a correct critique of this historicist idea, belonging to the tradition of 
socialism and orthodox Marxism, showing heterogeneity as a constitutive 
element of the composition of contemporary living labor. But this correct 
critical approach often risks concluding the impossibility of the common 
composition of the differences, that is to say, the impossibility of breaking 
with capital and the construction of a new social relationship. 
Therefore, we could say against the first pole: differences are irreducible to 
homogeneity; and against the second: but they can compose themselves in 
the common. Because the common is the base and the product of differences 
and multiplicity. In fact, if they are separated from the common, differences 
become fetishes, continuously translated in the language of value: this means 
making capital the only active subject of history, homogenous and empty, 
abstract and normative. So the risk is to fall again into the historicist trap that 
was originally put into question. In other words, universalism is never a 
starting point, as imaged by the Enlightenment and socialist traditions, but it 
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is always what is at stake in the struggles and the product of living labor 
cooperative’s potentia. 
We should briefly clarify what this means for cognitive capitalism and 
cognitive labor. It does not refer to a new stage of the historical process, 
marching towards the transition beyond capital, its Aufhebung. And cognitive 
labor does not identify a sector of the technical composition of labor, as the 
‘knowledge workers’ or the ‘creative class’, or the forms of labor in specific 
areas of the world. Cognitivization (becoming cognitive of labor) is a process 
through which we can read the new quality of capital’s relations and the 
specific forms of exploitation and class antagonism today: in this process, 
knowledge is not only a source, but also a means, of production. In its 
production, we can qualify the forms of accumulation and the contemporary 
class composition on a global level. To use Marx’s Einleitung, the 
cognitivization of labor is a ‘general illumination which bathes all the other 
colours and modifies their particularity. It is particular ether which determines 
the specific gravity of every being which has materialized within it’ (Marx, 
1973: 107). If we do not grasp this general illumination, we cannot 
understand the specific elements, new or old, that are determined or re-
determined. 
1. Autonomy of Living Knowledge 
Over the last years, within university movements and transnational networks2, 
we have elaborated the concept of living knowledge that rose from the 
operaista analysis of the 1970s on the transformations of class composition 
(Alquati, 1976). We want to immediately give a warning about a populist 
interpretation of this category: in Italy, for example, some groups use it as an 
idea synonymous with knowledge ‘from below’, in opposition to academic 
knowledge, ‘from above’. There is nothing more subaltern than this idea of 
below and above. 
Instead, in Marxian terms, living knowledge indicates the new quality of 
the composition of contemporary living labor. The process of formation of 
living knowledge is rooted in the struggles over education, against waged 
                                                




labor and in the flight from the chains of the ‘Fordist’ factory, in the anti-
colonial movements and global migrations. So the concept of living 
knowledge points out not only the central role of science and information in 
the contemporary productive process, but above all its immediate 
socialization and embodiment in living labor. This means that today the 
classical relationship between living labor and dead labor becomes a 
relationship between living knowledge and dead knowledge. In this process, 
on one hand, living knowledge is valorized by capital, on the other hand, it 
tends to become autonomous with regard to the automatic system of 
machines. This leads the general intellect to no longer be objectified in dead 
labor, at least in a stable way. This means that knowledge cannot be 
completely transferred to machines and separated from the worker: the 
traditional process of objectification nowadays is overthrown, and living 
knowledge embodies many aspects of fixed capital, producing and 
regenerating the machine uninterruptedly. Living labor/knowledge needs to 
be vivified with a rapid temporality, from which there is a continuous excess 
of living and social knowledge. ‘The primary fixed capital becomes man 
himself’, affirms Vercellone (2007: 29), paraphrasing Marx. From this 
standpoint, the telematics network is an obvious and illuminating example. 
In this context, the necessity to reduce living knowledge to abstract 
knowledge, or the imperative of the measure of labor despite the crisis of the 
law of value, forces capital to impose completely artificial units of time. To 
use Marx’s words, it is for capital a ‘question de vie et de mort’. To reassure 
Marxist intellectuals and philologists, we can add that the crisis of the law of 
value does not coincide with its disappearance: however, it becomes not only 
a bare measure of exploitation, but an immediately empty and artificial 
measure of command. This is the political point. Therefore, capital has to 
capture the value of the production of subjectivity, to interpret in the double 
sense of its genitive: on one hand as the constitution of living labor, on the 
other hand as its productive potentia, not only for capital but also 
autonomously (Read, 2003). All in all, capital has to capture the production of 
the common in its double statute: it is, at the same time, the form of 
production and the horizon of a new social relationship, it is what living 
knowledge produces and what capital exploits. On this plane of tension 
between the autonomy of living knowledge and capitalist capture, we can find 
the space and time of antagonism today. 
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At this level, we have to re-think the relationship between the technical 
composition and political composition of class, i.e., the relationship between 
the capitalist articulation and hierarchization of the workforce and the 
process of its formation as an autonomous subject. These concepts were 
elaborated by operaismo in a specific phase, marked by the struggles of the 
workers in the relationship between the Taylorist factory and Fordist society. 
Nowadays, with the tendential overlapping between labor and life, there is 
also a sort of overlapping and confusion between technical and political 
composition. When production is based on the common, we could say in a 
certain sense that political composition comes before technical composition. 
Or technical composition is the block and segmentation of political 
composition. We have to elaborate a new concept of common composition: this 
exactly what is at stake.  
2. Communism of Capital 
The term communism of capital was used some years ago also by milieu close 
to The Economist, explicitly going back to the expression of ‘socialism of 
capital’ through which Marx described the rise of stock companies. 
Nowadays, the communism of capital (Marazzi, 2010a) is the form of the 
capitalist social relationship in the age in which it is based on the capture of 
the common. In other words: less and less does capital organize the social 
cooperation upstream, like in the phase of industrial capitalism; more and 
more must it organize this capture downstream. The corporate figure of the 
cool hunter can be an example here. If in the 1920s Henry Ford said ‘buy the 
car that you want, the important thing is that it’s a Ford Model T’, 
summarizing the (impossible) capitalist dream to induce the needs from 
above, the cool hunter acts directly downstream, trying to capture and 
translate the excess of forms of life and expressions of subjectivity into the 
language of the value. The ‘centre’ is forced to go into the ‘periphery’ in order 
to capture the production of the common. 
In this context, the classical distinction between profit and rent is quite 
problematic: when capital appropriates a social cooperation that mostly takes 
place without its direct organization, these two terms overlap. So rent 
becomes the form of capitalist command that captures the autonomous 
production of living labor/knowledge. The Schumpeterian entrepreneur is 
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definitely dead. Today the form of the enterprise is the organization of the 
‘hunters of the common’. A quick joke: if the Bolshevik party overthrew the 
highest level of the potentia of the associated living labor productive force – 
the factory – in subversive enterprise, today we could say that capital is forced 
to overthrow the highest level of the potentia of the associated living labor 
productive force – the network – in the form of the enterprise. 
This analysis allows us to understand why many contemporary liberal and 
neoliberal scholars have exalted the characteristics (free cooperation, 
centrality of non-proprietorial strategies, horizontality of relations and 
sharing, etc.) that are the patrimony of critical media scholars and activists. 
For example, Yochai Benkler (2006), starting from the description of the 
cooperative and self-organized practices in the web, hypothesizes the 
emergence of a horizontal production based on the commons. The well-
known jurist of Yale University illustrates the passage from a system based on 
intellectual property to a system increasingly based on open social networks, 
in which open source and free software are entirely valorized3. From 
Benkler’s analysis, it’s simple to observe that the production of the common 
is at the same time extreme resource and mortal threat for contemporary 
capitalism. And if intellectual property risks blocking not only the 
autonomous power of the productive forces but also the dynamics of 
innovation that innervate production relations, then capitalism has to become 
‘property-less’. This is the clash between Google and Microsoft, or the 
alliance between IBM and Linux. This is the web 2.0, that is to say, the 
response to the autonomy of the living knowledge of autonomous 
networking. 
But to recompose command and govern social cooperation downstream, 
capital is continuously forced to block the productive potentia of living 
labor/knowledge with various means – from intellectual property to 
precariousness. This constitutes the new form of the contradiction between 
productive forces and production relations and therefore the base of the 
contemporary global economic crisis, i.e. the crisis of the communism of 
capital. So, against the interpretation of the crisis that re-proposes the 
contraposition between the real economy and the financial economy, we can 
                                                
3 For an important critique of the digital utopia and its developments, see 
Pasquinelli (2008). 
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define financialisation as the real and concrete form, although perverse, of 
capitalist accumulation in a system that must capture value that cannot be 
measured without command, that is as violent as well as empty and artificial 
as its capacity of organization. 
On this base, we can also say that we have to question and re-think the 
cyclical nature of the capitalist process (crisis – restructuration – expansion – 
new crisis, and so forth). Since the communism of capital is based on the 
capture of what it cannot organize and what structurally exceeds it, i.e. the 
production of the common, the crisis assumes a permanent dimension. Let’s 
think back to the crises of the last fifteen years: from the collapse of the 
South-East Asian markets, to the crash of Nasdaq, up to the subprime crack 
and, recently, the explosion of public debt; we witness an exceedingly rapid 
succession of bubbles with deep global effects – from net economy to debt, 
and maybe the next one will be the ecological or social network bang. The 
question is: what is inside the bubble? There’s the Internet and networks, i.e. 
social cooperation; there is the debt, i.e. welfare and social needs – education, 
communication, houses, healthcare, and mobility; there is life, i.e. the 
production of the human being through the human being. The flesh and 
body of the bubble-financial economy is the common. Therefore, temporality 
is completely unstrung: the crisis is no more a specific phase of the economic 
cycle and a structural horizon, but the permanent and impassable condition 
of capitalist development. In other words: the communism of capital is 
capture without organization, block without development, and accumulation 
without progressive promise. 
3. Institutions of the Common 
As we have said, the common is both extreme resource and mortal threat for 
a capitalism in permanent crisis. The Keynesian or neo-Keynesian recipes, 
aiming at re-starting the economic cycle through public government, have 
failed. Indeed, the communism of capital is not only a permanent crisis, but it 
also represents the irreversible end of the dialectic between public and 
private. The institutions of the communism of capital are beyond classical 
juridical definitions. Let’s take the example of the contemporary 
transformations of the university, summarized in the formula of 
corporatization. It does not refer only to the intrusion of private money in a 
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public institution, and it is not tied to the juridical status of single universities. 
In the American case, the paradigmatic model of the full development of the 
corporatization trend, public universities are funded by corporate money, and 
private institutions receive vital state and federal funds. The definition of the 
corporate university is independent from the representation of itself as public 
or private. The process points out how the university itself must become a 
corporation, based on: the calculus of costs and benefits, inputs and outputs; 
the cuts to the workforce costs and its precarization; on profit/rent to 
capture; and rating agency evaluations in order to compete in the global 
educational market. The corporatization of the university means precisely 
dissolving the dichotomy between public and private. 
Then, let’s take the connected topics of debt and the central element of 
the contemporary crisis as a standpoint to investigate the interweaving 
between the cognitive economy and financialization. To follow the example 
of education, it would be a mistake to think that increasing university fees – a 
common transnational trend, now becoming more and more dramatic with 
the crisis – mean the return of the classical mechanisms of exclusion. In fact, 
we can see a trend of increased enrolment, seemingly strange due to the 
increasing level of precarization and impoverishment. How is this possible? 
Through the system of debt: in the context of the absence or structural 
dismantling of welfare policies, debt is used by millions and millions of 
proletarians and downgrading middle class as a tool to access higher 
education. Debt is a selective filter and a reduction of the social wage, often 
before the access to a monetary wage. It represents an exemplification of 
what we call ‘differential inclusion’, or financialized inclusion to the welfare.  
But the use of the credit – against the moralist judgments of the statist left, 
as well as catastrophist and liquid modernity’s sociology – also highlights the 
incompressibility of the social needs conquered by the multitude and its 
struggles, from housing to healthcare, from mobility to communication and 
knowledges. The debt system is a dispositif of individualization of these social 
needs, and capture that is produced in the common in the mechanisms of 
financialization. But it also shows the fragility of contemporary capitalism: the 
increasing non-repayment of debt, the right to bankruptcy practiced by the 
proletarian, precarious, downgrading middle class and the working poor, is 
one of the subjective roots of the crisis, and it is a tool to re-appropriate 
social wealth. It’s not by chance that this students’ and precarious workers’ 
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‘right to bankruptcy’ became a central claim in the global day of action of 15th 
October 2011. In fact, we can say that the struggle over credit-debt in 
cognitive capitalism is the functional equivalent of the struggle over salary in 
industrial capitalism. 
Now, we are at the point that the struggles raise: the processes of 
financialization and corporatization cannot be faced and defeated on the field 
of the public, because this is simply an articulation through which those 
processes work. The battlefield is immediately based on the re-appropriation 
of social wealth, and therefore its constitution in commonwealth; this 
happens on the plane of the construction of institutions of the common, i.e. 
the collective creation of common normativity immanent to the composition 
of living labor and social cooperation. The institutions of the common are 
not ‘happy islands’ or utopian spaces protected from capitalist accumulation, 
but the organization of collective autonomy and the destruction of 
apparatuses of capture. 
Here we face a first important question: what is the relationship between 
the public and the common? This is a strategic issue for the struggles and its 
forms of organization. Let’s take another recent example from the Italian 
context where, in Spring 2011, a great mass mobilization lead to the victory 
of the referendum against the privatization of water. The slogan ‘water is a 
common good’ is extraordinarily important and quite problematic. It is 
important because it indicates that the issue and the desire of the common 
have become hegemonic. But it is also problematic for a couple of reasons. 
On one hand, beneath the concept of common good there is a naturalistic 
idea of the common, an uncontaminated space outside subsumption and to 
be defended from the intrusion of capital. It is what we call a Polanyian idea 
of the commons. But – following Marx – what makes the common the 
common is not the so-called nature of it, but living labor and social struggles. 
There is no common outside production and relationships of power: water 
becomes common when social cooperation appropriates it. To be brief: the 
common does not exist in nature, but it is always instituted. On the other 
hand, following this naturalistic vision of the common good, or the commons 
(plural), it coincides with the public, that is to say, State management. Because 
we know that, in the modern capitalist era, the public is what is produced by 
everybody but belongs to nobody, that is to say, it belongs to the State. From 
this point of view, the case of water in Italy shows that its re-publicization 
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changes very little of concrete collective life, because public companies are 
completely inside corporate parameters, financialization processes and 
competition in the private market. Therefore, the challenge rising from social 
struggles is how to transform the mobilizations over the public into the 
organization of the common. This is the political point. 
Then, there is a second important question: what is the relationship 
between the communism of capital and the institutions of the common? 
Does the communism of capital mean the objective premise of its 
overcoming, the linear passage from the communism of capital to 
communism beyond capital? Is the full development of cognitive capitalism 
the key to going to the next stage? Again: this is not a metaphysical problem, 
but it is related to the choices of strategic political options. For example, in 
the Italian university movement there are some groups – in this case in 
implicit alliance with the liberal or neoliberal opinion makers – that try to 
convince Italian capitalists that investment in the so-called knowledge 
economy is in their interest; they do not understand that Italian capitalists do 
not invest because they know their interests very well, and their role in the 
hierarchies of the global market of cognitive capitalism! Therefore, to answer, 
we could paraphrase Lenin: the ‘proximity’ of such capitalism to communism 
should genuinely serve the living knowledge as an argument proving the 
proximity, facility, feasibility, and urgency of the common revolution, and not 
at all as an argument for tolerating the repudiation of such a revolution and 
the efforts to make capitalism look more attractive –something which all 
reformists are trying to do. 
So, the institutions of the common are not the opposite of capital’s 
command but its destruction: the destruction of the apparatuses of capture 
and blockage of social cooperation. It is not the affirmation of a new 
measure, but its radical negation. We have to defeat every neo-socialist 
temptation: reforming capital is impossible. Socialism cannot run again to 
save capital from its crisis: the failure of the European left is in this. Michael 
Hardt and Toni Negri are right: the one divides in two (2009: 290-296). The 
idea of transition in terms of historicist linearity is our enemy: the transition 
can only mean, exclusively, the hegemony of the common and the actuality of 
revolution. 
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4. Movements of the Common and Constituent Plan 
To conclude: rupture and constituent separation, this is the node. The 
process of collective re-appropriation of the wealth that is frozen in the 
dialectic between public and private means, in fact, the creation of new 
institutions. Also in this case, these are very concrete issues that are 
immediately translatable into keywords. This means that there is nothing to 
defend: the challenge of the movements of the common is immediately on a 
constituent plane, as social struggles clearly show. The occupation of squares 
(that contagiously bounces from Tahrir Square and Tunis’ Casbah to Puerta 
del Sol and Occupy Wall Street, going through Athens and arriving on 15th 
October) is not a simple protest, there are not demands to address to the 
government or visibility in the supposed public opinion: it indicates the 
immediate creation of a new space, an embryonic form of metropolitan 
production and organization of life in common. Squares and networks are 
not the public space dreamed up by Habermas, but they become common 
space: communication and decision are unified by the constituent potentia of 
the multitude. 
At the beginning of the text we sketched the convergence and 
differentiation of a downgraded middle class and a proletariat with no more 
illusions of ‘social redemption’ in the current system. The subjects of these 
struggles find almost only the function of control without material benefits in 
public welfare. The uprising in the Paris banlieues or the recent riots in 
England are not the jacquerie of the excluded people, but a revolt against the 
subaltern inclusion of the poor productive multitude. Between the 
downgraded middle class and the ‘no future’ proletariat, there could be 
frictions or latent fragmentation; but we cannot avoid this risk through a 
politics of alliances based on the exhausted mechanisms of representation. If 
there is a mass perception of capital as a purely parasitic block against the 
cooperative potentia of living knowledge, the political question is the 
construction of common composition, i.e. new institutions of the common in 
revolt. 
Between 2007 and 2008, when the UniNomade and edu-factory collectives 
were developing our analysis of the global economic crisis (Fumagalli and 
Mezzadra, 2010; edu-factory, 2010), we could not see the emergence of new 
cycles of struggles, or it is better to say, those new cycles were only 
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fragmented in character. Today we can say that – in the permanent crisis of 
capitalism – we have to question and re-think the idea of cycle from the point 
of view of struggles, too. They assume a new temporality: the struggles wait 
and attack the enemy where it is the weakest; they act contagiously and 
explode like bubbles. But these bubbles are not metaphysical events, they are 
full of flesh and blood of the organization processes of living 
labor/knowledge, i.e. they are full of the common. How is it possible to 
construct continuity and sedimentation in the ‘bubbles’, and can they be 
transformed into a constituent process? How can we avoid the double risk of 
accumulative determinism (the linear development of the processes without 
events) or, symmetrically, of the messianism of the Event, i.e. the 
metaphysical re-proposition of an idea of revolution disembodied from the 
historical determination of class composition and struggles? 
These are the urgent political questions. All in all, in the time when the 
desire of the common becomes majority in the struggles, we can reformulate 
the classical definition of the revolutionary situation: the ruling elites of the 
global capital cannot live as they did in the past; the workers, the precarious, 
the students, the poor, the productive multitude do not want to live like they 
did in the past. But we also know that a revolutionary situation does not lead 
to revolution in a mechanic movement, and that the ruling elites will not fall 
if we do not push them down. This is our task.  
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Free Labour Syndrome. Volunteer Work and 
Unpaid Overtime in the Creative and Cultural 
Sector 
Precarious Workers Brigade and Carrot Workers Collective 
 
Free labour has been finally confirmed as a widespread syndrome in the 
cultural sector. Its negative symptoms include, but are not limited to: the 
drive or compulsion to undertake unpaid internships and voluntary work 
placements; the tendency to work beyond ones’ physical and mental limits; 
the incapacity to resist unpaid overtime, as well as a generalised sense of 
frustration, isolation, worthlessness and insecurity. Early diagnosis is often 
made difficult by the positive sensations that accompany the desire to work 
for free: aspirations, hopes, promises, an ephemeral sense of belonging to a 
world of glamour and disinterested intellectual and artistic beauty. Subjects 
experiencing early symptoms of the free labour syndrome are often unable to 
identify the source of their anxiety due to their education and their rejection 
of empathic identification with workers in similar situations across other 
sectors. Some specialists have called this denial of subjects’ own material and 
immaterial needs, such as food, shelter and emotional support, the ‘labour of 
love’ – with reference, presumably, to the proverbial blindness that is 
associated with this feeling. 
Environmental factors determine the development of the syndrome in 
those who are culturally predisposed. Due to the withdrawal of public funds 
from both the education and the cultural system, unpaid internships are 
perceived and promoted as the only way into paid employment and/or 
meaningful occupations.  
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1. Views from the Floor 
The collective voice that authors this piece emerges from a constellation of 
groups that we are a part of. Hence we are variously implicated in the many 
histories of different groups that have been reinventing themselves at 
different points and with varying speeds. The ‘we’ (our group subject) began 
about five years ago, and it very much started as a space to think about 
changes going on within the cultural sector. We felt the need to link that with 
a critique of the creative industries in a way that would enable us to articulate 
in a self-reflective manner, an understanding of what cultural labour meant 
and what our political positions were. The collective process started by 
sharing testimonies of what our different practices were and meant, and we 
invited more people into the process that slowly coalesced around various 
activities, processes and occasions. Based in London, the first moves of our 
collective practices have been very much inspired by those who have worked 
on similar campaigns – e.g. Intermittents du spectacle and the White Masks in 
France; Serpica Naro in Italy, etc. The names we used for our collective 
processes have changed too at various moments, to match different 
modalities of thinking and acting together, different contexts of intervention, 
and varying numbers of people involved. As many other collectives, we 
realise that organising around labour legislation does not account for the 
desires that bring people to work for free. Akin to the question raised for 
women’s wages in the home, the issue of wages alone did not seem sufficient 
as a mobilising strategy. We came together to ask questions about the forms 
of life we want to inhabit, facing our own gestures of complicity and 
imagining possibilities of disobedience and refusal. 
To understand and mobilise around the expanding phenomenon of free 
labour in the creative and cultural sector, we started by asking ourselves – as 
current and ex-interns, and precarious workers in London’s art, culture and 
education fields – ‘to tell it like it really is’, and to collect testimonies and 
evidence from the floor. Since we started this process in the middle of the 
2000s, the context for the discussion of free labour has evolved. 
1) The paradigm of free labour has expanded well beyond the field of 
culture and the instances of internships that were the initial focus of our 
research. Free labour, in its various guises, appears as the condition of work 
within the late capitalist economy. In the early 2000s, the issue of free labour 
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was discussed mainly in relation to the ‘free’ production of content by users 
participating in online platforms (Terranova, 2000). Since then, the debate has 
expanded to include: 
 free labour across the entire service industry (increasingly linked to 
critiques of immaterial, feminised and precarious labour); 
 the rise of internships as a compulsory passage between formal education 
and the job market, transferring the cost of training from the sector and 
the education system to the individual; 
 a radical outsourcing of research and innovation by the corporate world, 
towards the academy, pushing the self-exploitation and risk-absorption of 
cognitive workers to a new threshold; 
 the becoming reality of brutal regimes of workfare that just a few years 
earlier were only a menacing cloud on the horizon. These regimes force 
the unemployed to work free of charge, often for mega-corporations and 
superstores. 
2) There has been a lot of quickly evolving terminology used to advertise and 
describe unpaid work in the cultural sector. When we began working 
together, we focussed on the figure of the intern. Yet, many organisations are 
now advertising their internship positions as ‘volunteer’ because various 
campaigns – including a recent union case won by BECTU1 and the National 
Union of Journalists’ victory in its Cash for Interns Campaign2 – proved that 
what some organisations have been calling ‘internships’ are legally defined as 
work. The National Minimum Wage legislation says that everyone working in 
the UK is entitled to at least a minimum rate set by the law3. An exemption 
from the legislation means the ‘voluntary workers’ are not entitled to the 
NMW 4. Yet, the category allows for many profit-making arts and cultural 
                                                
1 The UK’s media and entertainment trade union. 
2 See http://www.journalism.co.uk/news/nuj-chalks-up-first-victory-in-cashback-for-
interns-campaign/s2/a544128/. 
3 See http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Employment/Employees/TheNationalMinimumWage/ 
DG_10027201. 
4 Also from the above website: ‘Voluntary work: You’re classed as doing voluntary work if 
you can only get certain limited benefits (e.g. reasonable travel or lunch expenses) and 
you’re working for a: charity, voluntary organisation or associated fund-raising body, 
statutory body.’ 
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institutions, drawing on funding from the private sector and operating like 
businesses, to rely on these kinds of unpaid work. 
3) The ‘Creative Industries’ have lost centre stage both as governmental 
strategic framework and as social promise. Its critiques revealed that while 
populations are encouraged to become more creative, only a few are allowed 
to ‘cash in’ on cultural capital produced in common. The creative industries 
paradigm has to rely upon an intense community of exchange that fosters 
ideas and clusters of collaboration, to then single out and enclose the ‘best’ 
ones, or those fittest for marketisation. As argued by Andrew Ross (2003), 
competitive collaboration and exploitation mark the very way in which the 
creative industries work, rather than being a contradiction that is about to be 
resolved, or a systemic failure that could be dealt with through reforms. But 
the creative industries are not only the label of an economic policy; they also 
point to a set of strategies of governance that collide with the processes of 
increased scarcity: of jobs, services, rights, and wealth. The acquisition of soft 
skills and the flexible mind-set promoted through the figure of the creative 
global worker sugar-coats many of these scarcities by making them coincide 
superficially with social desires. 
Many of us have experienced choosing a career or a ‘study pathway’ when 
the framework of the ‘Creative Industries’ was still in full force. Within the 
UK, but also other areas of the European Union, the creative sector was 
being shaped through discourse and investment, and began to emerge as the 
desired future edge of the Old Continent’s economic strategy. No longer 
competitive in terms of cheap labour costs, countries like Great Britain began 
repackaging themselves as producers of everything new and cool. It is hard to 
say how much of New Labour’s discourse about creative education – 
‘everyone can be creative’ – has influenced the many teenagers and young 
adults who decided to train and work within the creative and cultural sectors 
in the 1990s and 2000s – for sure the numbers of students in the field have 
been soaring since then5. Projections however show that the service sector, 
not the cultural or creative sectors (the difference between those was never 
                                                
5  The number of students enrolled in creative arts and design courses went up from 87,170 
during the academic year 1996/97 (4.9% of total HE student population in the UK) to 
173,825 (6.9% of total) in 2009/10. Source: Higher Education Statistics Agency, 
http://www.hesa.ac.uk. 
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clear anyway), is expected to be the largest employer in the next two decades. 
‘Austerity’ has replaced ‘creativity’ as the political catchphrase of the moment, 
accompanying the driving down of real wages. That brief parenthesis during 
which it was plausible to imagine the artist as being the new successful and 
affluent entrepreneur has now closed. The currently multiplying creative 
quarters, showcase festivals and start-up hubs clearly show themselves to be a 
mix of corporate social responsibility projects, big-politics opportunism and 
exploitation of precarious work – and have nothing to do with people making 
a decent and self-determined living via culture. The current situation has us 
confronting a bundle of desires that are no longer being addressed, not even 
nominally, by policymaking – how to evade the humiliation of the 
relationships at work, how to positively contribute to society with one’s job, 
how to carve out our own spaces?  
There is of course no reason to be nostalgic. Yet, to describe what has 
changed we must pass through what has been ‘a shattering of hope’ (Beuret, 
2011). Indeed, as we carried a large 10ft long papier-mâché carrot to 
parliament at one of the student demonstrations, a young student came up to 
us and said – ‘but there are no carrots any more’. And it is indeed refreshing 
to see how this shift has registered as a sharp political awareness with the 
young people that we work with. 
2. The Carrot 
One of the symbols we adopted for this research upon our condition is that 
of the carrot. One of our collective names includes it too: Carrot Workers 
Collective. But what is the carrot? The carrot is an ambivalent image that 
represents both a false promise and a genuine desire that are prevalent in free 
labour. It marks the subtle but important shift that occurs in going from 
‘working for a very bad salary’ to ‘working for free’ (or for symbolic or in-
kind reimbursements), as the economy of the exchange becomes completely 
based on social capital. The carrot symbolises the promise of paid work, 
meaningful experience, success and stability that in the cultural and creative 
sectors, more often than not, is never actually kept. The carrot signifies the 
hope that we might organise our work around ‘creativity’ rather than 
drudgery; an aspiration that is used to prompt, cajole and sometimes 
blackmail workers into long-term and recurring periods of free and precarious 
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labour. The carrot becomes a disciplinary device that taps into our aspiration 
to live and produce creatively, to manage our own time, to be social, in order 
to string us along. The carrot, in short, is the compound of promises and 
hopes that mobilise subjective and collective becomings when they are put to 
work as a tool of governance and production of surplus value. To examine 
how it operates as a device is compelling, because it forces us to scrutinise the 
ways in which our own desires are traversed by the forces we want to combat. 
To do so however, is not to engage in an exercise of self-blame; nor does it 
mean ending our critique with a cynical posture that laments that everything 
can and will be recuperated. On the contrary: it demands that we seek 
collective solutions to the conditions of life and work that we share to begin 
with, but that we often confront in isolation. 
Following from this, the carrot has also become an image that we use 
during a variety of actions. We have been dangling carrots from sticks during 
demonstrations, we have ‘returned’ giant papier-mâché carrots to various 
institutions that promote aspirational narratives while withdrawing social 
support; and we have been using carrots as props to begin conversations with 
strangers. The withdrawal of satisfaction and stability that runs as a constant 
across all the various positions of precarity implicated in cycles of cultural 
production is made tangible through the symbol of the carrot. 
Despite career advisors’ claims to the contrary, for many young people 
there is no linear progression, no process in which the subject smoothly 
moves along from studentship, to internship, to precarious and finally, full 
employment. Within the cultural and creative sectors, a condition of constant 
oscillation is perpetuated; a process that bears some resemblance to the mode 
of governance of migrant labour. The mainstream discourses on migrant 
labour often attempt to split this population between good, hardworking, 
legal migrants and the bad, criminalized, illegal ones. In fact, these two figures 
are often the same person, someone who enters the country illegally, engages 
in illegal labour for a period until she finds a regular employment contract 
that allows her to obtain a temporary visa, only to go back to illegality and 
cash in hand work agreements when such a contract expires (Mezzadra, 
2006). It is not a straightforward progression, but a state of permanent 
oscillation between precarious roles that creates an infinite pool of cheap and 
free labour. 
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Similarly, the high degree of precariousness in the cultural and creative 
sectors creates a reserve pool constantly threatening to expel the worker from 
her network of socialization that revolves around ‘the scene’ (Gielen, 2009). 
In this case, the career is not a progression, but a constant oscillation between 
gigs one does for money, more stable contracts, and unpaid projects one does 
out of passion or necessity for visibility. In what follows we will look at a few 
of these positions or moments within the cycle of free labour in the cultural 
sector. We have been thinking about each position not according to a 
psychological profile, but to the contrary, in an attempt to de-psychologise 
the sense of self in order to personalise the sense of power, by emphasizing 
the dispositives that determine the emergence of certain dispositions.  
3. The Intern 
The figure of the intern appears paradigmatic as it negotiates the collapse of 
the boundaries between Education, Work and Life. Whilst remaining a very 
specific example of a worker, the intern has come to expose the broader 
economic tendency of free labour conditions and precarity beyond the 
cultural sector, in which the carrot and the stick increasingly regulate our 
present: from student loans, ‘personal development’ pathways, to the things 
we tell ourselves to get through the day. 
The internship in itself embodies a certain reversal that is at work within 
the cultural and artistic sectors, the creative industries, and more broadly in a 
number of professions where labour of passion comes about through a desire 
to be emancipated from the drudgery of labour itself. Furthermore, the 
cultural sector is often considered to be the paradigmatic model of 
organisation for all labour (Virno, 2004). Interns have become the norm, but 
also a structural necessity, de facto masking the collapse of the cultural sector, 
hiding the exodus of public resources from these activities and thus 
preventing the general public from perceiving the unsustainability of the 
situation. For instance, according to a survey conducted by the National 
Union of Journalists (NUJ), 25% of interns claimed to work for media 
organisations that would not be able to function without interns (National 
Union of Journalists, 2008: 3). Another survey published by the Arts Council 
in 2006 exposed that there are two unpaid workers and one freelancer for 
every three regular employees in the visual arts sector. In this landscape, 
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interns offer both a solution and a threat. They fill in the ever-widening gaps 
between ambitions and cash, but they also legitimise the exploitative nature of 
cultural work – reminding those who are employed in the sector that there is 
always someone ready to do your job for free (if they can afford to). 
Furthermore, internships function as an access filter to professions 
perceived as desirable, a regulatory valve that replicates the most classic lines 
of class division. According to the same NUJ survey, on average interns are 
undertaking work placements in at least three different organisations; one in 
five for three months or more, with some working for more than six months 
unpaid (National Union of Journalists, 2008: 3). In order to be able to work 
for six months for free, the intern/volunteer needs to have the economic 
possibility of doing so. Increasingly, the internship is reiterated and repeated 
not to satisfy a desire for further training, but to postpone the moment of 
unemployment and eviction from ‘the scene’. The affiliation with cultural 
institutions, even when not remunerated, allows for the carrot to be 
preserved. 
As part of our engagement with the question of internships, we began to 
hold a series of regular meetings where people would gather to study 
together, discuss and share personal anecdotes. We held a few public events 
where participants could choose to give testimony while wearing donkey 
masks, so as to protect their privacy (the donkey of course being also an 
ambiguous symbol of self exploitation and complacency). We also carried out 
some photo-romance workshops, where participants could construct a 
common story out of their various personal experiences. 
Another action involved the staging of a ‘Creative Job Fair’ for the cultural 
sector. In the UK many such recruitment fairs exist, targeting recent 
graduates but mostly offering unpaid or precarious positions. At our fair, 
instead of the usual corporate desks, participants found peers offering legal 
advice, future mapping, tarot card reading, debt forgiveness, competitions for 
the fastest envelope-stuffer and recommendation letters. We found that the 
presence of stands dedicated to the various aspects of free labour was an 
effective dispositive as it allowed for long face-to-face encounters and 
discussion to take place. 
Out of these various initiatives, two main situations emerged as the most 
common negative experiences. In the first scenario, the intern is deployed by 
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the organisation to carry out mundane tasks that require very little skills: 
invigilating an exhibition space or an event; stuffing envelops and attaching 
stamps to correspondence; making coffee and reorganising archives are 
typical examples. The second kind of experience leans toward the opposite 
pole. Here, interns are given great responsibilities, such as project managing 
entire events or programmes, or carrying out research for the organisation; 
writing texts and making contact with stakeholders. The issue here is that 
often the intern is not credited for her contribution, and/or ends up handling 
responsibilities that match those of a highly skilled employee. 
4. The Student 
The figure of the student has become politically charged once again. Surely, 
most of the student protests and actions (beginning in 2009) stemmed from 
the announced cuts to the education sector and a three-fold increase in 
university fees in England. However, this situation also renewed the 
continuity and overlap between the positions of the intern, the student and 
the worker. Many students alternate periods of work in low paid jobs in the 
service sector with voluntary placements within the field of study. Summer 
internships are seen as the only way to boost one’s CV. Career services in 
many universities actively encourage students to spend their summers doing 
internships or working for free. Graduate recruitment fairs hosted on many 
campuses are full of stands advertising unpaid positions. However, often no 
critique of this model is offered to students as part of their educational 
experience – why it appears to have to be this way and how the system has 
changed radically over the last ten years. 
The school and the university, rather than protecting their students take 
up the role of gatekeepers for accessing job placements and brokers of talent 
for major corporate interests that, in turn, can offer donations and lend brand 
credibility to the expensive courses on offer. The experience of free labour, 
narrated as job placements, is often written into the curriculum of very 
expensive graduate and postgraduate courses. Many postgraduate courses 
showcase their corporate internship partners on their advertising materials, as 
it is a selling point to entice potential customers. Increasingly, a job appears as 
something you buy, and the monopoly seems to be in the hands of education 
providers. 
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On the other hand, post-graduate and research students also work as 
teachers within their universities. Low-paid teaching positions are often what 
supports workers in the creative professions through periods of unpaid 
labour with other cultural institutions. However, here again the situation 
indicates a spiralling dynamic: PhD students cost less than accredited 
professionals. Graduates are told repeatedly that they don’t have enough 
experience. While this notion of experience, one of the most complex 
philosophical notions to date, is never fully explained, an artificial scarcity of 
it has been created. Implicitly, experiences are also arranged into hierarchies: 
the willingness to work extra hours for no compensation, for instance, is 
translated as ‘commitment’, and has a higher currency than being engaged in, 
say, community gardening. 
During the recent season of protests against the cuts to (among other 
issues) higher education in the UK (2008-2011), we mobilised as students, 
teachers and cultural workers. We became involved in moments of 
demonstration, occupation and direct action working together with other 
groups and collectives in a mood of joyful rage. Among other things, we 
created a Protest Lab where people could meet to design banners, props and 
slogans together prior to the various demonstrations. A series of placards 
used the sign of equivalence (=) to debunk myths around cultural labour, 
aspiration and education. The signs, cut out in the form of speech bubbles, 
said for instance ‘the big society = you are on your own’; ‘education? = 
£40,000 + of debt’; ‘internship? = infinite free labour’. Some of the signs 
were left blank and could be completed by others during the demo. 
We also made a fake edition of the Evening Standard, a popular free London 
evening newspaper. Our version, renamed The Evening Substandard, comprised 
only a back and a front cover, so that it could be conveniently wrapped 
around existing newspapers. The front page was covered with utopian good 
news about increased social benefits and expanded opportunities for 
education, a very simple way to show alternatives and debunk the inevitability 
of the cuts. The newspaper was a way to engage with others, as we started to 
become more and more concerned about what happens at the margins of a 
demonstration. The slogans that most people chant going through the streets 
are often inaudible to those on the edges, and it gave us an opportunity to 
talk to them. The Evening Substandard was also an effective prop because when 
opened up, it created a kind of a space for interventions. Obviously, we do 
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not fetishize the paper as an object, but the experience of producing, 
circulating and using it made us more aware of the ways in which creative 
skills can contribute to the movement. 
5. The Cultural / Creative Worker 
We are told that the creative worker has become a symbolic economic figure, 
driving growth, setting lifestyle trends and reshaping urban environments. 
This does not only come from a post-autonomous form of analysis, but also 
from the discourses of management: ‘The way artistic labour is organised 
makes artists arguably a prototype not just for work organisation, but for 
innovation in the rest of the economy’, reads the report of the governmental 
consultancy NESTA (2008). The ‘self-actualising’ and infinitely flexible (and 
exploitable) ‘creative’ work becomes the ideal towards which all work should 
strive, serving as an example and encouraging a series of expectations around 
non-waged labour that infiltrate the entirety of productive and social relations 
(Carrot Workers’ Collective, 2011). 
In the 1990s, a phenomenon emerged in which, when presented with the 
ever-banal chat up line ‘what do you do for a living?’ people working across a 
number of creative areas responded: ‘do you mean my real work, or what I do 
for money?’ This distinction tells us something about the contingency of free 
labour or ‘unreal’ wage labour. Three out of five cultural workers have a job 
outside the cultural field that actually supports their work (Arts Council 
England, 2010). In this perceived unreality of a second job there is an 
evacuation of all aspiration and identification, making this group more easily 
exploitable. 
The day-to-day work within cultural production is often made possible 
through the enforced dedication of the workers in the field. Most of this 
work is not creative at all, but it has to do with administrative tasks 
(increasingly demanding, as the funding bodies require higher levels of 
bureaucracy than in the past), endless grant applications, or technical 
executions of projects conceived by others. Cultural workers are often split 
between the necessity of using free labour (their own and that of others) and 
the awareness that free labour is worsening their own conditions (being 
replaced by an intern or someone who can work more hours). 
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Often, cultural workers do not perceive themselves as workers and do not 
talk about what they do as work but as ‘practice’. This lends currency to a 
widespread perception that work in culture is a middle class occupation. 
However, this assumption, still popular within many left wing circles, is 
problematic for a number of reasons. First, the very idea that creative 
professions should be a remit of the middle and upper classes should be 
challenged, and doing so requires a redefinition of what counts as culture, as 
well as a realisation that the sector excludes those with fewer resources. 
Second, since the hype around the Creative Industries in the 1990s, the idea 
of a career in culture has become a much more widespread aspiration. Third, 
if we understand class in terms of income, recent reports have shown that 
cultural workers earn as an average 60% less than the national median of all 
UK employees, and 75% of them don’t have a pension (Arts Council 
England, 2010). 
To make matters worse, the UK’s new coalition government’s 
introduction of the notion of ‘The Big Society’ after the recent elections in 
2010, which is an ideologically-driven (mis-)appropriation of cooperative 
working/living and alternative economies, and its plans to impose regimes of 
forced labour on the unemployed disguised under the slippery title of 
‘workfare’, are symptomatic of an even stronger emphasis on the necessity of 
labour as indicative of personal wealth, placing great value in overworked 
bodies, self-investment and hyper-responsibility. While the state appears to 
hand back its power to the public, state funding is being violently withdrawn 
and masked by new troops of unpaid volunteers in the guise of self-
disciplined, socially responsible and committed individuals and communities. 
Another set of questions for us concerned our relationships with 
institutions of various kinds. This includes cultural institutions, and refers to 
the portion of institutional support we may receive for our practices – 
support that comes from public spending, and is thus directly caught up with 
politics with a capital P; but it also includes the educational institutions that 
may host us or employ us; and also perhaps some kind of institutionalised 
modality of being ‘critical’. Our line of inquiry has led us to become more 
aware of the implicit demands and expectations that come with these settings, 
and what might be our points of leverage. 
In 2010, we received an invitation by one of the art institutions in London 
to do a short residency as part of a seasonal programme that promised to 
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showcase political and critical artistic projects. In an attempt to answer the 
question of how to inhabit a cultural institution in a radical manner and in 
solidarity with broader social issues, we decided to open up this invitation. A 
call out to others critically involved in the cultural sector in London included 
a series of questions related to the role of institutions and the ways other 
practitioners thought about their involvement. It was very much an attempt 
to animate and bring together the cultural scene in turmoil because of the 
announced cuts and reforms. Would other creative workers take the risk to 
form an alliance? 
A series of meetings and processes that involved more than 60 people at 
times followed our call. Other responses were articulated in the familiar tone: 
‘I would not go near this kind of mainstream cultural institution’, usually 
from those that rarely get involved in any kind of practice that does not 
involve writing. The initial group that later came to operate under the name 
of Precarious Workers Brigade, came together under this pragmatic premise 
of wanting to do something meaningful with the (little) money, space and 
time offered by this cultural institution. Soon enough, this invitation became 
to be perceived as a pretext. The much more urgent questions that drove the 
process included: is there enough will and capacity right now to building a 
broad and strong movement of cultural workers that intersects with other 
new and emerging groups in the city? Is it possible to connect the struggles of 
cultural workers beyond the so-called creative class to build solidarity with 
other workers and to organise around the more systemic issues that we all 
face? How can we develop sustainable ways of organising that take into 
account the overworked, transient, underfunded and precarious nature of 
many of our lives? 
The process started in August 2010 as a series of facilitated discussions 
and rounds of introductions, mapping out the concerns and desires people 
were bringing to the table, and what they thought should happen next. It was 
quite interesting to notice how there was never an issue about 
accommodating one desire over another, as one may expect working with 
very diverse groups. Finally, we ended up with a series of subgroups that 
would develop specific interests, but there was a real moment when anything 
that had enough support would be collectively sustained towards realisation. 
Hence the original invitation worked out to be simply an excuse, a carrot, to 
create an energy that then went in another direction and proliferated in a way 
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that we couldn’t have expected beforehand. On this occasion, somehow we 
were able to claim back this investment, this cultural capital handed to us by 
the institution, and use it for other purposes. The project became an 
opportunity to renegotiate how we generate value and self-value, which in a 
place like London, where sociality is very fast and very atomised, is a pressing 
problem. 
While the group was deliberating proposals for what could be done next (a 
seminar, debates about the discourses of the Big Society and its relation to 
culture, making objects and carrying out performances) the cultural institution 
that offered to host us put on the brakes. Two weeks before the event was 
scheduled, they called and asked us to postpone to a later moment. As this 
was happening in November 2010, rescheduling would have severed our 
project from the context of on-going protest that created a necessity for it in 
the first place. In a way this was the best that could happen – we realised that 
we wanted to go ahead anyway and that the cultural value of the institution 
did not matter to us. 
The project evolved into the People’s Tribunal on Precarity6. Its form 
allowed us to map the systemic nature of our concerns regarding our working 
practices of our own and that of the institutions we work with, share 
testimonies and gather evidence, as well as identify culprits. Our success came 
in the form of a coherent, collective analysis. An experiment with tools of 
collective research became a platform for addressing institutional and 
personal collusion within the free labour paradigm and opened a space to 
think possible remedies and recommendations.  
Closing Remarks 
Many groups of militant researchers are reticent about sharing what they 
actually do as their practice. There are strong theoretical reasons for this 
approach that stem out of mistrust for universalising methods, which we also 
share. At the same time, we find that there are other pedagogical reasons that 
call for the sharing of anecdotes and precedents, also in written form. This is 
not a matter of compiling DIY books with recipes to follow or ‘best 
                                                
6 See http://precariousworkersbrigade.tumblr.com/post/3999720634/precarity-the-
peoples-tribunal. 
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practices’, but it has to do with what we could call ‘engagement tools’ that is, 
the more visible, perceptible components of a practice. This line of 
questioning involves not taking for granted the practicalities and materialities 
involved in organising direct actions or co-investigations, hosting events or 
making time based performances. We became interested in tools as 
something you can touch, feel, break; objects that we might make as we make 
ourselves into a group. While we want to avoid producing a trademark 
approach or a methodology, we do cultivate a set of questions to do with the 
very nature and modality of the ‘we’, the collective, the notion of a having a 
collective ‘practice’: what is an exteriority and an interiority of an open group 
practice? how we sustain ourselves? how can we maintain a group ecology? 
how do we relate to each other across the different group experiences that 
keep proliferating? Within our group process we share a very intimate space 
of friendship. It is the collaboration with each other that holds this space 
together. 
Of course, this is positive because it would be unlikely that any of us 
would be willing to be in this intensive collective process without getting an 
affective return, having a sense of intimacy with each other, a shared history 
as well as a reciprocal learning process. On the other hand, this leads to 
questions about the way a group is held together. In a situation like ours, 
where we operate through such strong affective ties, the danger is that it also 
becomes very demanding, so that the core group has shrunk at different 
moments. We have been thinking about the advantages and disadvantages of 
this modality, what does it mean for us as a group not to be adopting the very 
strict protocols of meetings that you may find in plenary assemblies for 
instance. Of course, we do have a minimum set of procedures for keeping the 
group and the process open and accountable, we do take notes and make 
agendas. However, there is a dimension of familiarity and quotidian 
informality among some of us that may become difficult for people to fully 
come into and inhabit the group process. But then again, some other people 
who become involved really loved this intimacy and the idea of becoming 
part of a collective process that offers more then a dry ‘contractual 
institution’ (Wills, 2011). 
What does it mean to practice, to practice collectively, is a question we are 
keen to reclaim back from the predicament of free labour.  
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Art strikes and the metropolitan factory 
Stevphen Shukaitis 
 
The unrest of change, assuming theatrical form as a spectacle, transforms the 
city into a penultimate opportune occasion for mastering unrest itself… The 
impermanence of the city affirms the active capacity of the collective to be 
self-fashioning and, simultaneously, its anomic recognition of the perishable 
character of all that comes to be, showing in this way the limits of a finitude 
which is typically celebrated for its works and achievements, while being 
denigrated for its failure to master creation itself. 
Alan Blum (2003: 232-233) 
Gazing down upon the city, looking at the development of the metropolis, 
one is struck by many things. Perhaps one the more obvious, regardless of 
what one thinks of the process that led to its development, is that it’s often 
rather ugly. Not just in the way it looks (jungles of concrete and steel), but 
even more so in what it does: how the city operates as a factory, isolating 
people from each other, channeling social relations into prescribed routes and 
preventing other from forming, transforming our relationship with nature, 
and so on. David Harvey, the renowned Marxist geographer, responded to 
this observation with the comment that it was ‘really quite a strange thing that 
the bourgeois has no imagination’, no sense of creativity that can devise 
anything more appealing in its domination and transformation of the social 
space and the urban environment. This may seem a minor point or trite 
observation. What does it matter how aesthetically appealing, how well 
designed or not, an area is, when there are more crucial questions and 
ongoing issues of communities being displaced, workers being exploited, and 
the nature of social life being shaped by the needs of capital? This is true 
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enough to a degree. But what is interesting about such an observation is the 
process it hints at and what this can tell us about the development of 
capitalism today and our struggles to shape social life and interactions 
otherwise. 
Whether or not the bourgeoisie has any creativity is debatable (Marx 
himself marveled at the inventiveness of the ruling class in transforming 
social reality, albeit usually for the worse), this is not so important, precisely 
because it is so skilled at stealing the imagination and creativity of others. And 
this is precisely what the history of the transformations of the city and society 
more generally show us. Social and political movements, new artistic 
developments and quarters, as soon as they arise (or even before they arise 
sometimes) are seized upon by real estate developers, urban planners, and 
policy makers, to create the image of a new ‘hip’ district that will boost real 
estate prices, attract ‘more desirable’ residents, and so forth, in a virtuous 
spiral of capitalist development. This process of gentrification led by or 
inadvertently spurred by developments in artistic and social creativity, is an 
old one. When Albert Parry wrote his history of Bohemia in the US (1960) he 
paid close attention to the relation between artists and the rise of the real 
estate market in the 60s and 70s. But in Parry’s case the decades in question 
were the 1860s and 70s rather than the rise of loft living, to borrow Sharon 
Zukin’s description of the reshaping of lower Manhattan during the 1960s 
and 70s (1989). The point of raising this is not to sulk over this process or 
mourn that so much creative energy fermented by often-antagonistic social 
movements gets turned into mechanisms for further accumulation. Rather 
the question is making sense out of it, and making sense in a way that further 
clarifies this process for political and social organizing. 
In recent years there has emerged within radical theory and organizing 
coming out of Europe, Italy and France specifically, a focus on the 
metropolis as both a space of capitalist production and resistance to it. This is 
based on an argument developed over many years within autonomous social 
movements that we live in the social factory, that exploitation does not just 
occur within the bounded workplace but increasingly comes to involve all 
forms of social interactions that are brought into the labor process. In the 
social factory our abilities to communicate, to relate, to create and imagine, all 
are put to work, sometimes through digital networks and communications, or 
through their utilization as part of a redevelopment or revitalization of an 
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area based on the image of being a creative locale. Given this argument it 
becomes possible to look at the rise of the discourse of the creative city and 
the creative class, most popularly associated with its development by Richard 
Florida, and then seized upon by large numbers of urban planners and 
developers. The rise of the idea of the creative class is not just a theorization 
of the changing nature of economic production and social structure, it is, or 
at very least, has become a managerial tool and justification for a restructuring 
of the city space as a factory space. 
But to read Florida’s arguments, such as in The Rise of the Creative Class 
(2002) or Cities and the Creative Class (2005), is to encounter a very strange 
managerial tool. It is quite strange in that while on face value his work seems 
to describe empirical phenomena, namely the development of an increase in 
prominence of forms of labor that are primarily premised on creating new 
ideas and forms rather than physical labor, whether that is actually the case or 
not is not the main issue. The creative class is not a homogenous or unified 
whole but is itself, even in Florida’s description, marked by an uneven 
development of the forms of creative labor engaged in (for instance in 
distinguishing between a ‘super creative’ core of science, arts, and media 
workers from the ‘creative professionals’ and knowledge workers who keep 
the necessary organizational structures running). It is not then that they 
necessarily describe an empirical reality or condition, the existence of the 
creative city, but rather as a form of mythological social technology of 
governance: to bring it into being by declaring its existence. In other words, 
the question is not whether the creative class exists as such, but rather what 
effects are created through how it is described and called into being through 
forms of governance and social action based upon these claims. Planning and 
shaping the city based around a certain conceptualization of the creative 
potentiality of labor, or the potentiality of creativity put to work, is not an 
unprecedented or unique development, but rather is the latest example of 
capital’s attempt to continually valorize itself through recuperating the 
energies of organizing against it.  
The argument that all of society and social relations are being brought into 
economic production leaves out a crucial question, namely what are the 
particular means and technologies through which social relations are made 
productive. How are aspects of social life outside the recognized workplace 
brought into the labor process? What are the technologies of capture that 
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render the metropolis productive? This is precisely what the creative class is, a 
social position that formalizes the process of drawing from the collective 
wealth and creativity of the metropolis, and turns it into a mechanism for 
further capitalist development. It is what Zukin describes as the advent of an 
‘artistic mode of production’ where mixed residency and industrial space 
usage is accompanied by the intermingling as art through life, and work all 
throughout life. In the industrial factory it was generally very easy to clearly 
distinguish between those who planned and managed the labor process and 
those who were involved in its executions, between the managed and the 
managers, the owners, professionals, and subordinate labor workers who 
were of interest only for their ability to work and not their ideas. But in 
today’s post-industrial service economy these distinctions become 
increasingly hard to make. The passionate and self-motivated labor of the 
artisan increasingly becomes the model for a self-disciplining, self-managed 
form of labor force that works harder, longer, and often for less pay precisely 
because of its attachment to some degree of personal fulfillment in forms of 
work engaged in (or a ‘psychic wage’ as Marc Bousquet [2008] refers to it). 
To use the language developed by autonomist movements, what we see in 
the rise of the creative class both as empirical description and as discourse for 
the management and shaping of the city, is a shifting of class composition. 
Class composition is made of two characteristics: technical composition, or 
the mechanisms and arrangements capital uses for its continued 
reproduction; and political composition, or the ability of ongoing struggles 
and movements to assert their own needs, desires, and shape the conditions 
of the existing economic and political reality. The rise of the creative class is 
formed by a convergence of a set of dynamics including demands put forth 
by workers for more fulfilling kinds of humane and engaging labor rather 
than repetitive meaningless tasks. The rejection of the factory line and factory 
discipline that emerged during the late 1960s was met during the 1970s by 
managerial attempts to create jobs that were more fully engaging for the 
worker, but in doing so also more fully exploited the laboring capacity of the 
worker. Similarly, campaigns of community organizing and neighborhood 
renewal undertaken by social movements around the same time (such as in 
the lower east side of New York) were then used by financially backed real 
estate speculation to kick start a renewed process of capital accumulation 
based on land values. The point of identifying and analyzing these relations of 
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social contestation and capitalism is not to lament them, but rather, when one 
thinks about them compositionally, which is to say looking at the relation 
between contestation and accumulation, understanding how the city 
functions as an expanded factory space broadens the terrain for disrupting 
capitalist domination of social life. 
What this comes down to is the realization that capital depends on a 
certain kind of glide for its continued development. Capital is not real, it has 
no body and certainly no imagination – it can create nothing on its own. 
Rather what capital increasingly relies on today is the movement of ideas and 
creativity through networks of social relations, cooperation, and 
communication that are already in existence. What capital needs is a process 
through which this dispersed creativity already in circulation can be harvested 
and put to work in the renewed production of surplus value. The bourgeoisie 
then exists not in the form of the factory owner, the one who owns the 
means of production, but rather the figure that renders the diffuse 
productivity of the metropolitan factory into forms that can be exploited. 
Capital is reproduced through profit making that has become rent: by 
attempting to restrict access to this social creativity rather than through its 
ownership. The creative class and its dispersal through the rise of the creative 
city/cluster is the process through which the siphoning off of social 
imagination is managed, the way that the pleasure of being in common 
becomes the labor of living together.  
Understanding how capital attempts to turn its glide through social space 
into capturing profits does not mean that there are no options left for 
interrupting and breaking these circuits of accumulation. If anything the 
number of points where capitalism is open to disruption have multiplied 
exponentially. In so far as we are engaged in the labor of circulation and 
imagination necessary to keep a parasitic economy alive, we are also located 
precisely at the point where it is possible to refuse to continue to do so. The 
subversive potentiality of any creative art or artistic production then is not 
simply its expressed political content, but rather the potentiality it creates for 
interrupting the circuits of capitalist production that it is always already 
enmeshed in. In the metropolitan factory the cultural worker who thinks that 
she is autonomous simply because there is no foreman barking orders is just 
as capable of having her passionate labor co-opted, perhaps all the more 
deeply in so far as the labor discipline is self-imposed and thus made partially 
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imperceptible. Through understanding the social technologies of rendering 
the city as a unified social fabric of production it becomes possible to develop 
further strategies of refusal and resistance that finds avenues for creative 
sabotage and disruption all throughout the city. 
Reconsidering the Art Strike 
The art of the future is not connoisseurship, but labor itself transfigured. 
Nikolai Tarabukin (Quoted in Kuric 2010: 242) 
What then, is to be done, when it seems that there is nothing to be done? 
That is, how is it possible to recompose strategies for social movement and 
subversion within the space of a metropolitan factory that has found ways to 
turn the practices of antagonistic cultural production into levers of further 
accumulation of capital? Perhaps then the question becomes less one of what 
is to be done and more of what is to be undone, or action through 
antagonistic not doing: in short, to reconsider the notion of the strike for 
cultural labor. 
Everyone is an artist. This would seem a simple enough place to begin; with a 
statement connecting directly to Joseph Beuys, and more generally to the 
historic avant-garde’s aesthetic politics aiming to break down barriers 
between artistic production and everyday life. It invokes an artistic politics 
that runs through Dada to the Situationists, and meanders and dérives 
through various rivulets in the history of radical politics and social movement 
organizing. But let’s pause for a second. While seemingly simple, there is 
much more to this one statement than presents itself. It is a statement that 
contains within it two notions of time and the potentials of artistic and 
cultural production, albeit notions that are often conflated, mixed, or 
confused. By teasing out these two notions and creatively recombining them, 
perhaps there might be something to be gained in rethinking the antagonistic 
and movement-building potential of cultural production: to reconsider its 
compositional potential. 
The first notion alludes to a kind of potentiality present but unrealized 
through artistic work; the creativity that everyone could exercise if they 
realized and developed potentials that have been held back and stunted by 
capital and unrealistic conceptions of artistic production through mystified 
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notions of creative genius. Let’s call this the ‘not-yet’ potential of everyone 
becoming an artist through the horizontal sublation of art into daily life. The 
second understanding of the phrase forms around the argument that 
everyone already is an artist and embodies creative action and production 
within their life and being. Duchamp’s notion of the readymade gestures 
towards this as he proclaims art as the recombination of previously existing 
forms. The painter creates by recombining the pre-given readymades of 
paints and canvas; the baker creates by recombining the readymade elements 
of flour, yeast, etc. In other words, it is not that everyone will become an 
artist, but that everyone already is immersed in myriad forms of creative 
production, or artistic production, given a more general notion of art. 
These two notions, how they collide and overlap, move towards an 
important focal point: if there has been an end of the avant-garde it is not its 
death but rather a monstrous multiplication and expansion of artistic 
production in zombified forms. The avant-garde has not died, the creativity 
contained within the future oriented potential of the becoming-artistic has lapsed 
precisely because it has perversely been realized in existing forms of diffuse 
cultural production. ‘Everyone is an artist’ as a utopian possibility is realized 
just as ‘everyone is a worker’. This condition has reached a new degree of 
concentration and intensity within the basins of cultural production; the post-
Fordist participation-based economy where the multitudes are sent to work in 
the metropolitan factory, recombining ideas and images through social 
networks and technologically mediated forms of communication. We don’t 
often think of all these activities as either work or art. Consequently it 
becomes difficult to think through the politics of labor around them, whether 
as artistic labor or just labor itself. 
The notion of the Art Strike, its reconsideration and socialization within 
the post-Fordist economy, becomes more interesting and productive (or 
perhaps anti-productive) precisely as labor changes articulation in relation to 
the current composition of artistic and cultural work. The Art Strike starts 
with Art Workers Coalition and Gustav Metzger and their calls to withdraw 
their labor. First the AWC called for a strike in 1969 to protest the 
involvement of museum board members and trustees in war related 
industries, as explored brilliantly by Julia Bryan-Wilson (2009). Gustav 
Metzger then called for a strike of a minimum of three years, from 1977-
1980, although he notes that almost no one noticed (which perhaps is not so 
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surprising when you go on strike by yourself). Metzger and the AWC’s 
formulation of the Art Strike was directed against the problems of the gallery 
system. This conception was picked up by Stewart Home and various others 
within the Neoist milieu who called upon artists to cease artistic work entirely 
for the years 1990-1993. In this version, the strike moves beyond a focus on 
the gallery system to a more general consideration of artistic production and a 
questioning of the role of the artist. In the most recent and presently 
emerging iteration, Redas Dirzys and a Temporary Art Strike Committee have 
been calling for an Art Strike currently as a response to Vilnius, the capital of 
Lithuania, becoming a European Capital of Culture for 2009. The designation 
of a city as a capital of culture is part of a process of metropolitan branding 
and a strategy of capitalist valorization through the circulation of cultural and 
artistic heritage. (In Vilnius this has played out through figures like Jonas 
Mekas, George Maciunas, the legacy of Fluxus, and the Uzupis arts district.) 
In Vilnius we see the broadening of the Art Strike from a focus on the gallery 
system to artistic production more generally, and finally to the ways in which 
artistic and cultural production are infused throughout daily life and 
embedded within the production of the metropolis. 
The Art Strike emerges as a nodal point for finding ways to work critically 
between the two compositional modes contained within the statement 
‘everyone is an artist’. An autonomist politics focuses on class composition, 
or the relation between the technical arrangement of economic production 
and the political composition activated by forms of social insurgency and 
resistance. Capital evolves by turning emerging political compositions into 
technical compositions of surplus value production. Similarly, the aesthetic 
politics of the avant-garde find the political compositions they animate turned 
into new forms of value production and circulation. The Art Strike becomes a 
tactic for working between the utopian not-yet promise of unleashed 
creativity and the always-already but compromised forms of artistic labor 
we’re enmeshed in. In the space between forms of creative recombination 
currently in motion, and the potential of what could be if they were not 
continually rendered into forms more palatable to capitalist production, 
something new emerges. To re-propose an Art Strike at this juncture, when 
artistic labor is both everywhere and nowhere, is to force that issue. It 
becomes not a concern of solely the one who identifies (or is identified) as 
the artist, but a method to withdraw the labor of imagination and 
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recombination involved in what we’re already doing to hint towards the 
potential of what we could be doing. 
Bob Black, in his critique of the Art Strike (1992), argues that far from 
going on a strike by withdrawing forms of artistic labor, the Art Strike formed 
as the ultimate realization of art, where even the act of not making art 
becomes part of an artistic process. While Black might have meant to point 
out a hypocrisy or contradiction, if we recall the overlapping compositional 
modes of everyone being an artist, this no longer appears as an antinomy but 
rather a shifting back and forth between different compositional modes. 
While Stewart Home has argued repeatedly that the importance of the Art 
Strike lies not in its feasibility but rather in the ability to expand the terrain of 
class struggle, Black objects to this on the grounds that most artistic workers 
operate as independent contractors and therefore strikes do not make sense 
for them. While this is indeed a concern, it is also very much the condition 
encountered by forms of labor in a precarious post-Fordist economy. The Art 
Strike moves from being a proposal for social action by artists to a form of 
social action potentially of use to all who find their creativity and imagination 
exploited within existing productive networks. 
But ask the skeptics: how we can enact this form of strike? And, as 
comrades and allies inquire, how can this subsumption of creativity and 
imagination and creativity by capital be undone? That is precisely the 
problem, for as artistic and cultural production become more ubiquitous and 
spread throughout the social field, they are rendered all the more apparently 
imperceptible. The avant-garde focus on shaping relationality (for instance in 
Beuys’ notion of social sculpture), or in creative recombination and 
detournément, exists all around us flowing through the net economy. Relational 
aesthetics recapitulates avant-garde ideas and practices into a capital-friendly, 
service economy aesthetics. This does not mean that they are useless or that 
they should be discarded. Rather, by teasing out the compositional modes 
contained within them they can be considered and reworked. How can we 
struggle around or organize diffuse forms of cultural and artistic labor? This 
is precisely the kind of question explored by groups such as the 
Carrotworkers’ Collective, a group from London who are formulating ways 
to organize around labor involved in unpaid forms of cultural production, 




In 1953, Guy Debord painted on the wall of the Rue de Seine the slogan 
‘Ne travaillez jamais’, or ‘Never work’. The history of the avant-garde is filled 
with calls to ‘never artwork’, but the dissolution of the artistic object and 
insurgent energies of labor refusal have become rendered into the workings 
of semiocapitalism and the metropolitan factory. To renew and rebuild a 
politics and form of social movement adequate to the current composition 
does not start from romanticizing the potentiality of becoming creative 
through artistic production or working from the creative production that 
already is, but rather by working in the nexus between the two. In other 
words, to start from how the refusal of work is re-infused into work, and by 
understanding that imposition and rendering, and struggling within, against 
and through it. 
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Economists Are Wrong! 
The Warsaw Manifesto 2011 
Freee Art Collective 
 
Freee produces manifestos and holds group readings of manifestos with the 
aim of generating discussion. Participants are requested to read the given text 
and make their own minds up about what they believe. When present at the 
group reading, the participants only read out the words of the manifesto they 
agree with. The reading then becomes a collective process in which 
individuals publicly agree, as well as disagree, and declare their commitment 
to Freee’s manifesto. While the use of a specific text by Freee is a given, the 
text itself can be used and reworked by those who read it to formulate their 
own opinions, just in the same way Freee has reworked it from the original. 
Freee acknowledges that ideas are developed collectively through the 
exchange of opinion. In this way, Freee offers a text that they produced but 
one that then becomes the basis for further critical thinking. 
The content of Freee’s manifestos are an explicit call for the 
transformation of art and society and Freee readily takes and uses existing 
historical manifestos, speeches and revolutionary documents, such as The 
Manifesto for a New Public (2012) based on Vladimir Tatlin’s The Initiative 
Individual in the Creativity of the Collective (1919), the UNOVIS, Program for the 
Academy at Vitebsk (1920) and the Freee Art Collective Manifesto for a Counter-
Hegemonic Art, based on the Communist Manifesto by Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels (1848).  
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Economists are Wrong  
Is art an economic activity? Should art be independent of economic pressures? 
Is the value of art to be determined separately from its value as a commodity? 
Can we apply the Marxist labour theory of value to art? To consider the 
question of value in art from a Marxist perspective is, on the face of it, to 
invoke two kinds of philistinism. Marx tells us that value is twofold, with use-
value and exchange-value forming a contradictory unity of value. There is no 
third kind of value. So, if art is supposed to be useless and priceless, how can a 
Marxist engage seriously with art with only use-value and exchange-value as 
tools? 
Art and Labour 
When an economist says a ‘work of art often arrives on the market because of 
one of the famous ‘three D’s’ (divorce, death, or debt)’, it is clear that cultural 
economics places its emphasis on consumption and the secondary market. 
From a Marxist point of view, it is utterly absurd for a product to ‘arrive’ on 
the market without being produced. Even if we could press the economist to 
start an economic analysis of art with its arrival for sale on the primary 
market, we would have arrived too late. No Marxist could knowingly 
subscribe to such a belated economic analysis. Artworks themselves cannot 
be a given, as it is for mainstream economics, but must be identified as the 
object of economic analysis. 
Errors are made by not knowing what precisely Marx’s labour theory of 
value sets out to explain. Andrew Kliman tells us, ‘Marx’s value theory […] 
pertains exclusively to commodity production, that is, to cases in which 
goods and services are ‘produced for the purpose of being exchanged’, or 
equivalently, produced as commodities’. This is important for a Marxist 
economic analysis of art because, as he goes on to say, ‘if the products have 
been produced for a different purpose, that of satisfying the producers’ and 
others’ needs and wants, they have not been produced as commodities’. Kliman 
explains:  
a key reason for distinguishing between commodity production and non-
commodity production is that prices or rates of exchange are determined 
differently in the two cases. When things are not produced as commodities, 
the  rates at which they exchange may depend exclusively upon the demand 
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for  them, or upon normative considerations, or […] upon customary rules. 
It is  only when products are produced for the purpose of being exchanged 
that their  costs of production become significant determinants of their 
prices. 
Not all production is commodity production. Not all production is 
production for financial exchange. Not all production is determined by supply 
and demand. Economics is not the best method of examining non-economic 
production. Economists give artists bad advice. 
If artists increase and decrease production according to demand and alter 
the production of their work according to market preferences (e.g. halting 
production of this version of their work and expanding production of that 
version of their work), they must be in the business of producing 
commodities. At the same time, of course, we must insist that if artists do not 
increase and decrease production according to demand and do not alter the 
production of their work according to the preferences of the market, then 
they are demonstrably not in the business of producing commodities. If art is 
produced as a commodity, that is to say produced for the purpose of being 
exchanged, then it is the kind of product that Marxist economics explains. If 
art is not produced as a commodity, but rather to satisfy aesthetic and cultural 
needs and wants, then it is not. There is no shortcut to this kind of economic 
examination, no general rule, no standard economics of art in the age of 
consumerism, or the changing economic status of the artwork in the society 
of the spectacle. We can look at art’s apparent commodification only by 
asking on a case by case basis whether, as Kliman puts it, ‘their costs of 
production become significant determinants of their prices.’ 
Mainstream economists will argue that the labour theory of value is 
mistaken. This is partly based on the fact that mainstream economists are not 
interested in the source of value at all (they have no alternative explanation to 
the Marxist argument). It is also partly based on the fact that mainstream 
economics takes for granted the key elements of capitalism (supply and 
demand, prices, profit, wages, etc.), whereas Marxism calls all these into 
question. Marxism shows us the limits of economic thought and the limits of 
a social system based on market forces. Marx was right. Capitalism inexorably 
leads to crisis. Economists tell us, on the contrary, that supply and demand is 
a self-correcting mechanism. 
 
Freee Art Collective 
 240 
Economists are fucking wrong! 
Following the labour theory of value, we would expect to determine whether 
art is produced as a commodity from an analysis of artistic production, not by 
examining the behaviour of its consumers or its systems of distribution and 
display. If we find that art production does not correspond to the model of 
commodity production, then no matter how art is subsequently brought into 
the circulation systems of capitalism, art is not converted into a commodity in its 
consumption. The labour theory of value proceeds from the value of labour, so 
we need to ask whether the price of artworks are determined by the value of 
the labour in their production. 
The labour theory of value, which explains how value is produced within 
capitalism, states that labour is the source of value. This value is then broken 
down into three types: the transfer of value, absolute surplus value and 
relative surplus value. Machines, for instance, transfer their value to the 
product; labour-power produces absolute surplus value, that is to say, value 
on top of the wages paid for it. Relative surplus value is produced by the 
division of labour, automation and so forth, which through increases in 
productivity and efficiency do not produce value in itself but increases the 
proportion of surplus-labour in relation to wages. 
We can test the question of the price of artworks as determined or not by 
the cost of labour in production by observing the means of production. In 
capitalist commodity production, capitalists increase absolute surplus-labour 
(and thereby surplus value) by attempting to extend the working day, the 
working week, the numbers of days worked in the year, and the number of 
years worked in a worker’s life. Second, capitalists increase relative surplus 
value through the use of technology and supervision, which play an effective 
part in driving down labour costs through the division of labour, deskilling 
and increasing productivity. 
If the price of artwork is set by the labour that goes into it, then we would 
expect that the prices of artworks would vary according to the average labour 
that goes into producing them. When the price of an artist’s work goes up, 
this is not because the labour producing it has gone up, that the assistants 
have managed to have their wages increased or their hours reduced. Also, 
when the price of an artist’s work drops, this is not due to the efficiencies of 
competitors in the market who have managed to lower their production 
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costs. No, the prices of artworks does not fluctuate according to the cost of 
labour, technological efficiencies, or increases in productivity. Art prices are 
not determined by ‘socially necessary labour-time’. Mainstream economists 
might argue that art’s high prices disprove the Marxist labour theory of value, 
but what is shown here is that art is typically not produced as a commodity 
governed by supply and demand. 
Of course, assistants are wage-labourers. But this, in itself, is not proof 
that artists generate surplus value from them. If assistants do not produce 
surplus value then they are to be regarded as luxuries, like domestic servants 
in the nineteenth century. Marx derived the distinction between productive 
and unproductive labour from Adam Smith. Smith’s definition of 
unproductive labour still stands today: labour not exchanged with capital but directly 
exchanged with revenue. There is no such thing as productive or unproductive 
labour in itself. The difference is between labour that produces profits and 
labour that consumes revenue. In the 19th century, this distinction was clearly 
illustrated with the contrasting ways in which the capitalist paid two kinds of 
wages: one to the workers in a business enterprise and the other to domestic 
servants in their homes. The former was productive because it produced 
surplus -labour and the latter unproductive because it used up revenue. 
Another, clearer, way of understanding the distinction between productive 
and unproductive labour is to examine whether the capitalist or the labourer 
owns that labour. 
If we retain our focus on artistic labour, rather than its products, the test 
of Smith’s definition of unproductive labour provides clear results. Is artistic 
labour exchanged with capital or directly exchanged with revenue? Since 
artists are not wage-labourers employed by capitalists, but own their means of 
production as well as the products that they produce, we are forced to 
conclude that artistic labour is unproductive labour even if certain capitalists, such 
as gallerists, dealers and, later in the process, investors, earn a profit from 
trade in the products of artistic labour. 
Normally, unproductive labour does not produce products that are luxury 
goods; normally the unproductive labour is the luxury good itself. Art isn’t 
usually unproductive labour that is not a luxury in itself but produces luxuries 
without first producing commodities. Studio assistants are wage-labourers, 
but if they are unproductive labourers, like domestic servants, then they do 
not produce surplus value. 
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Yet, if the value of labour does not determine the price of artworks, what 
does? The variations of price of an artwork are not due to underpaying or 
overpaying in relation to the actual value, nor is it due to an increase or 
decrease in the average cost of the means of production. A collector does not 
pay less than the value of a work by a young artist only to realise its true value 
once they become a mature artist. Both the relatively cheap price and the 
relatively expensive price are the true value of the work at two different 
points in time. Art appreciates. However, while investments normally 
appreciate because a firm for which one owns shares is profitable, or is 
perceived to be so – that is to say, by drawing on or anticipating the 
production of surplus value in production – this is not the case in the 
appreciation of artworks. The relative cheapness of a work by a lesser known 
artist or ‘early work’ is based on the risk that the artist will never develop a 
significant career; the relative expensiveness of the same work later on is 
based on the subsequent rarity of ‘early work’ and the price of the mature 
work, which retrospectively sets the pace for prices of earlier works. Just as 
skilled workers are paid more than unskilled workers because this kind of 
labour costs more to reproduce, the cost of reproducing a successful, mature, 
reputable, established artist with hundreds of important exhibitions and a 
bibliography to match is expressed in the price of their works. 
However, this explanation, which can be found partly in Diederichsen, 
presents an immediate difficulty, which Diederichsen misses. The reputation 
of an artist is not a quality that is contained in their labour, is not produced by 
them, and is not under their control. The reputation of an artist is ascribed to 
their work by others. So, if we are to explain the high prices of artworks in 
terms of the reproduction of labour-power that produces them, we need to 
consider the labour-power of those who contribute to the value of the work’s 
reputation, namely art critics, theorists, curators and art historians. 
Formal and Real Subsumption 
How might we test, from a Marxist point of view, the common complaint 
that art has been incorporated into capitalism? 
Marx’s distinction between formal and real subsumption is part of his 
explanation of the incorporation and transformation of particular spheres of 
production by the capitalist mode of production. We must remind ourselves 
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that Marx did not theorise the subsumption of commodities. For Marx, the 
incorporation and transformation of spheres of production occurs with the 
formal and real subsumption of labour. 
The formal subsumption of labour takes place when the capitalist takes 
financial control of production – owning the means of production, paying 
wages for labour-power, extracting surplus labour and surplus value. Before 
production a market relation is established between the capitalist as a 
purchaser of labour and the worker as a seller of labour, and within 
production these same individuals are put in a conflictual relation with each 
other in which the capitalist struggles against the workers to extend the 
working day, increase productivity and so forth, while the workers struggle 
against the capitalist to reduce the working day, improve working conditions 
and so on. 
The real subsumption of labour goes further than this, establishing a 
capitalist mode of production with the division of labour, the employment of 
machinery, the centralisation and intensification of production on a large-scale 
and the transformation of the production process into a conscious 
application of science and technology. In short, everything that is implied 
with the idea of industrialisation. Formal subsumption is presupposed by the 
real subsumption of labour, but only the latter can be described in terms of 
what Marx calls the continual revolution of the means of production and 
relations of production in capitalism. 
In order to determine whether artistic labour has been subsumed, we need 
to ask ourselves, therefore, two questions. First, whether artistic labour has 
been converted into wage-labour, and second, whether the production of art 
has been transformed by the processes of industrialisation. The producers of 
art still own their means of production. Unlike in the capitalist mode of 
production, the product of the production of art is invariably owned by its 
producer. Artists have not been converted into wage-labourers, employed by 
a capitalist. Gallerists have nothing to gain from extending the working day of 
artists and technological developments are not implemented to increase 
productivity. The gallerist does not establish a relationship with the artist 
along the lines of the capitalist-worker relationship. There is no labour market 
separate from the market for artworks produced by artistic labour. Dealers do 
not employ artists. In addition, since no gallerist takes ownership of the 
means of production for art or engage individual artists to operate those 
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means of production, consequently the gallerist, unlike the capitalist, does not 
own the product. The gallerist enters the marketplace of art with capital and 
leaves the marketplace with profit, but they do this without formally 
subsuming artistic labour under capital, but by converting commodity-capital 
(artworks) into money-capital. This is why there can be no real subsumption 
of art. 
Wake up to the fact: the subsumption of labour can only take place with 
productive labour, i.e. with labour that is capable of producing surplus value 
directly for the capitalist. 
The Mainstream Economics of Art 
Hans Abbing proposes that art is economically exceptional because it is 
‘sacred’. Abbing says talking about money in relation to art is ‘taboo’: ‘profit 
motives are not absent, they are merely veiled, and publicly the economic 
aspect of art is denied’. The reference to taboo is a deliberate strategy to 
associate the uneconomic in art with irrationality. When he recounts the 
values of the art community, he frames them in terms of ‘myth’, ‘taboo’, 
‘ritual’ and ‘the sacred’. He is convinced of the rationality of the economic, 
while subscribing to the idea that the arts promote an alternative ‘value 
system’, ‘the gift sphere’ or ‘the gift economy’, an idea that he derives from 
the abstruse anthropological ideas of Lewis Hyde. The concept of the ‘gift 
economy’ allows Abbing to register these so-called irrational values without 
them coming into conflict with economics and economic value. In fact, this 
apparent irrationality is a cover for economics. In art, he says, ‘anti-market 
behaviour can be profitable’. Economic value trumps the values of art every 
time. This is the precise opposite of the Marxist critique of political economy. 
From a Marxist point of view (i.e. the critique of political economy), art’s 
antagonism to economics is not a ‘taboo’ but a clear-headed defence of art’s 
value from its dangerous liaison with sales, markets and business. Abbing’s 
economics of art alerts us to the controversial encounter between the values 
of art and economic value, but it does not analyse this antagonism as an 
instance of the abiding contradictions of capitalism itself. 
Mainstream economics has been developing what it calls Cultural 
Economics for several decades. From 1966 onwards, with Baumol and 
Bowen’s pioneering work on the ‘economic dilemma’ of the performing arts, 
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mainstream economists have increasingly come to think of art as an almost 
standard economic sector. 
If you insist that art is an economic activity like any other, then tell us: is 
the artist part of the proletariat, producing value through labour, or is the 
artist the capitalist or entrepreneur who makes artworks specifically for sale, 
advancing capital to pay the wages of assistants from which the artist makes 
profit? 
The debates on the funding of the arts from the late 1960s through to the 
1980s, between Baumol and Bowen, Richard Musgrave, Alan Peacock, 
William Grampp, Gary Becker, David Throsby and others, has followed a 
clear pattern in which the case for the public funding for the arts was 
increasingly shot down by the case against subsidies. We are now feeling the 
full force of this theoretical shift in the cuts to the arts. In this period, 
arguments have been presented for art to be regarded as a Veblen good, a 
luxury good, a public good, a merit good and an information good, among 
others. The debate has narrowed severely in recent years, resulting in the 
apparent victory of a neoliberal agenda for the arts. ‘Despite the special 
position that art occupies in the fabric and culture of societies,’ Clare 
MacAndrew says,  
the reality is that art is produced, bought, and sold by individuals and 
institutions working within an economic framework inescapable from material 
and market constraints. The economic case is clear: the market for works of 
art functions at least as well as many others (albeit imperfectly and with 
certain special features), as it allows market transactions by voluntary consent, 
in which buyers and sellers mutually benefit. 
It is interesting to note that economists do not agree what kind of good art is. 
The question of whether art is a public good keeps resurfacing despite 
neoliberal economists’ best efforts. The persistence of the question has sound 
economic grounds. Technically speaking, a public good is a good that is non-
rival and non-excludable, i.e. that the consumption of it by one person does not 
prevent others from consuming it and that nobody can be excluded from 
consuming it. This seems to fit certain patterns of ‘consuming’ artworks 
(viewing them in galleries, museums, reading about them in books and 
magazines in libraries, online etc.) but does not adequately account for 
artworks ‘consumed’ as singular or unique objects by collectors and investors. 
In some respects, artworks also exhibit the characteristics of information goods, 
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and in other respects they exhibit the characteristics of a Veblen good. On the 
other end of the scale, Richard Musgrave includes art among his list of merit 
goods – i.e. products that individuals ought to have regardless of their ability to 
pay for them. As such, for most of us, artworks are distributed and displayed 
as public goods, not commodities. 
It is rare – perhaps unique to art – for a product to have all these 
economic properties. Art does not belong to one category of good alone. 
Even the most expensive artwork exists within several distinct economic 
categories. This means that it is impossible to prevent art from spilling out of 
these economic categories, even when it seems to be exemplary of that 
category. This is the case in the relationship between art and luxury goods. 
Art and the Economics of Luxury Goods 
In mainstream economics, a luxury good is a good for which demand increases 
more than proportionally as income rises. What this refers to is the fact that even if 
the wealthy buy more expensive and higher quality bread, cheese and other 
necessities, they do not increase their consumption of bread and cheese 
proportionally to their relative wealth; their consumption of sports cars and 
designer clothing increases at a greater rate, becoming an increasingly large 
proportion of their expenditure. The formula seems sound enough, but it 
leaves out two entire branches of commodities that are not luxuries but 
which increase more than proportionally as income rises: firstly financial 
goods (investments, bonds, shares, etc.), and secondly expenditure on labour 
and machinery by the owners of firms, which also increases 
disproportionately to income. Nevertheless, the formula is at least good 
enough to account for certain consumption practices in relation to artwork. 
Roman Kraeussl makes the standard case: ‘Art is a luxury good. If aggregate 
levels of wealth are high, the demand for art may also be expected to be high, 
as investors may spend part of this excess of wealth in the arts. Changes in 
income are therefore likely to have a significant effect on the demand for art 
and the prices paid for works of art.’ 
The art market is indeed a vast luxury trade. But art is not a standard 
luxury in terms of its production. Unlike haute cuisine, haute couture or fine and 
rare wines, there need be no high quality within the product. At $15 million, 
Damien Hirst’s stuffed shark is one of the most expensive artworks by a 
Economists Are Wrong! 
  247 
living artist, but it is technically inferior to comparably preserved animals. 
One could purchase a better stuffed shark at a fraction of the price of Hirst’s. 
Artworks do not have to exhibit any qualities of the luxury trade in their raw 
materials, skills, technology, or any other intrinsic quality. 
Despite the conspicuousness of art’s luxury trade, artworks do not 
conform in many respects to the conventional economic pattern of 
consumption of a luxury good. Luxury goods such as sports cars are often 
purchased, as Thorstein Veblen observed, in part to exhibit them. However, 
the display aspect of luxury goods means showing off goods that are not 
normally consumed in their display. Nonetheless, when a non-owner of an 
artwork looks at it, she consumes it without purchasing it. This is why 
artwork is naturally seen as a public good as well as a luxury good. Sports cars 
and jewellery are not public goods or merit goods in addition to being luxury 
goods. Artwork, on the other hand, even if and when it is a luxury good is 
often (and, in principle, always!) a public good and a merit good. Even artwork 
that is a commodity, even artwork that is a luxury good, is never merely a 
commodity, is never merely a luxury. 
Economists are wrong. Artwork is not a commodity and art is not an 
economic activity. Art hates capitalism even if capitalism loves art. Capitalism 
loves art because its values are not determined by supply and demand. The 
reason economists think that art is sacred or artists are ‘perverse’ is simply 
due to the fact that artwork is not produced as a commodity for economic 
exchange. If all production followed the logic of artistic production, 
capitalism would be history and economists would be out of a job! 
Homo Economicus is a shit artist, a blind art critic, a moronic art theorist, a 
witless art historian and a cynical curator. Homo Economicus is also a dumb 
collector, a worthless gallerist, and an unreliable dealer. Let’s kick the 
marketplace out of art. And kick the economist up the arse. Are there any 
economists in the room? 
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Afterword: 
Do We Need a Lab? Capture, Exploitation and 
Resistance in Contemporary Creative 
Communities 
Agnieszka Kurant, Jan Sowa and Krystian Szadkowski 
 
The surplus labour of the mass has ceased to be the condition for the 
development of general wealth, just as the non-labour of the few, for the 
development of the general powers of the human head. With that, production 
based on exchange value breaks down, and the direct, material production 
process is stripped of the form of penury and antithesis. The free 
development of individualities, and hence not the reduction of necessary 
labour time so as to posit surplus labour, but rather the general reduction of 
the necessary labour of society to a minimum, which then corresponds to the 
artistic, scientific etc. development of the individuals in the time set free, and 
with the means created, for all of them. 
Karl Marx (1973: 705-706, emphases in original) 
Art and the Capture of Surplus Value in the Social Factory 
There is a politically interesting idea in the philosophy of art put forward by 
Jacques Rancière in his Politics of Aesthetics (2004). Going back to Schiller’s 
vision of the ‘aesthetic education of man’ combined with The Oldest Systematic 
Program of German Idealism (Behler, 2003: 161-163) and filtered through 20th 
century vanguard movements, Rancière attempts to portray artistic creation 
as a manifestation of a characteristic specific to the human species, namely 
the fact that a human being, as opposed to the rest of nature – to put it in an 
early Marxist perspective – creates its own world (Marx, 1988). Obviously, 
Marx regarded not art but the labour process as a sort of synecdoche or a 
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symptom revealing this fact, one that is being deeply mystified by capitalist 
practice and ideology. However, Rancière believes that ‘art anticipates work’ 
in this respect (2004: 44), thus manifesting the species-character of humanity 
in a sort of purer and stronger way. 
No doubt there is some truth to this and Rancière’s proposition offers 
insight into the social and political dimension of artistic production. For 
instance, it makes it easier to understand why contemporary artwork reaches 
such exorbitant prices. As Diedrich Diederichsen advocates, when we buy art, 
we are buying something more than just the artwork itself. He argues that we 
buy petrified time filled with an adventurous and free life (hence the 
importance of all sorts of myths surrounding a bohemian lifestyle), as 
opposed to our dull and predictable bourgeois existence. In the Rancièrian 
perspective, one might say that in buying art, we are buying the petrified 
essence of humanity – its creativity. 
On the other hand, there’s a caveat as well. One has to take into 
consideration the fact that art does not function in an ideal, free, non-
alienated, post-revolutionary society, but in a social reality deeply penetrated 
by capitalist relations and limitations. Whatever art could be in its essence, its 
social function remains marked by theses relations and limitations. While 
Rancière’s insight could very well describe some sort of ideal type, reality 
confronts us with a somewhat different and much more sinister process. Art 
seems to reveal not only the sublime essence of humanity, but also the very 
treacherous and negative character of contemporary capitalism, namely its 
parasitic nature. Artistic creativity and value production in art undergo a 
mystification similar to appropriation of value in the field of immaterial and 
biopolitcal production. It operates via one of the major common myths 
surrounding art: the idea of creativity as an individual process. This myth is 
still rooted quite deeply in art theory, where the concept of an artist-author as 
a solitary genius taking inspiration from their own personality, life and 
intellect is still present. A Joy Forever tries to question that point of view. We 
believe that the concept of ‘Author’ is, to an important extent, a construct 
created to appropriate the labour of the multitude in order to proclaim it as 
individual artwork. Mechanisms in the art market and cultural industries lead 
to the exploitation of the creative general intellect. They are based on the 
fetishisation and speculation not only of cultural/artistic objects, but also 
seemingly intangible processes and ideas. We believe that the very figure of an 
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author represents a mechanism of capture devised to appropriate value 
produced in a dispersed and networked creative process, and thus to make it 
suitable for spectacular gallery presentations and for trading on the art 
market, since both require a strong identity to be able to market or even 
sustain their respective endeavours. 
There’s a perfect illustration of these processes in artwork pertaining to 
the field of relational aesthetics. Artists creating relational art work with and 
through social relations 1. What is striking is that participants remain mostly 
anonymous and they rarely accumulate any sort of value as a result of taking 
part in the project. The artist does. She signs the entire project with her name, 
gets paid for doing it, adds it to her résumé and, more often than not, 
carefully documents her work in order to be able to talk about it during 
conferences, presentations and gallery lectures. The very fact of having a 
distinguished and renowned identity – as opposed to that of a mere 
participant – allows for an accumulation of surplus value on the side of the 
artist. So, yes, everybody is an artist, as Beuys famously claimed, but an artist 
in the ‘social gallery’, where his or her creativity is being exploited and 
captured just like our invisible work is in the ‘social factory’ described by 
Mario Tronti several decades ago.  
Immaterial Laboratory of Biopolitcal Production 
So what to do with art? Does it have any emancipatory or even critical 
potential? In many circles, art is still conceived as a social laboratory, where 
innovative ways for organising labour, socialising both for labour and through 
labour, as well as different types of production, speculation, and generation, 
accumulation and appropriation of value are continually tested. Art could also 
be perceived as a field with a potential for the creation of an alternative logic 
that could inspire the development of alternative economies. Nevertheless, 
artistic experiments are, like many other things and processes, immediately 
appropriated and commoditised by creative industries and internal 
mechanisms in the field of art. Despite this obvious fact, many artists 
                                                
1  As Nicolas Bourriaud claims, having coined the very term ‘relation art’. One can 
name figures such as Rirkrit Tiravanija, Douglas Gordon, Pierre Huyghe, Liam 
Gillick or Philippe Parreno. In the Polish context, one could point to Joanna 
Rajkowska, Paweł Althamer or Roman Dziadkiewicz. 
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continuously try to play a sort of ‘minority game’ with creative industries and 
the rest of the art world. This is surely a way of guaranteeing their own 
autonomy within the field of cultural production, but it remains unclear 
whether it could also prove useful in any social struggle undertaken outside of 
this field. 
However, we are aware that there is no ideal type of laboratory, where 
contemporary cognitive capitalism’s experiments with the organisation of 
labour, valorisation and mechanisms of capture are rooted. There is no single 
social, cultural or economic sector (which are thoroughly intermingled in the 
era of the social factory and the real subsumption of life itself under capital) 
that plays a leading role in the development of so called ‘knowledge-based’ 
capitalism, just as there is no single sector that is able to fuel its growth and 
seize hegemony over the others. However, what seems interesting, and what 
we have been trying to address in the framework of the Free/Slow University 
of Warsaw, is an enquiry into how a combination of various sectors of 
cognitive labour (like art and the academic world) reveals some sort of 
general tendency in capitalist development. While no single field of 
immaterial/biopolitical production provides enough data and examples to 
grasp the contemporary evolution of capitalist economy, all – or at least most 
of them considered in their similarities, dissimilarities and mutual 
relationships can tell us something about what is currently happening in the 
capitalist social factory. 
Some scholars like Yann Moulier-Boutang, for example, claim that 
cognitive capitalism’s labour paradigm seeks its models not only in the world 
of art, but also in the realm of academia. Industrial capitalism favoured libido 
sentiendi – that is, a desire to feel, to enjoy material goods – and libido dominandi 
- i.e. the desire to dominate – as modes of its agents’ operations. In cognitive 
capitalism, libido sciendi – the passion for learning and the taste for the game of 
knowledge, so important in science and art – plays the most significant role in 
the creative process (Moulier-Boutang, 2011: 75-78). 
Indeed, parallel to the abovementioned changes in the contemporary art 
world, some crucial shifts have occurred in other sectors of immaterial 
production, for example in higher education and research. As Carlo 
Vercellone has clearly stated, the struggles of the 1960s and 1970s marked the 
rise of the development of cognitive capitalism, a system of accumulation 
where the productive value of creative and knowledge-based activities gain 
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the dominant character, and the processes of valorisation of capital are 
directly related to the control of knowledge, affects and creative acts, and 
their transformation into commodities (Vercellone, 2009: 119). Demands for 
access to universities, democratisation of education, as well as mass refusal of 
the dull, Fordist monotony of factory work and modes of discipline and 
control related to it, spread across all Western countries. It gave birth to what 
Vercellone calls ‘mass intellectuality’. This explosion and burst of the creative 
powers of the working-classes entering higher education systems provoked a 
response in the development of collective labours’ capacities, i.e. the 
deployment of neoliberal regulation policies, a model of control that, among 
others, entails processes of precarisation: the multiplication of precarious 
forms of work (fixed term contract, interim, apprenticeship, subsidised 
employment, non-voluntary part-time labour, etc.), and a break from standard 
Fordist full-time and stable employment – both inside academia and in the 
outside world. 
According to Slaughter and Rhoades, authors of Academic Capitalism and the 
New Economy (2004), these practices include, apart from a process of 
precarisation of academic work, a strong emphasis on intellectual property 
rights, patent rights, the introduction of managerialism as a form of control 
over production, and the application and imposition of accountability and 
effectiveness measurements (a process well described in this volume by 
Isabelle Bruno in her article about the ubiquitous practice of benchmarking). 
The abovementioned mechanisms do not exhaust capital’s instruments of 
control deployed in the higher education sphere, indeed all of them are, to 
some extent, implemented in other sectors (art included). The crucial link 
seems to be, again, the figure of the author and its persistence across a wide 
range of creative practices. Vanguard visual artists may not have a lot in 
common with Hollywood movie stars and academic publishers, but they do 
share one crucial characteristic: a fetishist admiration of signing ‘their’ work 
with their name. Zeal in defending copyright seems to be as strong among 
academics as it is among audio-visual producers. After all, it was not the 
Record Industry Association of America, but a coalition of academic 
publishers from Europe that brought down the (in)famous e-book sharing 
platform Library.nu on the grounds of copyright infringement. 
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Art and Financial Capitalism 
As stated in the introduction by Michał Kozłowski and Kuba Szreder, this 
book aims to analyse and deconstruct creativity in more ways than one. 
However, if there is a single topic to sum up and point to as the most 
inspiring from a socio-political point of view, it would in our opinion be the 
relationship between contemporary artistic production and the most 
advanced forms of the capitalist economy. The above mentioned critique of 
the notion of authorship can very well be transposed to areas of a quite 
materialist Marxist critique. Figures such as artists or academic publishers, 
among many others, are widely becoming capital’s mechanisms of capture 
and transformation of the potentia of living creativity into dead creativity, its 
main source of rent. Mechanisms of capturing and accumulating value very 
similar to the ones diagnosed in the relational art field are operating in 
technologically advanced branches of capitalist production like the internet or 
the academic publishing market. The way Google or Facebook capitalise on 
the dispersed and networked activity of the multitude of its users, or how 
huge academic publishing corporations enclose work of scientists and 
scholars, perfectly corresponds to the practices of relational artists. In both 
cases, the author/owner doesn’t so much produce the final outcome and 
profits but rather captures the value produced by others and turns it into a 
sort of rent derived from the author/owner’s particular position within the 
network of cooperation. This is only the first of many striking similarities. 
The contemporary process of capitalisation is accompanied by the erosion 
and deregulation of fixed roles and activities. The freer the worker, the more 
s/he puts herself to work. In response to these processes, the contemporary 
artist elaborates a perverse series of equivalences: between production time 
and social time, between discourse and the material conditions of display, 
between communicative activity and the production of commodities, etc. 
Artistic praxis starts producing a wider discourse, reaching beyond images 
and objects towards other forms such as writing and socialising. 
Artistic and cultural modes of production (along with scientific ones) are 
no longer merely supplementary fields of capitalistic social infrastructure: they 
become central sectors of production to which other fields of social labour 
remain subordinated in economical as well as symbolic terms. This theme is 
broached in this volume by several authors. In her article, Marina Vishmidt 
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talks about ‘speculation as a mode of production’ highlighted in the art world. 
Art and money as social mediations of labour both depend on the negation of 
the social form of concrete labour through the modality of ‘speculation’ – 
money grows through speculation understood as claims on future value, 
while art is valued through speculative markets and has been seen as a 
process of speculative thought since the beginning of Conceptual Art. 
Whereas speculative thought refers mainly to art and aesthetics, particularly in 
their connection to re-imagining social relations, ‘financial speculation’ can be 
more broadly defined as the self-expanding, or self-valorising, dynamic of 
capital as such, highlighted in value-form analysis – i.e. speculation as social 
form. The speculation of art (or, the speculation that is art), measures and 
dramatises its speculative capabilities through its relation to labour, be it a 
relation of proximity or negation. In this sense 
art cannot be considered in relation to politics without first being considered 
in relation to labour – and this is even more the case when artistic subjectivity 
and modes of production become a supplement to the restructuring of the 
labour-capital relation away from the wage and its equivalences to the 
precarious and “infinite” demands of creativity. Art as a model of 
emancipated labour figures both unalienated activity which is not measured in 
money, and the infinite unwaged exploitation that capital is imposing on all of 
us in the drive to find new sources of accumulation. (Vishmidt, this volume) 
Similar issues are raised in this book by Luc Boltanski and Neil Cummings 
who both emphasise the parallel development of contemporary art and 
financial capitalism. Cummings even points to a remarkable coincidence: the 
first major public auction of contemporary art happened almost at the same 
time as the (in)famous abandonment of the gold standard in the US, a move 
regarded by some as the inaugural moment of financialisation in the world 
economy. It should come as no surprise that the art market is doing 
exceptionally well in these times of contemporary financial turbulence. Luc 
Boltanski, referring to Lucien Karpik’s idea of the ‘economy of singularity’, 
examines an unexpected link between artistic creation and market 
speculation: nowadays the most elaborate investment formulas are singular 
creations of mathematical genius offered to rich investors on individual terms 
and tailored to their singular demands – exactly like portraits of the rich 
painted by artists centuries ago. Boltanski argues that by submitting culture to 
its rule, capital has not destroyed singularity (as was feared by such theorists 
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as Walter Benjamin and other philosophers from the Frankfurt School), but 
rather learnt to deal with it and adapted itself accordingly. As such it’s 
through contact with art and through the incorporation of the artistic mode 
of production that capitalism has evolved in the last decades. 
We are facing here, again, the same problem of art being a laboratory – 
not for resistance and emancipation, but rather for exploitation and capture. 
And not only of art, but an entire sector of immaterial/biopolitical 
production that represents a dominant tendency in capitalist development. 
Artistic Mode of Revolution? 
At the same time, the artistic condition has become an illusionary refuge for a 
lot of disenchanted members of society. In a recent poll, around twenty-five 
per cent of young German people interviewed by journalists answered the 
question ‘what do you want to do when you’re an adult?’ by stating that they 
wanted to be artists. According to Franco Bifo Berardi, they say they want to 
be artists because they feel that 
being an artist means to escape the future of sadness, to escape the future of 
precariousness as sadness. They are thinking, well, precariousness and sadness 
can become something different, something not so sad, not so precarious, if 
they withdraw their faith, if they withdraw from any expectations of the 
capitalist future. I don’t want to expect anything from the future, so I start my 
future as an artist. (Berardi, 2012: 43) 
Berardi also talks about the general intellect, in its present configuration, as 
fragmented and dispossessed of self-perception and self-consciousness.  
But what does art have to do with social resistance, or moreover, with any 
kind of social and political revolution? To answer such a question, we could 
refer back to 2011 – a threshold of social unrest all over the world. In the 
shadow of the Wall Street occupation of 2011, one of the stages of a very 
important process came to an end: the march of the Indignados reached 
Brussels and those involved conducted a mass demonstration on 15th 
October 2011. A lot has been written on the movements of 2011, but in 
reference to the activities of the Indignados we should first of all keep in 
mind it was a process of massive organisational effort – a process of 
founding, designing and reinventing the frames of autonomous institutions of 
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the common, on a daily basis. The Indignados were thus, first and foremost, a 
collective effort devoted to the invention of new collective forms of life. 
During the last assembly in Brussels there was a discussion concerning the 
potential next steps that should be taken by the marching Indignados that 
ended without any strict conclusions. One of the proposals came from the 
curator of the Berlin Biennale, the well-known Polish artist Artur Żmijewski, 
famous for his artistic experimentations with excluded and traumatised social 
groups. Through his representative, he invited a group of Indignados to visit 
Berlin and become a part of the forthcoming Biennale, granting them full 
infrastructural support and hospitality. In doing so he simply gave the 
impression that he would have liked to become a curator of this social event 
of resistance. In his manifesto, Applied Social Arts, he poses a desperate and 
at the same time very important question: does contemporary art have any 
visible social impact? He proposes that the ‘[i]nstrumentalisation of autonomy 
makes it possible to use art for all sorts of things: as a tool for obtaining and 
disseminating knowledge, as a producer of cognitive procedures relying on 
intuition and the imagination and serving the cause of knowledge and 
political action’ (Żmijewski, 2007). In his view, art must therefore struggle to 
retain its power to act, also politically. Is the artist or curator, external to a 
social movement, who presents him or herself as its patron or supporter, able 
to support the whole process? Is art an open door through which living 
creativity could escape the mechanisms of capture? We don’t really think so. 
The curator is the ultimate figure of creativity’s corruption and contemporary 
art itself can be approached today as a complex apparatus of the 
domestication and capture of resistance, transforming it from a living 
experience into petrified oeuvres. The political failure of the Biennale that 
presented the Indignados movement as a sort of social zoo, reconstructed on 
the Kunstwerke ground level for the bourgeois to watch from the first-floor 
balcony, epitomises the whole failure of an approach that treats social 
movements as if they were artistic creations featured in an art exhibition. This 
is the kind of laboratory we do not need, a laboratory of capture and 
exploitation signed with the names of its curators. However, like other 
sectors in society, contemporary art is also a battlefield where the struggle 
over the control of value is, should and will continuously take place. 
The critique of the political economy of social creativity presented in this 
volume traces multitudinarian paths – as opposed to paths captured by the 
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figure of the author – for surpluses of creativity, as well as for outlining and 
describing the multiple exploitation mechanisms that capital is always forced 
to impose in order to prolong its own existence. Nevertheless, the artistic (or 
biopolitical) mode of revolution is still something that needs to be 
theoretically and practically worked out and elaborated. 
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